Strategic agents in voting games. by Hortala-Vallve, Rafael
Strategic Agents in Voting Games
Rafael Hortala-Vallve 
London School of Economics and Political Science
Dissertation subm itted for the degree 
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
in the Field of Economics
April 2005
UMI Number: U194821
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U194821
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Library
and Eoonowic Science
f
8 3 ^ 5
A bstract
The first part of this Thesis asks whether we can devise voting rules that allow strategic 
voters to express the intensity of their preferences. As opposed to the classical voting 
system (one person - one decision - one vote), we first propose a new voting system where 
agents are endowed with a fixed number of votes that can be distributed freely between a 
predetermined number of issues that have to be approved or dismissed. Its novelty, and 
appeal, relies on allowing voters to express the intensity of their preferences in a simple 
manner. This voting system is optimal in a well-defined sense: in a setting with two 
voters, two issues and uniform independent priors, Qualitative Voting Pareto dominates 
Majority Rule and, moreover, achieves the only ex-ante (incentive compatible) optimal 
allocation. The result also holds true with three voters as long as the valuations towards 
the issues differ sufficiently. Experimental evidence is provided supporting equilibrium 
predictions and showing that Qualitative Voting is better able to replicate the efficient 
outcome than Majority Rule. More generally in a setting with an arbitrary number 
of voters and issues, we show: (1 ) that a mechanism is implementable only if it does 
not undertake interpersonal comparisons of utility; (2 ) the impossibility of implementing 
strategy-proof mechanisms that are sensitive to the voters’ intensities of preferences and 
satisfy the unanimity property.
The second part of the Thesis studies the interaction between politicians’ strategic behav­
iour and voters’ turnout decision: politicians diverge to motivate citizens to vote and they 
adapt their policies to the most sensitive voters —thus less sensitive voters abstain on the 
grounds of perceiving politicians being too similar. Moreover, citizens in central/moderate 
positions abstain. We find support for our predictions using NES data: (1 ) a perceived low 
difference between the Democratic and Republican parties tends to decrease a citizen’s 
probability to vote and (2 ) moderate citizens vote less.
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Voy no se hacia addnde,
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Preface
Voting leads to the aggregation of individual preferences into social preferences. Its analy­
sis is central in Economics and justifies the contribution of economic theory in an area 
that traditionally belongs to Political Science. In addition, economists have attempted 
to envision economic policy decisions not as exogenous decisions but as generated by a 
complex institutional and political process which can be explicitly incorporated in formal 
models developed by economic theorists. Both aspects give rise to the area in which we 
are interested, Political Economics.
This Thesis is precisely concerned about analysing the strategic behaviour of agents in­
volved in voting games. We divide our study in two parts. We first analyse how the 
stra teg ic  in teractions betw een voters limit the possibilities of allowing them to ex­
press the intensity of their preferences when transfers are not permitted. Secondly, we 
elucidate the effect of po litic ians’ s tra teg ic  behaviour on voters’ turnout decision. 
Apart from the obvious common objective of analysing strategic agents in voting games, 
both parts are also related in the sense that citizens are always modelled as heterogeneous 
agents with multidimensional preferences. The multidimensionality allows us to use eco­
nomic theory tools in a setting that lacks monetary transfers but that has inherent gains 
from trade due to the heterogeneity of agents.
In both parts we accompany the theoretical analysis by an empirical one. We believe that 
this should be the way to proceed (when possible) to further emphasise the applicability 
and relevance of our theoretical speculations. In the first part, we run an experiment on 
Qualitative Voting and use its data to highlight how our theoretical predictions should be 
tested in subsequent and more exhaustive experiments. In the second part, we provide 
an empirical validation of our understanding of the relation between political competition 
and electoral participation using data from the United States.
In Chapter 1 we ask whether we can devise voting rules that allow voters to express 
the intensity of their preferences when monetary transfers are forbidden. We propose an
5
6answer in two stages.
First, as opposed to the classical voting system (one person - one decision - one vote), we 
propose a new voting system, Qualitative Voting, where each agent is endowed with a fixed 
number of votes that can be distributed freely between a predetermined number of issues 
that must be approved or dismissed. The novelty, and the appeal, of Qualitative Voting is 
that it allows voters to express the intensity of their preferences in a simple manner. We 
demonstrate that this voting system is optimal in a well-defined sense: in a setting with 
two voters, two issues and preference intensities uniformly and independently distributed 
across possible values, Qualitative Voting Pareto dominates Majority Rule and, moreover, 
achieves the only ex-ante incentive compatible optimal allocation. The result holds true 
whenever we introduce a third player as long as the possible preference intensities differ 
sufficiently.
Second and more generally, in a setting with an arbitrary number of voters and issues, 
we show that a social choice function is implementable only if it does not undertake 
interpersonal comparisons of utility (it should only be contingent on the voters’ relative 
valuations between the issues). Following this characterisation we prove the impossibility 
of implementing strategy-proof mechanisms that are sensitive to the voters’ intensities 
of preferences and that preserve unanimous wills (unanimity implies that any issue is 
approved or dismissed with certainty whenever all voters wish so). We end that Chapter 
by overcoming the impossibility result through dropping the unanimity property. We 
identify an infinite set of social choice functions that are strategy-proof and sensitive to 
the voters’ intensity of preferences.
In Chapter 2 we design an experiment to contrast the theoretical predictions with the 
experimental evidence and to observe how voters behave in those situations where the 
theory remains silent. Ultimately, we want to compare the outcome and welfare achieved 
by our subjects through the use of Qualitative Voting with the ones that would obtain if 
Majority Rule was used.
Subjects are endowed with 30 votes and are matched in groups of two, three or six 
voters and vote over two, three or six, issues. We observe that subjects vote according 
to equilibrium predictions. In general, Qualitative Voting is better able to replicate the 
efficient outcome than Majority Rule (6 8 % vs. 37% of the cases). In terms of welfare the 
gains are not so significant since Majority Rule already does pretty well. Most importantly, 
we construct the basic tools to be used in subsequent works when analysing Qualitative 
Voting and voting strategies in multidimensional settings. For this purpose we build three 
scores that capture (1 ) how close the voting behaviour is from truthfully revealing voters’ 
preferences; (2 ) how close the voting profile is from distributing evenly the voting power
7across issues; and, (3) how close the voting strategy is from concentrating all the voting 
power in the most preferred issue.
Finally, in Chapter 3 we analyse the interaction between electoral competition and voters’ 
decision to vote, as opposed to abstain. When voters weight the benefits of voting against 
the costs, we show that politicians offer differentiated policies to motivate citizens to 
vote and they adapt their policies to the most sensitive voters —thus less sensitive voters 
abstain on the grounds of perceiving politicians as being too similar. In a multidimensional 
policy space setting, this implies that citizens that only care about few issues do not vote. 
In our two-party model, citizens who position themselves relatively to the left or the right 
of the political spectrum vote for the party that is closer to them, while citizens who 
position themselves in the central/moderate positions abstain.
We test two implications of our model using data from the National Electoral Studies for 
1972-2000 and find support for our predictions: (1) a perceived low difference between 
the platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties tends to decrease a citizen’s 
probability to vote and (2) moderate citizens are less likely to vote. These results are 
robust to accounting for socioeconomic, demographic and political individual controls, 
state-level institutional controls, state and year fixed-effects, state-specific time trends 
and to the model specification.
Finally, it has been argued that studies using reported turnout may suffer from an over- 
reporting problem. We prove that false reports do not drive our results.
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Part I
Strategic Voters
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Chapter 1
Q ualitative Voting
“The history of economic institutions shows a great deal of change, facilitating 
economic activities that would have earlier been impossible. No similar devel­
opment and change has occurred in the political system; yet the need for such 
facilitation is undoubtedly equally great” James Coleman (1970)
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 M otivation
Voting is the paradigm of democracy. It reflects the will of taking everyone’s opinion into 
account instead of imposing, by different means, the decision of a particular individual. 
At its root lies the belief that people should be allowed to freely cast their votes and, 
above all, they should be treated equally.1 Consequently, as opposed to many economic 
situations, voting is considered a situation where no side payments are allowed so that 
agents are treated in an ex-ante identical position and wealth effects play no role.
Despite the adequacy of different particular rules to different settings, Majority Rule 
(MR, hereafter) is almost uniquely the rule used. From an economist’s perspective, and 
given that most of our work is built on the diverse behaviour of individuals with different 
marginal propensities to consume, produce, etc., the main concern is that MR does not 
capture the intensity of voters’ preferences. Just as we contemplate the importance of
^ ee , for instance, Locke (1690).
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the willingness to pay in the provision of public goods, we should take into account the 
willingness to influence in a voting situation. An increase in the overall efficiency should 
follow.
The fact that majorities usually impose their will regardless of the intensity of their 
preferences is known in the political science literature as "the problem of intensity". The 
answer to this puzzle has always been founded on an argument of equality: if we were 
to treat differently a very enthusiastic voter from a very apathetic one, equality would 
no longer hold.2 Nevertheless this reasoning is too narrow. In this Chapter we show 
that we can build a very simple voting rule that allows voters to express intensity and 
reach a strictly Pareto superior allocation than the one achieved by MR; moreover, we 
characterise what can be implemented in multidimensional settings with no transfers.
Following Coleman’s quote, we ultimately want to stimulate the current debate around 
the development that should occur in our political institutions to better represent and 
govern our societies. We want to consider voting systems where the concept of decision 
preferred by most members is replaced by decision most preferred by members; we want 
votes to have an embedded quality which is somehow associated to the intensity of the 
voters’ preferences; ultimately, we want to show under which circumstances the strategic 
interactions between voters do not undermine the gains we expect from them expressing 
their willingness to influence.
In a setting with a closed agenda of N  issues that have to be approved or dismissed, we first 
propose a Qualitative Voting rule (QV, hereafter) that allows voters to simultaneously and 
freely distribute a given number of votes among the issues. In this way we are providing 
voters with a broader set of strategies than the classical “one person — one decision — 
one vote” strategy and we are preserving the equality inherent in any voting procedure 
given that all individuals are endowed with the same ex-ante voting power.
Essentially, QV introduces two main improvements with respect to the usual voting rules. 
On the one hand, it answers the classical debate in the political science literature on “the 
problem of intensity” allowing strong minorities to decide over weak majorities. Secondly, 
it allows voters to trade off their voting power, adding more weight to the issues they most 
care about, and unlocks conflict resolution situations.
The latter intuition is best captured by the following situation. Imagine two voters with 
opposing views on two issues but such that the first voter mostly cares about the out­
come on the first issue while the second voter mostly cares about the second issue. QV 
allows each of them to decide on their most preferred issue and hence non-cooperatively
2 See Spitz (1984).
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coordinate on the only Pareto optimal allocation that yields a strictly positive utility to 
both voters (in the sense that each one wins his most preferred issue and loses the least 
preferred one). We can devise many different instances in which such situations occur and 
where side payments may not be possible (or may be forbidden): a divorce settlement, an 
international dispute, a bilateral agreement in arms/pollution reduction, a country having 
the two chambers governed by opposing parties,3 a clash between the management and 
the union of a particular firm, etc . . . 4
The goal of the first part of the present Chapter is not only to compare QV to MR but 
also to assess its optimality. Hence we use a mechanism design approach that allows us 
to characterise the optimal allocations among the implementable ones.
In a setting with two voters, two issues and independent uniform priors on the voters’ 
preferences, Theorem 1.1 tells us that QV reaches the only ex-ante optimal allocation. 
Moreover, Theorem 1.2 establishes that the result holds true whenever we introduce a 
third voter as long as the voters’ valuations towards the issues differ sufficiently. The 
introduction of a third voter yields a departure from the pure conflict resolution situation 
so that we can assess the optimality of allowing minorities to decide over weak majorities. 
Theorem 1.2 tells us that it is ex-ante optimal to decide among divergent issues by means 
of QV as long as the minority’s feeling towards a certain issue is stronger than the sum 
of the majority’s feeling.
We present examples in Subsection 1.3.3 that illustrate the results and shed some light 
on the applicability of QV in the real world.
The dependence of the results on the independent uniform priors is shown to be critical 
in Section 1.3.4. The more skewed the priors are, the more strategically voters react 
and, consequently, the more difficult it is to achieve a truthful revelation of preferences. 
Hence, the strategic interactions between individuals may lead to the non-existence of
3 The US Congress and Senate have repeatedly been in a situation where one chamber had a Republican 
majority and the other a Democratic one. Consequently, many bills have been vetoed by one chamber so 
that decisions have not been easily made. QV could have made the decision process more efficient allowing 
each party to support those bills which its electorate felt more strongly about. Money and Tsebelis (1997) 
claim that the gains we expect from the use of QV may already be observed through the existence of 
committees: “One essential assumption of distributive theories of Congress is that the policy space is 
multidimensional. This is how committee chairs and members extract gains from trade. They give up 
their positions in the less important dimension in order to gain in the more important one, their own 
jurisdiction.”
4 Our setting can be reinterpreted as an extension of the Colonel Blotto Game (two colonels are fighting 
over some regions and have to decide how to divide their forces; the one with larger forces wins the region 
and the winner of the battle is the one with the most won territory) taking into account that now the 
colonel is not indifferent between winning two different regions. Hence the payoff of the game is not only 
contingent on how many regions he has won or lost but precisely on which regions he has won or lost. 
Myerson (1993) refers also to the Colonel Blotto Game when analysing the incentives for candidates to 
create inequalities among voters by making heterogeneous campaign promises.
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pure-strategy equilibria in the game induced by QV. This does not undermine the first 
part of this Chapter. There exist situations in which one can strictly Pareto improve the 
allocation achieved by MR through the simple mechanism QV.
The drawback above leads us to the second half of this Chapter where we assess which 
voting rules or general mechanisms are robust —that is, are implementable given any 
specification of the priors. In our setting robustness is equivalent to strategy-proofness. 
Hence, in the second half of the Chapter we move from Bayesian Nash implementation 
to dominant strategy implementation.5
We first characterise the set of strategy-proof mechanisms and present our main con­
tribution to the mechanism design literature: any implementable mechanism should be 
homogeneous of degree zero on any player’s declaration.6 This means that all proportional 
types are treated equally and bunched together. In other words, the interim prospects are 
only sensitive to the relative valuation between the issues. The result can be interpreted 
as implying that there cannot be any direct interpersonal comparison of utilities (they 
are not incentive compatible) and any aggregation procedure should be preceded by an 
intrapersonal one. Intuitively, an apathetic voter and an enthusiastic one are essentially 
treated in the same manner provided that their relative valuations between any two issues 
coincide.
Following the characterisation of all implementable mechanisms we further require the 
usual condition of unanimity (in our setting unanimity requires an issue to be approved 
or dismissed with certainty whenever all players wish so) which leads to a very negative 
result: there are no mechanisms sensitive to the voters’ intensity of preferences that are 
strategy-proof and satisfy the unanimity property.
The key intuition for this result lies on the fact that any strategy-proof mechanism that 
satisfies the unanimity property needs to be insensitive to the voters’ intensities of pref­
erences on those issues where unanimous wills exist. Consider now a strategy-proof qual­
itative mechanism that satisfies the unanimity property. It needs to be sensitive to the 
voters’ intensities of preferences for some particular profiles but it cannot be so on those 
issues where unanimous wills exist. This renders the mechanism asymmetric with respect 
to the sensitiveness to preferences’ intensities and implies that such mechanisms are not 
strategy-proof.
5 In Bayesian Nash implementation it is required that players truthtell their preferences as a best 
response to the common knowledge prior distribution of their opponent’s preferences. Instead, strategy- 
proof implementation (or implementation in dominant strategies) requires truthrevelation of preferences 
to be a dominant strategy for each player.
6 A function /  : RN —*■ K. is homogeneous of degree zero if /  (A • v) =  /  (v ) , for all X 6 R+ and v  €  R^.
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We then proceed by dropping the unanimity requirement (alternatively we can restrict 
the set of preferences so that no unanimous wills exist) and we distinguish an infinite set 
of strategy-proof qualitative mechanisms satisfying the usual properties of anonymity and 
neutrality that are ex-post incentive efficient.
In the remaining of this section we review the existing literature and relate our model to 
this earlier work. Next, the Chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.2 introduces the 
model, Section 1.3 analyses the indirect mechanism QV and its optimality in a setting 
with uniform and independent priors, Section 1.4 provides the general analysis of the 
intensity problem in a scenario robust to any specification of the priors (strategy-proof) 
and, finally, Section 1.5 concludes.
1.1.2 R elated literature
The fact that any implementable mechanism needs only to rely on the relative valuations 
between the issues stresses that intensity of preferences can play a role in voting games 
only when we move away from unidimensional settings. Furthermore, QV arises as a 
way to allow voters to trade-off their voting power. Indeed its gains come precisely from 
non-homogeneous preferences across issues.7 Accordingly, our work belongs to a wider 
set of models with two key features: heterogeneity of preferences and a multidimensional 
setting. In fact, we are dealing with a simple compaxative advantage argument, the key 
question is how to implement it: in the same way that each country should specialise in 
the production of the good in which it is relatively more productive, QV allows voters to 
decide on that issue they relatively care more about.
The two papers most closely related to our work are Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) and 
Casella (2003). Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) show that linking decisions normally 
leads to Pareto improvements. More specifically, they present a simple rule that achieves 
the ex-ante efficient allocation and that induces truthful revelation as we increase the 
number of decisions. Such rule is very simple in the sense that it just requires voters 
to match their voting profiles to the frequency of preferences across decisions according 
to the underlying distribution of preferences. The key differences with our work is that 
they propose an efficiency limiting result for a particular indirect mechanism and their 
action space depends on the prior distribution of preferences. Instead, we propose an 
indirect mechanism which does not depend on the prior distribution and characterise its
7 Bowen (1943) has already pointed out that MR is an efficient mechanism whenever the intensity of the 
voters’ preferences is disbributed symmetrically. In a similar way, Philipson and Snyder (1996) analyse 
an organised vote market and show that its efficiency gains (with respect to MR) are larger the more 
heterogeneous the preferences are.
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optimality.8
Casella (2003) proposes a system of Storable Votes to be used in situations where voters 
have to decide over the same binary decision repeatedly over time. Such a voting system 
is proved to Pareto dominate MR in a particular setting. Our framework is different in 
the sense that voters simultaneously cast all their votes and know their full preference 
profile at the time of voting (no time dimension). Moreover, we undertake a mechanism 
design analysis which allows us not only to compare two particular voting rules but also 
to characterise all implementable allocations and, from them, identify the optimal ones. 
Our impossibility result on implementing voting rules that are sensitive to the voter’s 
intensity of preferences (whenever we require robustness and unanimity) generalises also 
her conjecture that gains from Storable Votes may arise as long as priors are not too 
polarized.
Most of the literature on mechanism design without transfers (and most of the literature 
on voting) is built on a setting with ordinal utilities and where one alternative has to be 
elected out of many.9 Within that literature, QV has the flavour of a scoring rule though 
there is a crucial distinction:10 a scoring rule is used to elect one representative out of 
many, instead QV deals with a situation where N  independent issues have to be approved 
or dismissed. Our setting is one of a repeated binary election thus we are implicitly 
restricting the domain of preferences (see the example in page 50).
There is also an incipient literature that addresses the problem of eliciting the intensity 
of preferences in different settings with no transfers. Eliaz, Ray and Razin (2004) analyse 
how voters may abstain from an election depending on their relative aversion towards 
disagreement; Borgers and Postl (2004) demonstrate in a setting where two agents have 
to elect a representative out of three that no efficient mechanism exists; and, finally, 
Abdulkadiroglu (2004) proposes a mechanism for the allocation of indivisible goods where 
intensity of preferences can be elicited and the allocation achieved is at least as good as 
the one achieved by random serial dictatorship.
8 Assessing trade-offs between issues and extracting all possible gains from differences is also one of 
the main concerns of the negotiation analysis and the international relations literatures. See for instance 
Keeney and Raiffa (1991). Closer in spirit to our work, Shepsle and Weingast (1994, pg 156) assert that 
“The political solution is to create an institutional arrangement for exchanging support that is superior 
to a spot market”. Likewise, Levy (2004) models political parties as being able to exploit the gains from 
differing relative valuations in a multidimensional policy space.
9 The main references are Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975). These works can be seen to parallel 
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem from a mechanism design perspective. We defer further discussion to this 
strand of the literature to Section 1.4.2 after the presentation of our impossibility result.
10 “In a scoring rule, each voter’s ballot is a vector that specifies some number of points that this voter 
is giving to each of the candidates (or parties) that are competing in the election. These vote-vectors are 
summed over all voters, to determine who wins the election ”, Myerson (1999), pg 673-674.
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Our result on the impossibility of implementing strategy-proof qualitative mechanisms 
that satisfy the unanimity property is related to the literature on social choice (e.g. Arrow 
1951), on implementation (e.g. Gibbard 1973, Satterthwhaite 1975) and on the allocation 
of indivisible objects (e.g. Zhou 1990).
The literature on alternatives to MR is related to the present Chapter insofar as it proposes 
mechanisms which capture the intensity of the voters’ preferences but their complexity 
undermines its applicability. On the one hand, Tideman and Tullock (1976) develops an 
application of the Clarke-Groves mechanism to a voting framework. Needless to say, this 
requires monetary transfers and thus fails to satisfy the equality property. On the other 
hand, Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) propose a Point Voting Rule to be used for the 
contribution to public goods, with perfectly divisible points.11 They focus on identifying 
an (arbitrary) social choice function that induces the truthful revelation of preferences. 
This function belongs to the set of strategy-proof functions we propose in Section 1.4.3.
When we imagine a way in which politicians give more weight to a particular position we 
immediately think of logrolling or vote trading. This occurs whenever two voters agree 
on voting against one’s position on some non salient issues which are salient for the other 
voter. The result is that both voters will have gained support on their salient issues at 
the cost of losing non-salient ones. The relationship and gains of QV with respect to that 
particular way of expressing the willingness to influence are shortly discussed in Section 
1.3.4.
1.2 The general model
A voting game is defined as a situation where I  voters have to dismiss or approve N  
issues and no monetary transfers are allowed. Voters privately know their preference 
profile across the N  issues and the prior distributions from which these preferences are 
drawn axe common knowledge (note that this allows for deterministic priors or commonly 
known preferences). From a mechanism design perspective this is a problem where agents 
are characterised by multidimensional and multilateral asymmetric information and have 
no transfers.
Voters and issues are denoted i G (1 ,2 ,...,/}  and n G (1,2, ...N}, respectively. Voter t ’s 
valuation towards issue n is 6ln. The preference vector of voter i is Ql =  (# j,..., 0lN) G 
Q C R N,Vi = l  + I.
11Brams and Taylor (1996) propose a Point Voting Rule (the Adjusted Winner Procedure) that is 
essentially our voting system in a setting of a conflict resolution. Their weakness, though, is that they do 
not take into account the strategic interactions and restrict players to be truthful on their cast votes.
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Preferences should be interpreted as follows. A positive type (9%n > 0) wishes the approval 
of the issue, a negative one (0 ^ < 0 ) wishes its dismissal and its absolute value (|0 ™|) 
captures the intensity of the preference towards the approval or dismissal of that particular 
issue.
Voter Vs payoff on a given voting procedure n is described as follows,
{9ln if the issue is approved —9ln if the issue is dismissed
and the total payoff is the sum of the individual payoffs across the N  issues.12
An allocation is a iV-tuple of probabilities that corresponds to the probability of approving 
each of the N  issues. The set of allocations is defined as X  =  {(pi, ...,Piv) : P \ ,  •••? P n  £ [0,1]} 
where pn is the probability that issue n is approved. Hence, a voter with preferences 9l 
obtains the following utility for a given p € X\
N  N
U (P> 0 l )  :=  J 2 P n 0 h + (1 -  P n ) (“ An) = Y  ( 2j)n ~  ^
71= 1 71=1
Note that we are in a setting of private values where each agent’s utility depends only on 
his own type and utilities are multilinear.
1.3 A new voting rule
In this section we describe a particular voting rule, QV, that allows voters to distribute 
freely a certain number of votes between a prearranged number of issues. Our goal is 
two sided. First we want to compare the welfare properties of QV and MR. Second, we 
want to assess the optimality of the allocation achieved by QV when compared to all 
implementable voting rules.
The strategy space defined by QV are mappings from preference profiles to voting profiles 
V
V ~  {(t>i,t>2) 6 { - V , . . . , - l ,0 - ,0 +, l , . . . ,V } 2 : M  + h i  =  V }
so that a positive (negative) vote indicates the voter’s wish towards the approval (dis­
12 The definition of the payoff is implicitly assuming that issues are independently valued. That is, there 
are no complementarities between the issues. Provided that issues are independently valued, results can 
be extended to any linear transformation of the payoffs.
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missal) of the issue. 13
QV also defines a particular way to aggregate the cast votes. An issue is approved 
whenever the sum of votes on that issue is strictly greater than zero, dismissed whenever 
it is strictly negative and a tie breaking rule is applied whenever the sum of votes is equal 
to zero. The importance of the tie breaking rule is explained in Section 1.3.1 .2  below. 
For the moment we assume that ties are resolved applying the usual MR (that is, the will 
of the majority of voters is implemented and if no majority exists a fair coin is tossed). 
Briefly,
' +  ... +  v„ > 0 => The issue is approved
< v1 +  ... +  < 0 => The issue is dismissed
v \  +  ... +  =  0 =4> MR is applied
for every n = 1 -£ N .u
When assessing the optimality of QV we focus on a simplified setting with (i) two or 
three voters (I = 2,3), (ii) two issues (N  = 2,n € {1,2}), (iii) two valuations (6%n £ 
{± 1 , ± 0 } ,6 6  (0 , l ) 15) and (iv) uniform and pairwise independent priors:
f Pr (91 =  1) =  Pr (0*B =  -1 )  =  Pr (<£ =  6) = Pr (fl*n =  -0 )  =  J
1 Pairwise independence across issues and voters.
We define the set of a voter’s preference profiles as © := {±1, ±0} x {±1, ±0}
1.3.1 The indirect m echanism
1.3.1.1 The two voters’ case
The two voters’ case introduces the main features of QV: it allows voters to trade-off 
their voting power. Specifically, when we consider two issues QV allows voters to rank 
the issues and reach the only ex-ante optimal allocation. The next example best captures 
this intuition:
13 By means of a small abuse of notation, the action space is defined so that investing zero votes is 
informative about the wish of the voters’ preferences towards the approval or dismissal of the issue (i.e. 
0+ and 0“ have positive and negative sign, respectively).
14 MR requires an issue to be approved (dismissed) if the number of people wishing its approval is strictly 
higher (smaller) than the ones wishing its dismissal. In case of ties we assume that a fair lottery is played 
-i.e. the issue is approved with probability 1/2. Note that MR is just a particular case of QV with V  =  0.
15 Note that without loss of generality and in order to simplify the notation we have assumed the high 
issue to take a value equal to one. The analysis is totally analogous to the more general setting where
el  e { ± d , ± e } , e > G >  o.
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Example: Two friends, Anna (i = 1) and John (i =  2), are to go out 
on a Friday night and have decided they will first go to dinner and then to 
the movies. It is their first date so, above all, they want to be together even 
if they do not come to an agreement. Anna wants to see a horror movie 
and would like to have dinner in a new Italian restaurant while John prefers 
a comedy and a sushi restaurant. Following the previous notation we could 
define issue 1 as being the decision of which movie to go to (where p\ would be 
the probability of seeing an horror movie and 1 — p\ the probability of seeing 
a comedy) and issue 2  as being the restaurant choice (where P2 would be the 
probability of choosing the Italian restaurant and 1 — P2 the probability of 
choosing the Japanese restaurant). If they vote on each of the issues nothing 
is decided and they have to stay at home (we assume that this option is not 
optimal for either of them). Additionally, suppose that Anna really cares 
about which restaurant to go to and John, instead, cares more about the 
movie (i.e. 61 = (6,1) and 62 = (—1,—$)). It seems sensible that, as good 
friends, each of them will give up on his/her least preferred option. That is, 
they will both go to the Italian restaurant and then watch the comedy yielding 
an overall utility of (1  — 6) > 0 .
From a game theoretic perspective, they are both coordinating on the only Pareto optimal 
allocation that yields a strictly positive utility to both players (in the sense that each one 
wins his/her most preferred issue and loses the least preferred one). QV is precisely a 
mechanism that allows voters to coordinate non-cooperatively on the only ex-ante optimal 
outcome. We turn now into the rigorous analysis of the two voters case.
Voters are endowed with V > 0 votes that can be freely distributed between the two issues. 
We assume that V  is even so that voters can evenly split the votes between the two issues 
if necessary. The submitted votes can have a positive or negative value capturing the will 
of the voter towards the approval or dismissal of the issue.
The uniform and independent priors on the opponent’s preferences imply that it is a 
dominant strategy to truthfully declare the true sign of the preferences. Notice that in 
the case where a voter loses one of the issues he definitely wins the remaining one. This 
is because of the binary nature of our setting with only two issues. Losing an issue means 
having opposing preferences to the opponent on that issue and having invested fewer 
votes than he did. This implies that the voter at hand has invested more votes in the 
remaining issue. It can be easily proved that it is optimal to ensure that a voter does not 
lose his most preferred issue and consequently the optimal strategy for a voter who is not 
indifferent between the two issues is to invest all votes in his most preferred issue.
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Instead, a voter who is indifferent between the two issues is also indifferent between 
playing any of the strategies. We therefore assume that he splits his votes evenly. The 
adoption of this strategy can be seen as the middle point between the strategies followed 
by the mixed types and allows to reach the Pareto optimal allocation.
The night out example presented above highlights the fact that QV allows any voter to 
concede on his least preferred issue and whenever that issue is strongly preferred by his 
opponent, the opponent’s will is implemented. It follows immediately that such a voting 
rule Pareto dominates the allocations achieved by MR. Moreover, when we analyse the 
direct mechanism we prove that QV is not only superior to MR but it reaches the optimal 
allocation. Below we formally characterise the equilibria of the indirect mechanism.
Without loss of generality, we analyse the optimal strategy of voter i whenever he has 
positive preferences. His payoff is:
\ + \Py (*4 14 < o ) )  4 +  g  + \Pi (vi 14 < o ) )  4
where v\ — V — v\.
The previous expression captures the property that unanimous preferences are imple­
mented =  \P \  | > 0^) and Pn (vn) is the expected value of (2pn — 1) whenever
voter i casts vn votes. These expected values are defined as follows (conditional proba­
bilities are omitted for notational simplicity):
Pi (t>j) := 2  (P r (»} -  M  > o) +  5  Pr («j -  |u{| =  o )) -  1
P2 (<4) “  2 (P r ( -  (V -  1 ^ 1 ) +  u j > 0 )  +  \  Pr ( -  (V  -  | ^ | )  +  v'2 =  o ) )  -  1.
Simple calculations allow us to rewrite the payoff of voter i as
^  +  ( p r  (<4 +  « i > 0 )  +  ^ P r  +  «* =  0 )  }  (4  - 4 ) .
Voter i wants to maximise the expression inside the curly brackets whenever 6[ > 4  (i.e. 
v\ =  V ) . 16 Conversely, voter i wants to minimise it when 6\ < 0l2 (i.e. v\ = 0+). Finally, 
player i is indifferent on which strategy to play whenever he is indifferent between the 
two issues, 0\ =B\.  In the latter case we assume that he splits evenly his votes (note that
16 Voter i sets v\ is equal to V  because he wants to set v{ strictly higher (if possible) than the absolute 
value of his opponent’s invested votes on the first issue. Taking into account that player j  plays accordingly, 
it follows that the only equilibrium has non-indifferent players investing all their voting power on their 
preferred issue.
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this strategy can be seen as the limiting strategy of non-indifferent players and allows us 
to achieve the Pareto optimal allocation).
Summing up, the equilibrium strategies for a player with positive preferences are as fol­
lows:
if 0\ > 9\ then vl — (V, 0 +)
i f6\  = 0l2 then
if 9\ < 02 then v% = (0+ , V)
Hence, the allocation achieved by QV can be described as follows: whenever voters rank 
equally both issues or whenever both voters are indifferent, ties occur; instead, if voters 
rank issues differently, the individual that is not indifferent wins its preferred issue.
1.3.1.2 The three voters’ case
We depart now from a pure conflict resolution situation and consider a setting with three 
voters. In the previous analysis any voter tries to counteract the votes invested by his 
opponents. This effect is still in place now but we have an additional element: in some 
situations some voters may not be pivotal.
In the case of only two voters the tie breaking rule had no welfare effects. Instead, with 
three voters the tie breaking rule plays a crucial role and has important welfare effects. 
We will assume that in case of ties issues should be decided through the usual MR. We 
defer the discussion about the optimal voting rule to the end of this subsection once we 
have characterised the equilibrium of the game.
Voters are endowed again with an even number of votes V. Provided the uniform and 
independent priors it is still a dominant strategy to declare the correct sign of their 
preferences. We will now focus on symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. Symmetry should 
be interpreted as usual in voting theory: the three voters play the same strategy.
We want to focus on the set of final allocations reached in equilibrium rather than the set 
of equilibria. For this purpose we introduce the term essential as an equivalence class of 
equilibria that reach the same allocation —notice that given the nature of our game there 
are many situations where some votes are not pivotal and hence can be placed anywhere 
without affecting the outcome.
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The following Lemma proves first that the strategy followed by any voter is independent of 
the labelling of the issues. That is, the strategy of a non-indifferent voter is summarised by 
a parameter 7  6  { 0 , 1 , V} which should be interpreted (together with the corresponding 
positive or negative sign) as the number of votes invested in his most preferred issue. The 
votes invested in his least preferred issue are (V — 7 ) or ( 7  — V) depending on whether 
he desires the approval or dismissal of it. The Lemma also shows that in a symmetric 
equilibrium voters who are indifferent should divide equally their votes.
Lem m a 1.1 In a setting with two issues, three voters and uniform and independent pri­
ors, any symmetric pure strategy equilibrium satisfies the following two properties:
1. Non-indifferent voters use essentia lly the same strategy. That is, they invest the 
same number of votes in their most preferred strategy.
2. Indifferent voters essentia lly split their votes evenly. That is, they invest -j votes 
on each issue
The proof (which is provided in the appendix) relies on showing that an equilibrium 
where the strategies depend on the labelling of the issues cannot be sustained. Imagine, 
for instance, that there exists an equilibrium where indifferent voters cast more votes on 
the first issue: 7 *nd > V/2.  Then any voter is better off by deviating and playing, for 
instance, the complementary strategy where he invests 7 ind =  V — j*nd in the first issue. 
In this way, a voter shifts some votes from the first issue to the second and increases his 
pivotability.
Given the setting described above, an equilibrium to our game is uniquely defined by a 
number 7 * 6  {0,..., V}. The independent and uniform priors imply that the number of 
votes invested on a high valued issue should be at least as big as the number of votes 
invested on an issue whenever the voter is indifferent, i.e. 7 * > y - The next Proposition 
tells us which are essentially the three equilibria that one can find.
P roposition  1 . 1  In a setting with two issues and three voters, there are essentia lly  
three symmetric pure strategy equilibria. These are:
7 *nd = y  —all votes into preferred issue.
7 *nd = y  —equivalent to MR
l in d  ~2
where 7 * is the number of votes invested by non-indifferent voters in the most preferred 
issue and 7 *nd is the number of votes invested by indifferent voters in issue one.
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The proof of the proposition is quite tedious and is left to the appendix. Its difficulty lies 
on the essential aspect of it. This is because we can devise many possible combinations of 
votes where no individual is better off by deviating but where some votes are not pivotal 
and hence can be invested in any of the issues. The fact that these votes are not pivotal 
implies no changes on the final allocation.
The first equilibrium is the equilibrium we observed in the two voters case where non- 
indifferent voters invest all their votes in their preferred issue so that strong minorities 
impose their will over weak majorities. The second equilibrium replicates the MR alloca­
tion. For future reference they will be called Equilibrium QV (EqQV) and Equilibrium 
MR (EqMR), respectively.
Finally, the third equilibrium can be seen as a mid point between the other two where 
a member of a majority that feels stronger about the remaining issue just needs an 
indifferent voter to overcome a strong minority (instead of a voter with strong preferences 
as would be the case in the EqQV). The non-divisibility of the votes may imply that 
this equilibrium (and only this one) may not exist. Note that this equilibrium is not as 
relevant as the other equilibria since it only holds for a particular value of 0.17
Two relevant aspects are left to be considered. On the one hand, the fact that the 
Proposition holds for any number of votes indicates that it may also hold whenever we 
consider votes to be perfectly divisible. 18 On the other hand, the Proposition shows 
that QV has multiple equilibria and one of them replicates the outcome reached by MR. 
Henceforth, we focus our attention on the first equilibrium. It does not seem worth it 
to propose a slightly more complicated voting system than the traditional MR if it just 
replicates the same allocation and introduces no strictly positive gains. 19
The Tie Breaking Rule
We said above that in the three voter’s case the tie breaking rule plays a crucial role 
and has important welfare effects. Consider how pivotal is a voter under MR. Given the 
uniform priors assumption, a voter observes his will being implemented on any issue with
17 This equilibrium disappears whenever we consider the continuous valuation of the issues (see Section 
1.3.4). There axe two reasons for this to be the case: (1) the relative intensity for which it holds has measure 
zero in the continuous case (given uniform preferences) and (2) the strategy followed by indifferent players 
is crucial for this equilibrium to hold and these voters have in general zero measure in the continuous case.
18In Section 1.3.4 below, we show that in the case with continuous valuation of issues and perfectly 
divisible votes, the EqQV and EqMR are the only equilibria.
19 The multiplicity of equilibria when analysing different mechanisms is usually eluded by selecting the 
best equilibrium in each possible situation. Note that this approach would benefit our analysis because 
MR would never be able to do better than QV given that the latter also contemplates the allocation 
reached by the former. Therefore, focussing on the first equilibrium makes our optimality analysis more 
difficult.
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probability |  since the issue can only be dismissed if the remaining two voters are opposed 
to him —that event has probability Imagine now, that the tie breaking rule under QV 
is the toss of a fair coin. That is, the issue is approved with probability This implies 
that any voter becomes much less pivotal < | )  than he was under MR and it can be 
shown that QV is no longer optimal: MR does better.
The optimal tie breaking rule relies on preserving in an incentive compatible way how 
pivotal any player is under MR. In other words, in case of a tie issues should be decided 
through the usual MR. QV becomes a voting rule that allows issues to be decided on 
the grounds of the total intensity of preferences. In case the intensity of preferences is 
not decisive, the issue is approved on the basis of overall support (MR). QV happens to 
be a natural extension of the usual voting rule where voters declare their position with 
respect to the approval or dismissal of an issue and then invest extra votes to reflect their 
willingness to influence.
1.3.2 The direct m echanism
We want now to characterise the optimality properties of QV in the previous setting (that 
is, two issues and two or three voters). In order to do that we first need to characterise 
the whole set of implementable mechanisms in our setting.
The Revelation Principle allows us, without any loss of generality, to restrict the analysis 
to the study of direct revelation mechanisms. A direct revelation mechanism is a function 
(p) that maps any revelation of the agents types into an allocation. Such mapping is 
known as a Social Choice Function (SCF).
p : e 1 -► *
i.e. p (0 1, ..., 0 7) =  (pi (0 1, ..., 0 7) ,p2 (0 \  ..., 0 7) ) .
As standard in the literature, we want to focus our analysis on the set of SCFs that 
preserve unanimous wills (an issue is approved or dismissed with certainty if all players 
wish so), have no systematic tendency towards the approval or dismissal of any of the issues 
(neutrality) and treat all individuals in the same manner (anonymity). Moreover, given 
that we are in a multidimensional setting we want to extend these properties accordingly. 
On the one hand, we want the SCF to be neutral across issues in the sense that it should 
be invariant with respect to the particular labelling on each of the remaining issues. On 
the other hand, we want every issue to be treated analogously. It will be useful to define
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a SCF as being reasonable whenever it satisfies the previous five properties.
D efinition 1 . 1  A SCF p : © 7 —> X  is reasonable if and only if it satisfies
1. Unanimity: pn (01, ...,07) = < > 0, • jy
V '  \  0  if 6ln < 0,\/i = I + 1
2. Anonymity: pn (01,...,0 / ) = pn ^ 0 ° ^ ^ ,0cr(/ ^  ,Vn =  l-^iV,Vcr € Si.
3. Neutrality: pn (01, ...,07) = 1 — pn (—191, •••, —Q1) >Vn =  1 -j- iV.
Neutrality across issues: Vn = 1 -f- iV and 6 {+1, —1} , ra =  1 -f- TV
pn (0 1 , 61) = pn ((^i • 9\ , ..., 0 £ ,..., £N • 0 ^ ) , (f j • 0 { , 0 7, £n  -On ) ) .
5. Symmetry across issues: Vn =  1 -f- iV, Vcr G
Pn(e1,...,eI) =p„(n) ( ^ (1), . . . , ^ (N)) ) .
ty/iere Sfc denotes the set of all possible permutations of k elements.
It is trivial to check that the set of reasonable SCFs that are implementable is not empty. 
For instance MR is one of them.
1.3.2.1 Implementable mechanisms
We want to characterise all Bayesian Nash implementable allocations. Thus, we are 
interested in the SCFs that induce truthful revelation at the interim stage —the point 
where each agent privately knows his own type (but only holds beliefs on his opponents’ 
types) and he has to reveal his type in the direct mechanism or cast his votes in the 
indirect mechanism. The interim utility of a voter that declares 6% while his type is 0*, is 
defined as:
U {e \ p )  := Ee_t { « (p ( e \  0 -*), 0 ')}
where, 6~% := (01 , ...,0t_1 ,0t+1, ..., 07). Note that this is simply his expected utility taking 
into account that his opponents truthfully reveal their type. To simplify the notation let 
us also define the interim prospect on issue n as:20
Pn (0') := Ee-i {2pn ( 0 ' ,0 - )  -  l }  .
Hence, the interim utility is: u (•, 0) =  Pi (•) 0i +  P2 (•) 0 2 -
20Note that the interim prospect is the expectation of a linear transformation of the SCF, hence it is 
not a well defined probability. In particular, its domain lies on [—1,1].
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In order to characterise all implementable SCFs we just need to impose the Incentive
Compatibility constraints (IC) according to which it should be optimal for each voter to
reveal his true type. Restricting the analysis to the set of reasonable SCFs, together with 
the uniform and independent priors we assumed, imply that we just need to analyse the 
ICs from the perspective of a positive valued issue. That is, we just need to look at the 
interim prospects of approving the first issue whenever the declarations are (1 , 6), (6 ,1 ),
(1,1) and (6,6). The utilities of each of the three types of voter given truthful revelation
are:
• A non-indifferent type: P  (1,6) • 1 +  P (6,1) • 6
• A high type: P  (1,1) • 1 +  P  (1,1) • 1
• A low type: P (6,6) • 6 +  P (6,6) • 6
Note that we have dropped the interim prospects subscripts —i.e. P  ^6 *J =
The next Proposition tells us which are the conditions that any reasonable 
satisfy in order to be implementable.
P roposition  1 . 2  A reasonable SCF p : 0 7 —> X  is implementable if and only if the next 
four conditions are satisfied
1. P ( l , l )  =  P(6,6) 3. P(l,l) > p (9'1) + p <1’g)
2 . p ( i , e ) > p ( B , i )  4 . f ( i , i ) <  F ( 9 , 1 ) 194 t / (1’
The proof of the Proposition is an immediate consequence of imposing the conditions for 
truthtelling. For instance, the first condition is a consequence of requiring that a high 
type does not have an incentive to deviate by declaring he is a low type together with a 
low type not having incentives to deviate by declaring he is a high type. The rest of the 
conditions follow from considering the remaining deviations.
There axe few interesting things to say about the previous result which will be gener­
alised in Section 1.4.1. First of all, observe that the SCF treats exactly in the same 
way an enthusiastic and an apathetic voter ( P ( l , l )  =  P (6,6)).21 This highlights the 
fact that the first best allocation (the one that maximizes the sum of ex-ante utilities)
21 The symmetry across issues property plays a relevant role for this result to hold true. The next 
example shows that dropping such property may be critical in the case with discrete preferences:
There is only one voter ( i  =  1), and there only two issues (n  =  1,2). The player’s valuation 
0\ and 6\ are stochastically independent and uniformly distributed on {1 ,2}. The following 
SCF is strategy-proof but is not HDO because it allocates a different outcome to the players
p ' ( n -
SCF should
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can never be achieved since it requires interpersonal comparisons of utility. That is, it 
requires favouring those voters with stronger preferences and this can never be incentive 
compatible.
The remaining three conditions imply that the interim utilities should be convex. In 
particular, they require the interim prospect on an issue to be weakly increasing on the 
declaration on that issue, i.e. P  (1,1) > P  (0,1) and P  (1,0) > P  (0, 0).
Finally, note that the Proposition holds for any number of voters as long as they are 
deciding over two issues.
1.3.2.2 Is qualitative voting optimal?
From the viewpoint of the designer of the mechanism it is reasonable to ask if the voting 
rule he would like to implement is the best one under the “veil of ignorance”. That is, if 
by weighting all the possible combinations of types (given the prior distributions of them) 
the voting rule reaches the best possible allocation.
As Holmstrom and Myerson (1983) first pointed out, “the proper object for welfare analy­
sis in an economy with incomplete information is the decision rule, rather than the actual 
decision or allocation ultimately chosen [...] a decision rule is efficient if and only if no 
other feasible decision rule can be found that may make some individuals better off with­
out ever making any other individuals worse off.” In our setting this means that we do 
not have to compare the set of final allocations but the set of implementable mappings 
from preference profiles to allocations (that is, implementable SCFs). It would be useless 
to provide a welfare analysis regardless of incentive compatibility because strategic ma­
nipulation of privately held information will almost surely lead to a different allocation 
than the expected one.
Henceforth we adopt the criteria that any optimality analysis is made out of the set of im­
plementable SCFs. We denote this set V  (i.e. V  := {p : © 7 —> X  : p is implementable}).
The welfare criteria we are interested in is the set of SCFs that reach a Pareto optimal
(1,1) and (2,2);
p i ( l , l ) = J  p a ( l , l ) = 0  p i ( O , l ) = 0  pa (0,1)= I
pi (1 ,0)= 1 pa ( l , O )= 0  Pi (2,2)= 0 P2 (2,2) =  1
I am indebted to Tilman Borgers for bringing this fact to my attention.
In Section 1.4.1 we show that the "equal treatment of proportional voters" holds in general whenever 
we have a continuous support.
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allocation at the ex-ante stage.22 First, a Definition for the ex-ante utility for voter i 
given the SCF p:
Definition 1.2 We the define the ex-ante utility of player i given the implementable SCF 
p G V as,
(p) := E0< {E,-< {u (p (0 \ 0 -‘) , # )}  }
Definition 1.3 An ex-ante efficient SCF p : Q1 —► X  is an implementable SCF such 
that there does not exist any other implementable SCF such that makes some voters better 
off without worsening off any other, that is:
p is ex-ante efficient $p G V such that ul (p) > u% (p) for a lii = 1 -f-1
and ul iff) > u1 (p) for some i 6  {1 , 1} .
Definition 1.4 A voting mechanism is optimal if its associated direct revelation mech­
anism p : © 7 —> X  is reasonable and ex-ante efficient
It is essential to consider SCFs that are ex-ante efficient so that they are stable in the 
sense that voters will never want to jointly deviate and jointly choose a different decision 
rule. This argument also holds for the interim stage: we want mechanisms to be robust 
once agents privately know their types. It can be proved that ex-ante efficiency implies 
interim efficiency, hence our welfare criteria will also imply the stability of the voting rule 
at the interim stage.
The night out example described above illustrates that MR is in some cases not interim 
efficient. In that example, John and Anna had incentives to concede on their least pre­
ferred issue and both go to the Italian restaurant and the comedy. It follows that MR 
is not ex-ante efficient and that both friends may unanimously agree on resolving their 
dissenting issues through alternative methods.
The assumption that the intensity of the preferences towards each issue can only take 
two values (9 and 1) becomes now crucial. It allows us to write the interim prospects 
in terms of a finite number of parameters and, given that we restricted the analysis to 
reasonable SCFs, the number of parameters is treatable. The optimal SCFs are simply 
those that maximise the ex-ante utility of any single voter subject to the four constraints in 
Proposition 1.2 (the detailed analysis of the resulting linear program is in the appendix).
22 Our definition of ex-ante efficiency corresponds to the notion of ex-ante incentive efficient in Holm- 
strom and Myerson (1983).
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T heorem  1.1 In a setting with two issues and two voters, QV is optimal. Moreover, 
MR is not optimal.
QV is replicating the only ex-ante efficient and reasonable SCF but it is not the only 
indirect mechanism that can do so: QV is just one possible alternative. No other voting 
mechanism can do better.
In the three voters case we have seen that QV reaches two equilibria: one that replicates 
the MR outcome and one that allows strong minorities to decide over weak majorities. 
The next Theorem tells us when is the second equilibria ex-ante efficient.
T heorem  1.2 In a setting with two issues and three voters, whenever the values of the 
various issues are “different enough” (i.e. 9 € (0, QV is ex-ante optimal. Moreover, 
in that case MR is not optimal.
What do we mean by issues being “different enough”? Recall that when we described the 
simplified model we denoted the relative valuation of a low issue with respect to a high 
one as 9. The Theorem above is telling us that QV is optimal whenever the valuation of 
the high issue is at least three times the one of the low issue —0 G (0, 3 ). In other words, 
it is optimal to implement the will of an enthusiastic minority as long as the majority 
does not oppose the preference of the minority too strongly —agents want to commit to 
use such a rule before knowing their preferences so that their possibly strong views are 
not silenced by indifferent majorities.23
The main argument for proposing an alternative voting rule to allow voters to express 
their willingness to influence the final decision implicitly assumed that gains can only be 
possible as long as voters differed on which issue is the most relevant. And as long as 
their relative valuation towards the issues was different enough. Theorem 1 .2  reinforces 
this idea and shows precisely that the optimality of QV relies now on a particular range 
of values of the parameter 0 in contrast to the case with only two voters.
23In the interval 6 G ( | , the allocation achieved by the third equilibrium replicates the optimal 
allocation -note though that the third equilibrium only exists for 9 =  For 9 G ( | ,  l )  MR achieves the 
optimal allocation. Proofs are provided in the appendix. Note that the costs of the incentive compatibility 
are captured precisely in the interval 9 G ( | ,  | ) :  from an ex-ante perspective (and regardless of incentive 
constraints) it is optimal for a strong minority to decide over a weak majority when 9 G ( | ,  .
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1.3.3 T w o exam ples
1.3.3.1 The two voters’ case: conflict resolution
A more realistic version of the night out example may take the shape of a conflict resolution 
situation. In this case, two parties that have agreed on all concurring issues are to resolve 
their conflict on some dissenting ones. In this context it seems sensible not to expect 
the amicable behaviour we observed in the previous example. Now, parties may see any 
concession as a loss and (given the sequential nature of bargaining) may never truthfully 
declare their preferred alternatives leading to the deferring of any decision.24
Imagine a family enterprise that, after being badly managed for two generations, is in a 
very delicate situation and decides to hire a manager or CEO to redirect their business. 
The new CEO’s team carries out a comprehensive analysis of the situation and concludes 
that the image of the firm has to be updated and two proposals are made. On the one 
hand a restyling of the logo will change the consumer’s perception of their brand at a very 
low cost. On the other hand, a structural improvement of their main product line would 
also be beneficial to consumers’ perceptions and, furthermore, it will gain the attention 
of the press.
The owners are against any change in their product because this is, from their point of 
view, the essence of their business. Similarly, they cannot contemplate a restyling of their 
logo because it was designed by one of their ancestors and they feel emotionally attached 
to it.
The negotiations between both parties are at a deadlock and, as was highlighted before, 
any concession is seen as a loss. Furthermore, the parties rank the issues differently. The 
CEO realises that the first policy is interesting given its low costs but it will have no 
persistent effect on the public and he sees the latter as the essential move to refloat the 
firm. Instead, the family owners realise that something has to change but would not 
like to be unfaithful to their ancestor so, above all, want to keep their logo. This is a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma situation: whatever the opponent does any voter is always better off 
by not conceding and declaring both issues to be equally important (it is dominant to do 
so). And, as it is always the case, the unique equilibrium is a Pareto dominated one.
QV allows the voters to unlock the negotiation and non-cooperatively choose the Pareto 
optimal allocation. Let us analyse its logic: the CEO and the family are endowed with
24 The social psychology literature has largely focussed on the problem of people not declaring what 
they perceive as less important because there exists the risk that they will lose that issue without any 
compensation. See for instance Rubin et al (1986).
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V  votes each and invest all votes in their preferred issue. The reason being that, given 
the binary nature of the situation, winning one issue implies losing the remaining one. 
Hence, the optimal strategy is to make sure that the most preferred issue is not lost
Note that a particular feature of the conflict resolution situation with two issues (where 
voters’ preferences are opposed) is that it is robust to any possible prior in the voters’ 
preferences —that is, it is dominant for a non-indifferent voter to invest all his voting 
power on his preferred issue. In other words, Theorem 1.1 is strategy-proof whenever 
both voters have opposing preferences. The optimal outcome has each player deciding on 
their most preferred issue (if they both prefer a different one) or ties occurring in both 
issues.
1.3.3.2 T he th ree  vo ters’ case: a com m ittee m eeting
Imagine now a religious association which is composed of three factions with the same 
voting power at the annual committee. In that committee they need to update the 
association’s position in two major biological scientific advances: human cloning and the 
use of stem cells. Imagine that each of the members of the committee has no clue about 
their opponents’ preferences but privately know their own. The most progressive faction 
has no strong position on any of the issues but it is mostly in favour of both. Each of the 
other two strongly opposes one of the two issues and recognises that the positive aspects 
of the other one outweighs their moral prejudices and hence favours it. The next diagram 
captures their positions:
H um an cloning Use of stem  cells
F I agree agree
F2 strongly disagree agree
F3 agree strongly disagree
If they vote through MR, both issues are approved: a weak majority imposes its will over 
a strong minority. Is that situation optimal? We have just shown that from an ex-ante 
perspective (that is, before voters know what they are going to vote) the MR outcome 
may not be optimal. If the difference between the strength of the strongly disagree and 
the agree positions is wide enough, it is optimal to allow the enthusiastic minorities decide 
over the apathetic majorities. QV is again a system where agents are able to increase the 
probability of winning their preferred issue investing all their votes on that issue.
Following the analysis above, the first faction evenly splits its votes, the second invests
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all of them in the first issue and the third does the same in the second one (as depicted 
in the table below).
H um an cloning U se of stem  cells
F I V2
V
2
F2 - V 0
F3 0 - V
The outcome is now the opposite to the one before, both issues are dismissed and the 
overall welfare is strictly higher than the one obtained through MR.
1.3.4 D iscussion
The equilibrium of the voting game is not driven by the non-divisibility of points or the 
binary nature of preferences. Whenever we consider preferences to belong to the interval 
[—1 , 1] with independent and uniform priors, voters still follow the described strategy: 
they invest all votes in their most preferred issue or, only in the case with three voters, 
they evenly split their votes.25
Conversely, all optimality analysis rested heavily on the binary nature of the preferences 
and the uniform and pairwise independent priors. It seems natural to relax the latter 
assumptions and check whether the main optimality results are affected by such a change. 
A more precise knowledge of the opponents’ preferences may lead to the non-existence of 
pure strategy equilibria in the game induced by QV. The intuition is the following. For 
the voting profiles to be an equilibrium in a complete information framework, no voter 
should invest a single vote in an issue he is going to lose; consequently, a single vote should 
be sufficient to win any issue and overcoming the single vote invested by an opponent will 
occur almost surely.26 Hence, relaxing the priors may lead to some critical problems in 
the applicability of QV and in its optimality properties.27
25 Formal proofs of these statements can be found in the Appendix.
26 In general it is also true that the situation where ties occur in all issues is not an equilibria.
2 7 This may contrast with the intuition derived from Cremer and McLean (1988) that correlation allows 
the attainment of an efficient allocation. The result does not follow in our setting because correlation 
enhances the strategic interaction between individuals without introducing penalties associated with lying 
(recall that we are not allowing transfers). Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) provide an example that 
illustrates how the correlation on the intensity between the issues affects the gains we expect from linking 
decisions: perfect positive correlation collapses the problem into a one-dimensional one; conversely, perfect 
negative correlation is the best possible scenario for QV. Note also that Milgrom and Weber (1985) ensures 
the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in the general game with I  issues, N  players and V  votes as long 
as the informational structure of the game satisfies some mild conditions. Whenever we consider the more 
general case with perfectly divisible votes Simon and Zame (1990) generally characterise the conditions 
under which equilibria exists.
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Briefly, we have seen that more skewed priors may lead to voters becoming more strategic. 
Consequently, it is more difficult to achieve truthful revelation of preferences and the costs 
of inducing truthful revelation may outweigh the welfare gains we expect from the use of 
QV. This contrasts with the behaviour we observe under MR where voters always declare 
truthfully their type. In other words, MR is robust to any possible specification on the 
preferences’ prior distributions.
It is largely the above observation that leads us to the general analysis of eliciting the 
intensity of preferences in Section 1.4 where we characterise the implementable SCFs that 
allow voters to express the intensity of their preferences under any specification of the 
priors.
There are a couple of aspects of QV that we should discuss before proceeding to the 
analysis of robust mechanisms in general voting games. On the one hand, we should 
comment on how QV relates to the most usual way political parties express the intensity 
of their preferences, i.e. logrolling. And, on the other hand, we should also comment on 
the importance of the agenda in our setting.
Logrolling is defined as the exchanging of votes among legislators to achieve the approval 
or dismissal of the issues that are of interest to one another. Heuristically we could say 
that QV is related to logrolling in the same way monetary economies are related to barter. 
It eases the ways through which agents can express their willingness to influence given 
that it does not require a double coincidence of wants. Furthermore, it seems reasonable 
to expect that this increased freedom in the available strategies should prevent agents 
trading their votes because under QV a vote for an issue has always a value given that it 
can be moved to a more relevant issue.
The problem of modelling theoretically such phenomena relies on the fact that it usually 
occurs in a situation where a certain knowledge of the opponent’s preferences exists but 
there is still scope for the understatement of one’s preferences and, of course, the violation 
of the agreement once it is made.28 The latter can be easily overcome through some kind 
of reputation argument but the former generates major difficulties and remains an area 
of interest for future research.
The selection of the agenda is shown to be an important matter that arises when analysing 
QV and is one of the most important problems that arises in any negotiation. The intro­
duction of a new bill can drastically change the action taken by a particular individual, 
as is the case with QV. Namely, how, by whom and when should the issues be selected?
28 The lack of a satisfactory theoretical treatment of logrolling supports such an assertion. The most 
relevant work is by Wilson (1969) where agents interact in an exchange economy framework with votes 
being tradeable and perfectly divisible.
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There is a clear incentive to manipulate the agenda in order to induce particular outcomes 
and bundle issues that benefit some particular groups.29 Nevertheless, the literature lacks 
tractable models of agenda setting given the somehow dubious knowledge of the oppo­
nent’s preferences that is needed to correctly manipulate it. In our case, we take the 
agenda as exogenous: after some unmodelled negotiations an agenda is agreed by all 
voters.
1.4 General analysis o f eliciting the intensity of preferences
All results from the previous section have rested on the assumption of uniform and pair­
wise independent priors. It seems natural to relax such assumptions and check whether 
the main optimality results are affected by such change. Section 1.3.4 above has called 
attention to the fact that a more precise knowledge of the opponents’ preferences may 
lead to non-existence of equilibrium in the game induced by QV. Relaxing the priors may 
also lead to some critical problems in the optimality properties of QV —this is indeed a 
long standing critique to the whole literature on Bayesian Nash implementation.
Driven by the fact that MR induces truthful revelation given any possible specification of 
the priors, we want to characterise the set of SCFs that are robust to any specification of 
the priors and are also sensitive to the voters’ intensity of preferences.30
Bergemann and Morris (2004) show that requiring a SCF to be robust to any specifica­
tion of the priors (interim implementation for all possible type spaces) in private value 
environments is equivalent to ex-post implementation and is also equivalent to dominant 
strategy implementation or strategy-proofness. Hence in the remaining of the section we 
use the standard notion of strategy-proof. In a setting with I  players and N  issues, we 
generally show that a social choice function is implementable only if it does not undertake 
interpersonal comparisons of utility (it should only be contingent on the voters’ relative 
valuations between the issues). Following this characterisation we find the impossibility
29For an example of the scope of such a problem see Metcalfe (2000). In the context of criminalising 
bribery at an international level between OECD countries, he shows how the setting of the agenda mo­
nopolised the negotiations for twelve years. He also emphasizes the perverse effect that the introduction 
of a divisive issue has in a negotiation: it creates a conflict between two factions that strongly disagree on 
the outcome of such issue and prevents any agreement being reached on the remaining ones. In a different 
setting Dutta et al. (2003) define and prove the existence of an equilibrium for agenda formation  when 
one alternative has to be selected out of many -other references can be found therein.
30 A voting game has been defined as a situation where N  independent binary decisions have to be 
made. Trivially, it is always optimal for any voter to truthfully reveal whether he wishes the approval or 
dismissal of each of the issues. See Dasgupta and Maskin (2003) for a further defense of the robustness of 
MR in a standard Social Choice framework.
CHAPTER 1. QUALITATIVE VOTING 38
of implementing strategy-proof (or robust) mechanisms that are sensitive to the voters’ 
intensities of preferences and satisfy the unanimity property.
The impossibility result is consistent with both literatures on social choice and implemen­
tation. The former has exposed the impossibility of producing rational aggregators (in 
the sense that the social preference relation is transitive) whenever we consider universal 
preference domains. The latter has shown that the strategic interaction between voters 
that arises from the fact that individual’s preferences are not publicly observable also 
leads to impossibility results (e.g. Gibbard-Satterthwhaite Theorem).
At the end of this Section we drop the unanimity requirement and propose a set of SCFs 
that satisfy some appealing conditions.
1.4.1 Im plem entability  result
Without any loss of generality we restrict the analysis to the study of direct revelation 
mechanisms. That is, Social Choice Functions (SCF) that map any possible preference 
profile into an allocation.
p  : O 1  - >  A *
i.e. p (0 1, . . . ,  e1) =  (pi (0 1, . . . ,  e1) , . . . ,p N (0 1, . . . ,  e1) ) .
We want to characterise all feasible allocations under the universal domain assumption 
—the SCFs that induce truthful revelation when © =  R.N. It will be useful to define the 
prospect of issue n being approved for the present case of dominant strategy implemen­
tation analogously to what we did in the previous section:
p n (8) ~ 2 Pn( e ) -  l . e e e 1
Hence, the indirect utility of a type 0l who declares being 0* whenever the remaining 
voters truthfully reveal their type is:
: = u ( p ( e \  6 -^ ,6 ^
N
=  pn (»'. 8~') -Oh =  P  ( e \  6 " )  ■ 8i
n=1
where, 9~l := (01, ..., 04" 1 ,0<+1, ..., 07).
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Strategy-proof mechanisms are those SCFs that satisfy Incentive Compatibility constraints 
(IC) —that is, it should be optimal for each voter to reveal his true type given any profile 
of preferences:
9% £ arg maxu ^0*, 0^ , Vi =  1 -£ / ,  V0 £ Q1
eeG
We define ul (9) := u (9l , 9) as the utility of voter i in equilibria.
It follows that a strategy-proof SCF needs to satisfy the necessary first and second order 
conditions for truthtelling for all voters:
r - W y . ^ L  . = o
dd \  ) \ 9 = e x
/ 2. 2  u ( 0 , 0 ) • is negative semidefinite a(el) V ) eW
for i =  1 , . . . ,/ .
The next Proposition is just an extension of the usual technique used in one-dimensional 
screening problems due to Mirrlees (1971). It is the first step to simplify the first and 
second order conditions above in order to characterise all the implementable allocations.
P roposition  1.3 The SCFp : ©J —> X  is strategy-proof if and only if the voters’ induced 
utilities are convex and its gradients are equal to the interim prospects.
ni ( »  f VaiU* (9) = P(9) for all 9 e  0 7i.e.: 0  €argm ax-i n ( 0 , 0  )<*=*►< 6
e 6 0  '  '  ul is convex on 9% £ © for all 9 £ Q1
where (6) := ( ^ 2,....
dufe^e)
Proof. Sufficiency. The envelope Theorem directly implies that —^  '
Q X — Q i
V eiUl (9) = P l (9). Given that the FOC is satisfied for all 9 £ O1 it can be differen­
tiated with respect to 9 yielding: 9 +  9 = 0- The SOC implies that the first
matrix is negative semidefinite, hence the second one should be positive semidefinite.
Necessity. One can easily reverse the previous reasoning to get the local conditions. We 
just need to prove that the conditions are global. A continuously differentiable function 
u% : Q1 i—► R is convex on 9% if and only if u% (9) > u% ^  +  V 0iUl (9) (9 — 9  ^ ,V0,0 =
^0*,0_lj  £ 0 . Using the fact that (9) = P(9) and the Definition of ul (9) we can
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get the global condition:
11* (0) > „ * ( 9 ) >
/<^'S1
<ctT+
p(6)-e > p ( e ) i+
p(0)-e > P(6)■ < m CD >-
i
ul (e\9) > «* (e\ 6 M , V M e e 7
This concludes the proof. ■
An analogous result can be found in Rochet and Chone (1998) in the presence of trans­
fers. Note that the convexity condition implies that the prospects are, ceteris paribus,
dP (6)weakly increasing in the type of each voter on the relevant issue (i.e. > 0,Vn,i).
TL
Moreover, the convexity condition implies that the utility function of each player is differ­
entiable almost for all preference profile. Hence we require no regularity condition on the 
set of solutions of our problem but instead these are derived from the IC constraints.31
Note that the equality V diUl (0) = P(0) in Proposition 1.3 together with the Definition 
of ul(-) imply that any implementable SCF should satisfy the following linear first-order 
partial differential equation:
V eiui {e)-6 = ui {6). (1.1)
Euler’s Theorem implies that the former equality is satisfied if u% (•) is homogeneous of 
degree one on 6% G © (HD1: A • =  t • ul(6), A e R, A > 0). Further­
more, Euler’s Theorem on homogeneous functions is invertible, that is, only homogeneous 
functions of degree one satisfy equation ( l . l ) . 32 The next result follows:
Theorem 1.3 The SCF p : Q1 —* X is strategy-proof if and only if the voters’ induced 
utilities are HD1 and convex on their own preferences. That is, ul (6) is HD1 and convex 
on Q% for all 6 €E 0 7.
The homogeneity of degree one on the interim utilities implies that the interim prospects
31 See Rochet (1985) for a detailed proof of the fact that implementability implies differentiability for 
almost all preference profiles. Note the equality V 0iu ‘ (6) =  P(9) in Proposition 1.3 should be stated in 
terms of "for almost all 6l 6  0*.
32See Lemma 1.4 in the Appendix.lt is worth noting that this Lemma can only be applied wherever 
the function is differentiable. Nevertheless, the fact that u*(-) is convex implies that it is continuous and 
differentiable almost everywhere. Thus, Lemma 1.4 can be applied wherever the function is differentiable 
and by continuity we can extend the homogeneity result to those points where the function may not be 
differentiable (the kink points that may exist in the convex function u*(-)).
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are homogeneous of degree zero (HDO) . 33 This means that all proportional types are 
treated equally and bunched together. In other words, the interim prospects are only 
sensitive to the relative valuation between the issues. The result can be interpreted as 
implying that there cannot be any direct interpersonal comparison of utilities and any 
aggregation procedure should be preceded by an intrapersonal one. Intuitively, an apa­
thetic voter and an enthusiastic one are essentially treated in the same manner provided 
that their relative valuations between any two issues coincide. This extends the equality 
argument embedded on any voting game and presented in the introduction: not only it is 
the case that wealth effects can play no role in a voting game, but neither can the pref­
erence endowment of each individual. Whilst the former argument is an axiomatic one 
(imposed by ethical or practical reasons) the latter is an equilibrium result, a necessary 
condition for the voting game to be implementable.
Note that we consider a multidimensional mechanism design problem with multilateral 
asymmetric information without transfers. The main difficulty (and main contribution 
with respect to the existing literature) lies exactly in the fact that transfers are not allowed. 
Consequently, we introduce an endogeneity problem in the sense that we can no longer 
associate a high transfer to a high type declaration in order to induce truthful revelation 
of the preferences. Therefore, when a voter declares that an issue is highly preferred, the 
SCF should not only increase the probability of winning that issue but the associated 
cost should be formulated in terms of a decrease in the probability of him winning any 
other issue.34 Intuitively, this complicates the analysis. However, as opposed to what one 
would expect, having no transfers simplifies the analysis because the first order partial 
differential equation that arises from imposing truthful revelation (IC) is now solvable.
To illustrate such a property, imagine a setting with only two issues. For a SCF to 
be implementable it should only depend on the direction of the preference vector and 
should be invariant to its modulus.35 As a result, we have reduced the dimensionality of 
our problem to one dimension. Furthermore, if the setting is unidimensional, the HDO 
implies that interim prospects should be invariant with respect to the intensity of the 
preferences and should only depend on its sign (that is, whether the voter wants the 
approval or the dismissal of the issue).
Hence, the argument usually endorsed by political scientists that “the introduction of an
33 The partial derivative of a HD1 function is a HDO function.
34 Precisely, this intuition is at the heart of the particular voting rule we described in Section 1.3: QV 
endows agents with a given number of votes such that whenever an agent wishes to strengthen his position 
on a particular issue he does so at the cost of lowering his voting power on the remaining ones.
35 Such concept becomes clearer if we consider polar coordinates. In that setting, the interim prospects 
should only care about the angular coordinate (angular coordinates if the setting has more than two 
issues) and neglect the radial coordinate.
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intensity dimension attacks political equality in ways not permissible within the context 
of democratic theory” is questionable.36 Intensity can be taken into account as long as 
we broaden the usual limits and we bundle together the voting of more than one issue. In 
other words, allowing agents to express the intensity of their preferences whenever they 
vote goes hand-in-hand with the argument of analysing voting games in multidimensional 
settings.
It is worth saying that Theorem 1.3 applies to any general setting as long as voters have 
quasi-linear von Neumann Morgenstern utilities (i.e. cardinal utilities) and there are no 
transfers. Hence it does applies to electing representatives, allocating private goods to 
individuals, etc.... We may, in each case, add extra feasibility constraints on the sum of 
probabilities across individuals or issues. Note also that our result is stronger than the 
standard result that voters’ incentives in any game are not changed if the von Neumann 
Morgenstern utilities are multiplied by a constant. Indeed it is the case from the IC 
constraints that the expected utility of a voter when he declares 6l or A • 9l (A > 0) 
coincides, yet this is a weaker statement than requiring the SCF on every single issue 
to remain unchanged when the voter’s declaration is multiplied by a positive scalar.37 
Moreover, our result is not solely a necessary condition for implementability but, together 
with the convexity condition, it is also a characterisation of all implementable SCFs.
It is clear from Theorem 1.3 that increasing the number of issues should relax the imple­
mentability constraints which in turn allow us to reinterpret the main result in Jackson 
and Sonnenschein (2003) —incentive costs diminish as we increase the number of issues 
we consider and first best can be arbitrarily approached. The HDO result implies that the 
SCF can only be sensitive to declarations that have one lower dimension than the prefer­
ence space. Consequently, the constraints that truthtelling impose on the implementable 
SCFs are less binding the higher the dimensionality of the preference space; at the limit, 
these constraints tend not to bind and the first best can be arbitrarily approached.
Theorem 1.3 also extends naturally to a Bayesian Nash implementation setting. We just 
need to be aware that the conditions are then imposed on the interim utilities rather than 
the ex-post ones. It is worth pointing out that in that case the Theorem is general in 
the sense that it allows for any prior on the opponents preferences. That is, it allows for 
correlation between issues, individuals, etc. The drawback is that it would be stated in 
terms of the interim prospects and consequently the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a SCF to be implementable critically depend on such priors.
36Spitz (1984), pg 30.
37It could be the case that the allocation (i.e. the n-dimensional vector of probabilities) changes when 
we multiply the declaration of player i by a positive scalar though keeping his expected payoff constant. 
This may ease the achievement of truthtelling of player j  and/or could have an effect on the ex-ante total 
welfare achieved by a particular SCF.
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Before we state two immediate consequences of Theorem 1.3 in the form of corollaries we 
want to stress the fact that the implementable SCFs have a very balanced structure. This 
is best captured by applying Schwarz’s Theorem (the order of the differentiation does not 
alter the result) to voter i ’s induced utilities:
d P n  (l9)  d P m  ( 9 )
d 9 l eel
Vn, m  =  1 + N  
Vi = 1 + 1
w e e '
That is, the marginal change of issue n ’s prospect to a variation on voter z’s preference 
on issue m  should coincide with the correspondent change on issue m ’s prospect to a 
variation on issue n. Note that this should hold for every preference profile and any 
voter.
C orollary 1.1 The utilitarian first best allocation can never be reached.
The utilitarian first best allocation requires approving an issue whenever the sum of utili­
ties is higher than zero and dismissing it whenever it is lower than zero; needless to say, this 
requires interpersonal comparisons of utilities thus cannot be truthfully implementable.
Theorem 1.3 also implies that any voter is indifferent between declaring his own prefer­
ences or declaring his own preferences normalised by, say, the L\ norm (that is, such that 
the sum of the absolute value of its components adds up to 1). This line of reasoning 
leads to the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 . 2  Any strategy-proof mechanism in a multidimensional setting with no trans­
fers can be replicated by a point-voting mechanism where voters are endowed with a given 
number of votes that can be distributed freely among the issues.
This last result can be read as a taxation principle in our environment. In the same 
way that the revelation principle allowed us to restrict our attention to direct revelation 
mechanisms we can now go back from any direct mechanism to an indirect mechanism 
where players are endowed with one perfectly divisible point that can be split among the 
issues.
This Corollary offers a new rational for the existence of fiat money in the following sense: 
any mechanism we can devise in a setting with no monetary transfers can be replicated 
by a mechanism where we introduce a numeraire that has no value. It has no value, first,
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because it does not enter the utility function of agents and, second, because it is useless 
outside the framework where it is defined (that is, it can only be used to express the 
voters’ preferences in a particular voting game). Hence, the only possible use it may have 
is on smoothing transactions, on allowing the mechanism to elicit the voters’ intensities 
of preferences when deciding which allocation to implement. Money is in our model 
a useless token that plays three main roles: (1 ) allows the mechanism to compare the 
voters’ valuation (unit of account)-, (2 ) allows agents to trade-off their voting power among 
the issues (if we gave our model a temporal reinterpretation this could be considered the 
usual storage of value property); and (3) allows agents to extract gains from their different 
relative valuations towards the issues (medium of exchange).
The analogy with prices allows a better understanding of Theorem 1.3 above. Just in the 
same way as a consumer requires that his marginal rate of substitution equals the price 
ratio of goods when he maximizes his utility, the ratio between the allocated votes on 
each issue should be equal to the relative valuation between them.
1.4.2 Im possib ility  result
We have characterised all strategy-proof SCFs as those that induce indirect utilities that 
are HD1 and convex. The set of such functions is not empty. Indeed, any voting rule that 
is not sensitive to the voters’ intensity of preferences is implementable. MR, dictatorial 
rules or rules that implement a particular allocation regardless of the voters declared 
preferences induce truthtelling. Obviously, we would like to impose minimal requirements 
on the set of SCFs we want to analyse so as to avoid the latter ill-behaved rules.
In this section we pay no attention to the usual requirements of anonymity and neutrality 
(that is, invariance of the mechanism with respect to the labelling of individuals and 
issues) but, instead, we require unanimous wills to be implemented.
The unanimity condition is a very mild requirement but leads to the central result of 
this section, an impossibility result. This condition is also known in the social choice 
literature as a weak form of efficiency; it requires an issue to be approved (alt. dismissed) 
with certainty when all player wish so.
Definition 1.5 The SCF p : 0 7 —> X  satisfies the unanimity property if
if 0^ > 0, Vi =  1 /  
if6 in < 0 y i  = l  + I
,Vn =  1 + N.
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We also define a mechanism as being qualitative whenever it is sensitive to the voters’ 
intensities of preferences —that is, it implements different allocations when some players 
vary the intensity of their preferences (but do not vary their wish towards the approval 
or dismissal of any of the issues). Note, for instance, that MR is not qualitative in the 
sense that it is only sensitive to the sign of the voters’ preferences and it is not sensitive 
to the particular relative intensities.
Definition 1.6 The SCF p : O1 —> X  is qualitative if there exists two preference profiles 
(9, 9 E O1) such that sign (0) = sign (d'j and p(9) ^  p ^0^ .38
The following Lemma shows that without loss of generality we can restrict our attention 
to those qualitative mechanisms that are sensitive to the intensity of the preference of 
a particular voter on a single issue. If the SCF was never sensitive to the intensity 
of a particular voter on a single issue we could construct an iterative process where we 
would change the valuation of an individual in a specific issue until we reached all possible 
profiles. The SCF would not change in the whole process thus it will fail to be qualitative.
Lemma 1.2 I f p ' .Q f - ^ X  is qualitative then there exists a voter j ,  an issue m and two 
preference profiles (9, 9 E Q1) such that
3 j, m  such that sign (0^ )  =  sign (&ln)
e%n =  ~9%n f i i i -
p ( 9 ) ^ p
Proof. We know that for any qualitative SCF p there exists 9,9 e Q1 such that sign (0) =  
sign and p (0) ^  p . Now consider an iterative process where change the initial 
preference profile 0  into 0  by varying at each stage a single value.
To illustrate this process we rewrite the preference profiles into the following form:
0 =  (ai,...,a/*jv) E R !*n  
0 = {h ,...,hHN)E  RImN
Now consider the profile <pk = (b\ , ..., bk, ak+1 ,..., u /* t v ) for k =  0 /  * N.
38 The operator sign  should be interpreted as a vector of minus ones, zeros and ones according to the 
sign of each coordinate.
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During the iterative process we compare the allocation achieved by ipk with the one 
achieved ipk+i- Given that p{0) — p (ip0) ^  p =  p (d'j we know that during that
process the SCF modifies the implemented allocation at least once. In other words, the 
allocation implemented by p changes when we vary the preference of at least one individual 
on a single issue. ■
The key intuition of this section lies on the fact that any strategy-proof SCF that satisfies
the unanimity property needs to be insensitive to the voters’ intensities of preferences
on those issues where unanimous wills exist. Alternatively, the SCF can no longer be
strategy-proof: any voter has incentives to save resources on that issue where unanimous
wills exist thus strengthening his position on the remaining issues. Recall that we have
seen, as a consequence of Proposition 1.3, that the prospect of approving any issue is
dP (0)weakly increasing on the declaration of any player on that issue (— — > 0). Hence
d&h
any player is willing to increase his valuation on any particular issue if this has no cost 
to him.
Lem m a 1.3 I f  p : e 1 ^  x  is strategy-proof and satisfies the unanimity property then, 
whenever sign (9ln) =  sign (6 Vi, j  = 1 + 1,
such that sign (x ) =  sign (6ln) .
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that at 9 E Q1 all voters wish the approval 
of issue one, in particular voter i has preferences ~9\ > 0. Given that there are unanimous 
wills on issue one, the probability of approving it is one and should not change whenever 
voter i slightly varies the strength of his preference towards that issue,
d p i(0) 
d9\
=  0.
0=0
Moreover, that probability should still remain unchanged whenever voter i varies his 
declaration on any of the remaining issue. Hence, given Schwarz’s Theorem, we have that 
the next equalities should hold:
d p i(0)
d9l
dpn (0)
0=0 d0\
= 0,Vn = 2 + N.
0=0
Therefore OU i _ =  (0 ,..., 0 ) for all 9i > 0 .0=0
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The proof is just using extensively the fact that the probability of approving an issue 
where unanimous wills exist can not change as long as unanimous wills are in place.
The Lemma implies that whenever unanimous wills exist, the implementability conditions 
should apply to the remaining declarations. That is, if agents are deciding over N  issues 
and there are unanimous wills on one issue then the implementability conditions should 
apply to the remaining N  — 1 issues. In particular, if there are two issues and voters 
unanimously agree on one, no intensities of preferences can be considered at all because 
the HDO applies to the single remaining issue.
Consider now a strategy-proof qualitative mechanism that satisfies the unanimity prop­
erty. It needs to be sensitive to the voters’ intensities of preferences for some particular 
profiles but it cannot be so on those issues where unanimous wills exist. This places a very 
asymmetric restriction on how sensitive to the intensity of preferences the mechanisms 
are —this is why such mechanisms cannot be strategy-proof. The next example sheds 
some light on this reasoning.
Example: Imagine a situation with two issues, two voters and a strategy- 
proof qualitative mechanism. We can find three positive parameters (a, b,a > 
0 ) such that 0  =  ((a, 1 ) , (—6 , —1 )) and 0  = ((a, 1 ), (—6 , —1 )) implement a 
different allocation (i.e. p(0) = p(d^j). Without loss of generality assume
that a > a  thus p\ (0 ) > pi (hence p2 (0 ) < P2 (^))-
Now consider the preference profile cp = ((a, —1), (—6 , —1)). Note that it 
only changes the sign of player l ’s preferences on issue 2. The SCF needs 
now to satisfy unanimous wills hence P2 (<p) = 0. The SCF is now left with 
evaluating the voters’ preferences on only one issue, hence it can no longer be 
sensitive to their intensities. In other words, p ((x, — 1), (—y, — 1)) =  (pi, 0) 
for any x, y > 0 .
For x  large enough and y = b we need p\ to be at least as high as p\ (0) for 
the SCF to be strategy-proof —i.e. p\ > p\ (0). Instead, for y large enough
and x = a  we need p\ to be at least as low as p\ (0) for the SCF to be
strategy-proof —i.e. p\ < p\ ^0 J .
Indeed, the condition p\ (0) > p\ ^0^ tells us that the former two conditions 
cannot be satisfied.
The proof of the following (impossibility) Theorem is basically an extension of the former 
example to the general case with I  voters and N  issues.
T heorem  1.4 There exists no strategy-proof qualitative SCF that satisfies the unanimity
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property.
Proof. We prove the Theorem by induction on the number of issues.
When N  = 1 there exists no strategy-proof qualitative mechanism (note that the unidi­
mensional case makes no use of the unanimity property).
Suppose now that there exists no strategy-proof qualitative mechanism for N  = k and, 
instead, suppose the opposite for N  =  k +  l .39 That is, imagine that there exists a 
strategy-proof mechanism that satisfies the unanimity property and is sensitive to the 
voters intensity of preferences in the (k +  l)-dimensional case:
36, p  G © such that sign (6) =  sign (p) and p (6) ^  p (p)
where no unanimous wills are present in any of the issues of 6 or 0.
By Lemma 1.2 we can assume without loss of generality that 6 and p  differ only on the 
valuation of voter one in the first issue. That is,
\  <p= ( (M 2 , - ,8 \r ) , . . . ,8 I) 
where a > b > 0. Strategy-proofness implies that p\ (6) > p\ (p).
Define the set of voters that wish the dismissal of the first issue as J  := G 1 : 6\ < 0 } £  
I. This set is not empty given that there are no unanimous wills. Denote k := #«/ and
J  =
We consider now an iterative process on the elements of J  similar to the one described in 
the proof of Lemma 1.2 where we sequentially switch the negative valuations towards the 
first issue of voters in J  into neutral valuations.
Define the following preference profiles where voter j i ’s preference towards the first issue 
is set to zero:
j  8=  ( ( a ,8 L .. .y N) ,. . . ,(0 ,8 ? ,.. . ,8 j} ) ,. . . ,8 1')
Strategy-proofness implies that p\ (6) > p\ (0) and p\ (ip) > p\ (ip). Three things can
39 The remaining of the proof consists on showing that the proposed SCF cannot be qualitative and 
strategy proof and satisfy the unanimity property when N  =  k +  1. Thus by contradiction we show that 
the inductive argument is satisfied.
40The sign #  denotes the cardinality of a set, the number of elements the set contains.
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happen: pi (0) > px (p), pi (0) = pi (p) < 1 and pi (0) = Pl (p) =  1 .
If pi (0) > pi (ip) or pi (0) = pi (ip) < 1 we move into the second stage of the iterative 
process now with j 2 and starting from the resulting preference profiles 0 and ip from 
the precedent stage. We keep on repeating the process until we reach the third possible 
scenario where pi (0) = pi (ip) = 1. The unanimity property ensures that such allocation 
is achieved and the process should end in at most k (k < oo) stages (say it ends in stage 
« ) .
The fact that pi (0) > pi (p) implies that pi (ip) > pi (p). Moreover, the inductive 
hypothesis implies the allocation achieved by 0 and ip coincide with the allocation where 
the first issue is approved and the intensity of preferences are not taken into account. This 
is immediate if k =  k. Instead, if k < k we can finish our iterative process by switching 
the preference of all voters that wish the dismissal on the first issue and hence end up in 
a situation where unanimous wills towards the first issue exist (note that the SCF does 
not change in this process). Hence, by Lemma 1.3 the achieved allocation is equivalent to 
one where the dimensionality is reduced in one and hence the inductive hypothesis applies 
and the SCF can only consider the sign of the preferences.
We now show that there exists a particular preference profile of voter j K for which 
truthtelling cannot be an equilibria.
Once again, strategy-proofness implies that pi (ip) > pi (p) and that for least one m  6  
{2,..., JV}, one of the two following conditions holds
f Pm (p) < Pm (p) and 0% > 0
\  Pm (p) > Pm (p) and 0 < 0.
Imagine pm (p) < pm (p) and 0% > 0. We can find preference profiles for voter j K for 
which he has no incentives to tell the truth.
Given that the allocation achieved by p  does not take into account the intensity of the 
preferences, for any profile of voter j K such that the sign of his preferences does not change 
the SCF implements the same allocation. In particular, the SCF should implement the 
same allocation for any positive value of voter j K’s preference on issue m. For a big enough
value it cannot be optimal to tell the truth given that pm (p) < pm (p).
An analogous argument applies whenever pm (p) > pm (p) and 0 ^  < 0 . ■
We have seen that any mechanism that is robust to any possible specification on the 
priors and satisfies the unanimity property cannot take into account the intensity of the
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voters preferences. This impossibility result is consistent with the social choice literature
and, in particular, the Gibbard-Satterthwhaite (G-S) Theorem where we see that the
strategic interactions between individuals do not allow to propose mechanisms that are 
implementable in dominant strategies and satisfy some appealing properties.
A version of the G-S Theorem states that in an election with three or more outcomes and 
where we assume a universal domain in the voters’ preferences, the only strategy-proof 
and onto SCFs are dictatorial. This result is more restricting than ours because we only 
claim the impossibility of implementing qualitative mechanisms. The reason why we get 
a distinct result is because we are implicitly restricting the domain of preferences. This 
is best captured by considering the following example. Consider a voting game with two 
issues and map all possible outcomes into the G-S framework with four alternatives:
Alternative A  is defined as approving both issues
Alternative B  is defined as approving the first issue and denying the second.
Alternative C is defined as denying the first issue and approving the second.
Alternative D is defined as denying both issues
Clearly, not all strict preferences can be assumed in the set of outcomes {A ,B ,C ,D }  
—for example, the strict preference A >- D >- B  >- C can never be observed. Most related 
to our work, Hylland (1980) proves that even in the case of cardinal and unrestricted 
preference profiles the random dictatorship was the only strategy-proof mechanism that 
satisfied the unanimity property.
Given the impossibility of implementing qualitative mechanisms that are strategy-proof 
and satisfy the unanimity property we are left with the question of which mechanism may 
be optimal. May’s Theorem (1952) could be extended to our setting if we added a stronger 
condition than unanimity, namely, positive responsiveness.41 In that case we obtain that 
the only SCF that is strategy-proof, anonymous, neutral and positive responsive is MR.
In the spirit of the literature following Arrow’s Impossibility result we should identify ways 
to overcome our result. One way to get through this result is relaxing the equilibrium 
criteria from dominant strategies to Bayesian Nash. We have seen in Section 1.3 that 
this particular line of research, together with an appropriate restriction on the domain of 
preferences, proves to be very successful and we can characterise some situations where 
there exists a very simple mechanism (QV) that allows the expression of interest by the 
voters and is not only superior to the MR but also optimal.
41 “By this [positive responsive] we mean that if the group decision is indifference or favorable to x, and 
if the individual preferences remain the same except that a single individual changes in a way favorable 
to x, then the group decision becomes favorable to x .” May (1952) pg 682.
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The second way to provide some positive results consists on dropping the unanimity 
requirement. This immediately implies that we are not able to achieve ex-post efficiency 
(regardless of Incentive Compatibility), yet we are able to characterise an infinite set of 
strategy-proof SCFs. The next subsection develops this approach.
1.4 .3  A  w ay to  overcom e th e  im p ossib ility  result
We restrict our analysis to the two voters case for ease of presentation. At the end of the 
section we show how our main result extends to the general case with I  voters.
As indicated above, we now drop the unanimity requirement to avoid the impossibility 
result. Equivalently we could restrict the domain of preferences such that there are no 
unanimous wills or assume that there has been a previous stage were all unanimous wills 
have been implemented.
In order to proceed in a meaningful way and avoid trivial mechanisms such as constant or 
dictatorial ones we have to require further conditions. Recall that the neutrality condition 
requires no systematic tendency towards the approval or dismissal of any of the issues 
(pn (01?#2) =  1 ~ Pn (—fl1?- #2) jVn =  1 -f- N). In the two voters case, any neutral 
qualitative mechanism satisfies a rationality constraint in the sense that it never does worst 
than MR .42 The proof of the latter result follows from the implementability conditions:
u (e\ e) > u (o \ 0) = p  ( e \  ejyj  • e \  v e \  e \  ej e 0.
Whenever voter i declares the opposite preference than voter j  ( -0 3), neutrality together 
with anonimity imply that the SCF should implement the MR outcome. Thus, for every 
possible preference profile the allocation implemented by truthfully reporting the type is 
at least as good as the one achieved by MR.
From the observation above we know that the utility induced by any neutral and im- 
plementable SCF should be non-negative since MR never generates a negative payoff. 
We also know that any implementable SCF generates utilities that are convex and HD1. 
Hence any neutral and strategy-proof SCF induces a seminorm in the space of preferences 
of each voter 43 In other words, the indirect utilities are functions defined in the space of 
preferences of each voter that satisfy the nonnegative property (u (0%, (0l, 63)) > 0 ), the
42 In the two players scenario MR is analogous to Unanimity: it implements unanimous will when they 
are in place and ties issues when players have opposing views.
43 A seminorm on a real vector space V  is a function p  from V  to the non-negative real numbers satisfying 
the scaling property (p (a x ) =  |a |p (x )) and the subadditive property (p (x +  y) <  p (x) + p ( y ) ) .
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scaling property (u (a • 6l, (a • 0l , 0J)) =  |a| • u (0 *, (0 *, 0J))) and the triangular (or subad­
ditive) property (u (0*, (0*, 0J)) +  u (if1, (<£>l, 0J)) > u (0* +  y?1, (0* +  0J))). Hence the
pair (0 , u (•,(•, 0J))) is a seminormed space for all 6J E © (and for all z, j  E (1,2} , z ^  j). 
Guided by this idea and the fact that the implementable SCFs should have a well de­
fined structure as suggested by Schwarz’s Theorem, we can propose the following infinite 
countable set of implementable SCFs:
P- (" ' 8’ ) = K(Ffc
k—1
where k is any positive even number and \\-\\k denotes the usual /c-norm.44 The prospect 
of approving any issue is well defined between —1 and 1. We can extend this set for any 
real number k greater than one just by carefully adapting the previous formula to avoid 
complex solutions:
k—1 / I i \ k—1
Pn (0 \0 2) = \  f«0 rc(0 i) ' (jjflTjj"] +  si9n (6n) • ( p i j | - j  | , f c > l -  (1 -2 )
Besides strategy-proofness, this infinite uncountable set of strategy-proof functions satisfy 
some appealing properties such as neutrality, anonymity, symmetry across issues and 
neutrality across issues.45 It is also interesting to observe that the SCF tends to the MR 
outcome whenever we let k —> 1 —in that case, the exponent (k — 1 ) tends to zero thus 
tends to put equal weight on all issues and voters. Instead, whenever k —> oo, the SCF 
tends to be almost equivalent to a SCF that requires voters to rank issues and only uses 
the information about the highest ranked issue —that is, puts a weight equal to one on 
the most preferred issue of any voter and zero on the remaining issues.
There are still a couple of properties worth mentioning. On the one hand, the defined 
SCFs are ex-post incentive efficient in the sense of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). That 
is, there is no implementable SCF that makes some voters better off without worsening 
off some other voters.46
On the other hand, we know that any linear combination of strategy-proof mechanisms 
is also strategy-proof. Moreover, any convex combination of SCFs characterised by (1.2) 
is also neutral, anonymous, symmetric across issues, neutral across issues and ex-post
44The fc-norm on MN is defined for any real number /c >  1 as follows: ||x||fc =  ^ |x i|fc +  ... -f |x./v|fc^ .
45 See Definition 1.1 for a precise definition of these terms.
46 Note that the concept of ex-post incentive efficiency differs from the one of ex-post efficiency. As was 
highlighted above, the sole fact of not satisfying the unanimity property implies that ex-post efficiency 
can not be achieved.
CHAPTER 1. QUALITATIVE VOTING 53
incentive efficient. This leads us to conjecture that the whole set of SCFs satisfying the 
previous properties is described by (1 .2 ) . 47
In the alternative in which we restrict the set of preferences such that no unanimous wills 
exist, we drop the coefficient \  in front of (1 .2 ) given that the value of the term inside 
the brackets is now included in [—1 ,1] instead of [—2,2] .48 Finally the analysis extends 
immediately to a setting with I  voters defining:
Pn (01, ...,07) = ^ n ( 0 4) • +  -  +  si9n (0ln) • j  > 1.
1.5 Conclusion
In the first half of this Chapter we have proposed an alternative to the usual voting rule 
which is simple and allows voters to express their willingness to influence. A mechanism 
which seems the most natural extension to MR and that is proved to be not only superior 
to MR but also a mechanism that achieves the best possible allocation and induces truthful 
revelation of the voters’ preferences in some general settings. Its essence relies on almost 
allowing for transferable utilities without introducing money; players can freely move their 
voting power across issues to strengthen their position in some issues. Following our initial 
quote we have extended the use of purely economic concepts into the political system. 
Yet, the results in the second half of the Chapter show that such development is not 
exempt from difficulties and we have shown that it is impossible to allow the willingness 
to influence to play a role in general settings where unanimity is satisfied. James Coleman 
best captured, once again, the rationale behind our reasoning:
“ Clearly a system of power that was parallel in all respects to a monetary sys­
tem could not be devised, because of the different nature of private goods and 
public policies. Yet it is equally absurd to believe, as the lack of political inno­
vations seems to imply, that political power must be as different from economic 
power in its organizations as is the case in existing political systems”49
The main findings of this Chapter can be summarised through its four theorems: (1) QV 
unlocks conflict resolution situations allowing each of the opponents to trade off their
47We have found no counterexample nor formal proof of such statement.
48In the two voters’ case, this restriction corresponds to requiring the two voters to have opposing 
preferences. In this case, QV replicates the allocation of the provided SCF in (1.2) when k —► oo. In 
particular, QV is strategy-proof and ex-post incentive efficient.
49Coleman (1970) pg 1082.
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voting power between the various divergent issues; (2 ) in a situation with more than 
two voters, QV allows very enthusiastic minorities to decide on those issues that the 
majorities are mostly indifferent towards; (3) whenever a public decision has to be made 
and no transfers are allowed, only the agents’ relative intensities between the issues can 
be considered; and (4) there exists no mechanism that sensitive to the voters’ intensity of 
the preferences, satisfies the unanimity property and is robust to any specification of the 
priors.
The driving force of our results and our main contribution to the existing literature 
relies on forbidding any kind of transfers between voters. This has been assumed on 
the grounds of an equal argument so that no endowment effects can ever play a role 
in voting games. Furthermore, we have extended such a concept when analysing QV 
by imposing the anonymity property: any aggregating device should not benefit any 
particular individual. Finally, departing from these axiomatic properties we derived an 
equilibrium result (Theorem 1.3) that concludes that a further condition of equality has 
to be satisfied: no direct interpersonal comparison of utility can be undertaken. It is not 
solely because a voter values one issue more strongly than another voter that he should 
be given more voting power on it. In other words, preference endowments should not play 
a role either.
Precisely, the equality argument in the three forms expressed above is crucial to ensure 
the stability of any aggregating mechanism as it is stated in the following quote:
“I do not believe, and I never have believed, that in fact men are necessarily 
equal or should always be judged as such. But I do believe that, in most 
cases, political calculations which do not treat them as if they were equal are 
morally revolting.” 50
Likewise, Dahl (1956) endorses the view that intensity of the voters’ preferences should 
be taken into account in order to ensure the stability of political institutions.
Given how the complexity of the problem escalates when we consider more general set­
tings, we are actually working on experimenting with QV in a more complex setting with 
diverse issues and voters to realise how people may react to different information struc­
tures .51 It seems sensible to expect that, the more issues or voters, the more dispersed the 
information about the opponents’ preferences will be. Consequently, similar results to the 
ones stated in this Chapter should follow. This is congruent with the notion that voters
50Robbins (1938) pg 635.
51 See the following Chapter..
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may not be able to react rationally to some complex situations given their lack of time, 
knowledge or aptitude to do so. Hence we may observe a less strategic misrepresentation 
of preferences and voters may use their private information almost truthfully. Be that as 
it may, this and further considerations are analysed in Chapter 2.
QV also introduces a new ingredient in the debate around the institutional adjustment 
that should occur in an extended European Union (EU). “There is a widespread conviction 
that the system established by the Treaty of Rome cannot function effectively in a Union 
of 25 to 30 members” 52 . Logrolling is a common feature in the present EU where countries 
(almost publicly) exchange their votes depending on the issue at hand. In an enlarged EU 
such system can not be efficient and QV could be the answer. Countries would be free to 
intensify their votes regardless of side agreements and, hence, obscure side payments.
52 http://europa.eu.int
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1.6 Appendix
P ro o f of P a r t  1  of Lem m a 1 .1 .
Given the uniform and independent priors we can restrict our attention without loss of 
generality to voters with positive preferences.
Assume that there is an equilibrium where non-indifferent voters use different strategies. 
That is, where a voter that prefers the first issue invests v on his preferred issue and a 
voter that prefers the second issue invests w on his preferred issue (v ^  w). Finally, an 
indifferent voter invests Vi on the first issue (without loss of generality we assume that 
Vi > -J-)- Once again, the described priors imply that v,w  > ^  and v > Vi, w > V —
We now show that the described equilibrium cannot be so because an indifferent voter 
always has incentives to deviate.
Any voter can face thirty six possible situations on each issue depending on the strategy 
played by both his opponents. In some situations the votes cast by his opponents are 
higher or equal than zero in which case, regardless of his strategy, the issue is approved. 
Similarly, if the invested votes are smaller or equal than —V  the issue is dismissed. The 
table below depicts such situations with a positive and negative sign, respectively. The 
remaining cells capture the total number of votes cast by voters two and three:
ISSU E 1
V + + + + + +
Vi V i-V + + + + +
( V - w ) V  — v — w 11 + + + +
1 1 6 —V  +  w — v —V -\-w — Vi -2  (V -  w) + + +
~Vi - — —V A w  — Vi V  — w — Vi + +
—v - — —V  + w — v V  — v — w V i-V +
—v -Vi 911 ( V - w ) Vi V
ISSU E 2
w + + + + + +
(V - V i) V  — W — Vi + + + + +
(V - v ) V — w — v Vi~V + + + +
- { V - v ) —V  +  v — w —2V + v + Vi - 2  (V -  v) + + +
11 —V + V i~ w - 2  (V -V i) -2 V  + v + Vi Vi —v + +
—w - —V + Vi — w —V  +  v — w 1 ci 1 s V - w -V i +
—w •**11 1 1 ( V - v ) ( V - Vi) w
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We can now compute the final allocation in each possible situation whenever voter one 
follows the three possible strategies. That is, whenever he invests (vi,V  — V{), (v , V — v) 
or (V — w,w). In order to compute the expected interim payoffs we define the following 
parameters:
a = 1 V — v — w +Vi > 0 6 = 1 —2V 2w -|- Vi ]> 0
a = — 1 V — v — w A Vi < 0 6 =  - 1 —2V + 2w + V i< 0
c =  1 <$■ 2V — w — 2Vi > 0
i—HII-e 2V — v — w — Vi > 0
c =  —1 2V — w — 2Vi < 0 1II 2V — v — w — Vi < 0
e =  1 —V  +  2v — Vi > 0 B = 1 —2V +  v +  2tu > 0
e =  — 1 & —V  +  2v — Vi < 0 B  = -1 —2V + v + 2w < 0
C = 1 <=> 2V — 2v — w > 0
C =  - 1 2V — 2v — w < 0
Weighting each possible situation by its probability53 we have that the expected payoffs 
when playing the three possible strategies are
II (Vi, V — V{) • 64 =  58 +  2a 4 - 6 +  4c +  2d +  e 
II (u, V — v) • 64 =  60 — 4a +  4d — 3e +  B  +  2C
*
and
n  (w, V -  w) • 64 =  63 +  4a -  46 -  4c -  4d -  2B -  C
Now we just need to consider all possible combinations of parameters to realise whether
it is strictly better to deviate. The following inequalities show that not all parameter
combinations are possible54
V — v — w + V{> 2V — 2v — w > 2V — v — w — Vi> 2V — w — 2v{
a C d c
—2V  +  v +  2w > —2V  +  2w + Vi 
B b
Whenever a = — 1 an indifferent voter is strictly better off by playing (v , V — v). Hence, 
for the proposed strategies to be an equilibrium a should be equal to one.
53 Given the uniform and independent priors, all columns (alternatively rows) occur with probability |  
except columns two and five which occur with probability
54 For instance, a =  — 1 ==> C  =  d =  c =  —1.
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Repeating the previous reasoning for d = —1 we can also see that an indifferent voter has 
incentives to deviate by playing (V — w,w). Thus, C = d = 1 .
Now assume that c =  — 1. In that case, the expected interim payoffs are equal to 
II (vi, V  — Vi) • 64 =  58 +  6 4 - e and II (w , V  — w) • 64 =  6 6  — 46 — 2B. Note that it is 
not strictly better to deviate only when b = e = B  = 1. It can be easily shown that d =  1 
and 6 =  1 imply that w > v, but d =  1 and e =  1 imply that V  +  v — w — 2vi > 0. The 
latter inequality cannot hold when w > v. Hence, in equilibrium, a = C = d = c=  1 .
Suppose now that B  =  1. First note that in that situation e should be equal to — 1 
because e =  1 implies (together with d = 1 ) that w > v and this is not compatible with 
V  + v — w — 2vi > 0 (this inequality results from combining C =  1 and B  =  1 ). Thus 
e =  — 1. Nevertheless, in that situation a non-indifferent voter that prefers issue 2 is 
better off by deviating and playing (vi, V  — Vi). Hence, in equilibrium B  — b — —1.
e = 1 implies, as before, that a non-indifferent voter that prefers issue 2  is better off by 
deviating and playing (yi, V  — Vi). And finally, e =  — 1 achieves an allocation which is 
identical to have all voters splitting evenly their voting power (hence it is essentially a 
situation where v = w = Vi and all values are close enough to i.e. 2V — 3v > 0) ■
Proof of Part 2 of Lemma 1.1.
The proof is analogous to the previous one. Assume that there is an equilibrium (v, V{) 
such that indifferent voters do not evenly split their voting power. That is, such that it 
reaches a different allocation to (v, ^ ) .  Without loss of generality we assume that Vi > 
Given that the only equilibrium with v = Vi is (^ , we have that v > Vi > y . As before, 
the uniform and independent priors allow us to do our analysis from the perspective of 
voter one and we assume that he has positive preferences (that is, he desires the approval 
of both issues).
The table below depicts the thirty six possible situations that a voter can face on each
CHAPTER 1. QUALITATIVE VOTING 59
issue depending on the strategy played by both his opponents.
ISSUE 1
V + + + + + +
Vi V i - v + + + + +
( V - v ) V  - 2 v •p*11 + + + +
1l — —V  V v  - V i -2  (V v) + + +
~Vi — - - V  V v  -  Vi V  — v — Vi + +
—v — - - V - 2 v Vi — V +
—v - V i - ( V - v ) ( V - v ) Vi V
ISSUE 2
V + + + + + +
( V - V i ) V  — v — V{ + + + + +
( V - v ) V  - 2 v Vi - V + + + +
- ( V - v ) — - T V  +  v +  Vi - 2 ( V  - v ) + + +
- ( V - V i ) — - 2  ( V - V i ) - T V  +  v  +  Vi V i - V + +
—V — - - V  - 2 v 11 +
—v $11 - ( V - v ) ( V - v ) ( V - V i ) V
We can now compute the final allocation in each possible situation whenever voter one 
follows the proposed strategy and whenever he unilaterally deviates and invests (V — v») 
votes in the first issue. As noted in the main text, we want to consider a deviation where 
voter one, realising that both his opponents invest more voting power on the first issue, 
deviates and casts more votes on the second one. Furthermore, the considered deviation 
does not change his payoff when he faces non-indifferent voters. In order to compute the
expected interim payoffs we define the following parameters:
a =  1 O  V  — 2v + Vi >  0 c = 1 TV — v — 2vi >  0
a =  — 1 V — 2v +  V{ <  0 c =  — 1 <*=> 2V — v — 2 v i < 0
6 = 1  O  —TV +  2v +  Vi>0  d =  1 —TV +  Svi < 0
6 =  —1 — TV +  2v +  Vi < 0 d = — 1 —2V + 3 v i> 0
Weighting each possible situation by its probability we have that the expected payoffs
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when non-deviating and deviating are respectively
r n  := ^  [(27 -  2b + 4c -  a) +  (31 +  2a +  6 )]
< and
k n d := n  +  ^  [8 -  4c +  4d].
Now we just need to consider all possible combinations of parameters to realise whether 
it is strictly better to deviate.
Whenever d =  1 or c =  — 1 it is strictly better to deviate. Instead, when d =  — 1 and c =  1 
both strategies yield the same expected payoff. Nevertheless in that situation some of the 
hypotheses axe violated (for b =  —a = 1 and b =  —a = —1, ( v , V i )  is essentially equal 
to (v , -y); instead, when a =  b = 1 , (v,Vi) does not constitute an equilibrium because a 
non-indifferent voter that prefers issue one is strictly better off playing votes on the 
first issue; finally, the case a =  b = — 1 can never happen). ■
Proof of Proposition 1.1.
Given that indifferent voters invest ^  votes in each issue we have that all possible com­
binations of cast votes in any of the issues by two voters that follow the strategy (v, 
are depicted in the matrix below:
V + + + + + +
V
2
V
2 V + + + + +
( V - «) V —2v % - v + + + +
- ( v - v) - - \ V  + v - 2  ( V - v ) + + +
V
2 - — -%V + v
V
2 —  V + +
—V - - - V - 2 v  | —  V +
—v _ V2 - ( V - v ) (V - v )
V
2 V
1 before, we define the following four parameters:
a =  1 v > 2v — V c =  1 & v > \ V — V
a = —1 ^ v < 2v — V c =  —1 v < \ V -  V
b = 1 v > v - \ d =  1 v > 2V --2v
b = - 1 v < v - % d = - 1 v < 2 V - -2v
CHAPTER 1. QUALITATIVE VOTING 61
where v indicates the number of votes invested in issue one by the remaining voter. 
Without loss of generality we assume that this voter has positive preferences and strictly 
prefers the first issue.
(y, y )  is an equilibrium if and only if it is optimal for the remaining voter to invest exactly 
v votes on the first issue (that is, v = v should be optimal).
The way to proceed is to define all possible cases so that the conditions that define 
the four parameters are well ordered. For instance, whenever v > | F  we have that 
0 < 2V — 2v < v — y  < t;V — v <2v  — V  < V  and it can easily be shown that v =  v is 
an optimal response for voter one. Hence, (v, y )  is a symmetric equilibrium as long as 
v £ (|V , V ]. This set of equilibria are essentially identical to (F, y ) .
A further analysis shows that there exists no symmetric equilibrium where v £ (|V , |V ] . 
The case in which v = implies that 0 < v — y  < 2V — 2v = 2v — V  < — v < V  and
a symmetric equilibrium can be sustained if and only if 9 =  y  If 0 < y  voter one prefers 
investing more voting power on his preferred issue and, inversely, he prefers to split his 
votes more equally whenever 9 > y  Hence we conclude that (\V , y )  is an equilibrium if 
and only if 9 =  y  Moreover, that equilibrium can be sustained by any v e ( |F , |F ]  .
Finally, v € ( y ,  ^V) can constitute a symmetric equilibrium only when 9 > y  when 
6 < a non-indifferent voter knows that by deviating and investing all of his voting 
power on his preferred issue he gains that issue when he is confronted with an indifferent 
voter and a low one (instead he loses it if he invests v votes). This equilibrium reaches 
the same allocation as MR. In fact, ( y ,  y )  is clearly an equilibrium for any 9 because 
any voter is equally pivotal with any number of votes (in particular with v = y ) .  ■
Proof of Theorem 1.1.
Any direct mechanism is defined by 512 parameters. That is, all possible combinations of 
both voters’ types multiplied by the number of issues we are considering. Restricting the 
analysis to reasonable SCFs renders the problem tractable and simplifies the analysis into 
six parameters; we need to define the SCF only on a particular issue when both voters’ 
preferences on that issue are opposed and this can be done regardless of the sign of the 
remaining issue.
More precisely, the neutrality property defines the value of the SCF whenever voters 
have analogous preferences (that is, whenever both voters coincide on how strongly they 
prefer each issue) and allows us to focus on positively valued issues (when the agent we
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analyse wants the approval of the issue). The symmetry across issues allows us to focus 
on a particular issue (say, issue one) and the neutrality across issues property reduces 
the possible types we have to analyse to four because the SCF has to be invariant with 
respect to the sign of the remaining issue. Finally, unanimity implies that we only have 
to consider the cases when the opponent wants the dismissal of issue one. The next table 
depicts the six parameters that uniquely define any SCF given the properties above:
Note that these parameters are probabilities of approving an issue, hence they lie in the 
interval [0 , 1].
We define the interim prospects given the four possible declarations as P  (1,6), P  (0,1), 
P ( l , l )  and P(6,9).  For instance,
P( l , 9 )  = 2 { j S j ( p ( ( l , e ) , ( e ) ) ) } - l  =  2 . i | i  + ^  + B + C + 4 | - l .
The optimal (reasonable and ex-ante efficient) SCF is the one that maximises the ex-ante 
utility subject to the truthtelling constraints (Proposition 1.2) and the feasibility ones 
(the six parameters need to belong to the interval [0,1]). The program reads as follows
max v* (p) = 8  [3 +  A  +  C  -  D  -1- F  +  (4 -  A -  B  +  E  +  F) 0\ 
A,B,C,D,E,Fe[  0,1]
'  1. - B  + C - D  + E  + 2F - l  = Q
subject to < 2 . 2A + B  + C - D - E - 1 > 0
3. - 6 B  -  2C -  6 D -  2E +  4F +  6  > 0
4. - A - 2 B - C - D  + F  + 2 + ( A - B - 2 D - E  + F + l ) 0 < 0
Solving this linear program we get that A = C = B  = 1,D = E  = 0 and F  =  1/2. Note 
that this allocation is the same than the one achieved by QV, hence QV is optimal.55 ■
55Note that IC implies that players that are indifferent between the issues should be treated analogously 
at the interim stage whether they hold strong or weak preferences. We have now proved that this is not 
only the case at the interim stage but also at the ex-post stage. In other words, the optimal implementable 
SCF does not undertake ex-post interpersonal comparisons of utility.
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Proof of Theorem 1.2.
Any direct mechanism is now defined by 8192 parameters. Restricting the analysis to rea­
sonable SCFs renders the problem tractable and simplifies the analysis into 44 parameters 
belonging to the interval [0,1]. The following tables define such parameters depending 
on the preferences of each individual. Note that given that we have three voters the final 
allocation should be a three dimensional table. Hence, in order to depict it we provide 
four tables each one corresponding to a different preference profile of voter one (as we 
assume throughout, voter one has positive preferences towards both issues).
9' =  (0,1),
( M ) A B C D 1 1 1 1
(0,1) E F G H 1 1 1 1
( i , i ) I J K L 1 1 1 1
(0,0) M N 0 P 1 1 1 1
(-0,0) 1-M Q R S P L H D
( - 1, 1) 1-1 T U R 0 K G C
(~o,i) 1-E V T 0 N J F B
( - i  ,o) 1-A 1-E 1-1 1-M M I E A
( - 1 , 0 ) ( - 0 , 1 ) ( - 1 , 1 ) ( - 0 , 0 ) (0 , 0 ) (1 , 1 ) (0 , 1 ) (1 , 0 )
( M ) E F G H l 1 1 1
( M ) 1-V a b c l 1 1 1
( i , i ) 1-T d e f l 1 1 1
(0,0) i -Q g h i l 1 1 1
(-0,0) 1-N 1-g j k i f c H
( - 1 , 1 ) 1-J 1-d 1 j h e b G
( - 0 , 1 ) 1-F 1-a 1-d 1-g g d a F
( - 1 , 0 ) 1-B 1-F 1-J 1-N i -Q 1-T 1-V E
(-1 ,9 ) (-9 ,1 ) (-1 ,1 ) (-9 ,9 ) (9,9) (1 , 1 ) (9,1) (1,9)
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(1 , 0 ) I J K L l 1 1 1
(0 , 1 ) 1-T d e f l 1 1 1
(1 , 1 ) 1-U 1-1 n o l 1 1 1
(0 , 0 ) 1-R 1-j P q l 1 1 1
( - 0 , 0 ) 1 - 0 1-h 1-p r q o f L
( - 1 , 1 ) 1-K 1-e 1-n 1-p p n e K
( - 0 , 1 ) 1-G 1-b 1-e 1-h i-j 1-1 d J
( - 1 , 0 ) 1-C 1-G 1-K 1 - 0 l-R 1-U 1-T I
( - 1 , 0 ) ( - 0 , 1 ) ( - 1 , 1 ) ( - 0 , 0 ) (0 , 0 ) (1 , 1 ) (0 , 1 ) (1 ,6
01 =  (0 , 0) ,
(1 , 0 ) M N 0 P 1 1 1 1
(0 , 1 ) i-Q g h i 1 1 1 1
(1 , 1 ) 1-R 1-j P q 1 1 1 1
(0 , 0 ) 1-S 1-k 1-r s 1 1 1 1
( - 0 , 0 ) 1-P 1-i i-q 1-s s q i p
( - 1 , 1 ) 1-L 1-f 1 -0 i-q 1-r p h 0
( - 0 , 1 ) 1-H 1-c 1-f l-i 1-k i-j g N
( - 1 , 0 ) 1-D 1-H 1-L 1-P 1-S 1-R i-Q M
( - 1 , 0 ) ( - 0 , 1 ) ( - 1 , 1 ) ( - 0 , 0 ) (0 , 0 ) (1 , 1 ) (0 , 1 ) (1 , 0
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1.1, we just need to compute the interim prospects in 
terms of these parameters and maximise the ex-ante utility of any of the voters subject 
to the truthtelling constraints. The interim prospects are proportional to:
P  (1,6) = - 9  +  A  +  2D +  2B + 2C +  2F + 2G + 2H  +  2 J  + 2K+
+2 L + 2N + 20 + 2P + 2Q + 2R + S  + 2T + U + V.
P ( 0 , 1) =  2 + 2 E - B  + 2G + 2 H - 2 J - 2 N - 2 Q - 2 T -  2V+
+2i + c l + 2b +  2 c +  2 /  +  2 h -}- 2 j  + 1 + k + 2 e.
P  (1,1) =  9 -I- 21 -|- 2 J  + 2L — 2T  + 2d + 2 f  — 2XJ — 21 + n+
+2 o — 2 R  — 2j + 2q — 20 — 2h — 2 G — C — b + r.
P(0,0) = \2 — 2L — 2 f  — 2R — 2j + 20  — D — 2H — 2Q — 2S+
+2h + 2N  — 2k + 2q — c — o + 2p -j- 2M  -I- s — 2 r.
The optimal (reasonable and ex-ante efficient) SCF is the one that maximizes the ex-ante 
expected utility subject to the truthtelling constraints and the feasibility ones (that is,
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the forty parameters need to belong to the interval [0 , 1]).
subject to <
max ul (p)
P ( i , i )  =  P(0,0)  
P ( i , 0 ) > P ( 0 , i )
p ( 0 , i )  +  p ( i , 0 )
p (  i . i )  >
p ( 6 , i ) e  + p( i , 0) d  
0 + 0
The end of the proof relies on writing the program in terms of the forty parameters and 
then, step by step, assuming whether or not any of the constraints is binding. Once this 
is done we are just left with some tedious (though trivial) linear programs. And it can 
be proved that for different values of 0 the corner solution varies. More specifically, all 
parameters are equal to one except those specified below:
• 0 G (0, ^) : R = S  = U = b = c = j  = k = l = Q.
• Q = R  = S  = T  = U = j  = k = l = r = 0.
• 0 G (±, l) : Q = R  = S = T  = U = V  = j  = k = l = r = 0.
A proper analysis of such allocations tells us that they coincide with the allocations 
achieved by the strategies where a non-indifferent voter invests V, |V  and % votes on his 
preferred issue, respectively. ■
Equilibria with continuous preferences and divisible votes (2 players).
We restrict the analysis to pure strategy equilibrium. Remember that Theorem 1 tell us 
that the optimal strategy is only contingent on the relative intensities of the preferences 
and, moreover, it is well behaved (monotonic) with respect to them. In order to simplify 
the analysis we assume a uniform distribution on the relative intensities rather than on 
the preferences themselves i.e.
( Pr ( K l  =  1} =  Pr {0'„ >  0 } =  i  
< £ e { ± l , ± 0 } :  I 9 ~  If [0,1]
( Pairwise independence across issues and voters.
We analyse the equilibrium from the perspective of a voter with positive preferences. The 
interim expected payoff of voter i when he invests vl G [0, V] CM votes on the first issue
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is:
where, <
Pi{vi)-e\  + p2 { v - v \ ) - e i2 
Pi (v‘) =  Pr +  v* > 0 | 0\ < o) +  \  Pr (v* +  tP =  0 | e{ < o)
P2 (l -  v%) =  Pr +  vi < 0 | 632 < 0^ +  \  Pr =  0 | 0J2 < 0^
Simple calculations allow us to rewrite the interim expected payoff of voter i as:56
P r(? / +  ^  =  O ) | - ( 0 j - 4 ) -
Hence, an indifferent voter is indifferent between playing any of the strategies (as was 
done in the binary case, we assume that he plays the undominated strategy Vi = and 
a non-indifferent voter (say he prefers issue one) wants to maximise the expression inside 
the curly brackets. In the case where (•) induces an atomless distribution on [0, V] it 
is dominant for voter one to set vl = V. Otherwise, if the induced distribution on the 
invested votes by voter j  on issue one is not atomless, V{ will always be strictly higher 
(if possible) than the absolute value of the lowest possible value of v i. Thus, the only 
equilibrium has non-indifferent voters investing all their voting power on their preferred 
issue.
Finally note that the proof can also be applied to the case of continuous preferences and 
non-divisible votes. We just need to restrict the set of strategies of voter i. m
I ^  +  j p r ^ +  ^ > 0 ) +  i
Equilibria with continuous preferences and divisible votes (3 players).
The setting is analogous to the one described in the proof above. We just need to add the 
restriction that we focus our analysis on symmetric equilibrium (that is, the three voters 
play the same strategy) and (as was done in Section 4.2) we further assume that voters 
behave equivalently regardless of the labelling or the sign of the issue.
This proof is a bit more complicated than the one above because now we need to consider 
whether each of them is in favour or against the approval of each of the issues in order 
to assign the appropriate sign to the cast votes. Once we take this into account we have
56 Conditional probabilities are omitted for simplicity.
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that the interim prospects read as follows ( v \ v k > 0 ):
Pi (</) =  i  Pr (vi + vk < v i \ 0{, 0$ < o) +  Pr (vj -  vk < vl \ 0{, -G\  < o) -  \
P2 ( l - v i) = i P r  (vi + vk > V + v1 | G{,9\ < o)
+  Pr (V  -  vk < V  -  vl | 6{, - d \  < 0) -  ±.
Note that the tie breaking rule is now playing a role because voter i just needs to equate
the sum of his opponents votes whenever only one of them desires the dismissal of the 
issue. Given the assumption that voters play equivalently regardless of the sign of his 
preferences we have that u-7 and (l — v-7') have the same induced distribution (the same 
can be said about voter fc’s strategy). That implies that iA is symmetrically distributed 
around In order to simplify the notation we define X  := yi + vk (which, accordingly, is 
symmetrically distributed around V  i.e. Pr (X  < k) = Pt (X  > 2V — k ) for k G [0,2V"]). 
Using such symmetry and the fact that (yi +  (l — vk)) is distributed as X, we can write 
the interim expected payoff for a voter that prefers issue one as follows
c t + i p r ( X  +  +
First note that whenever both opponents are splitting their voting power evenly (the case 
of MR), voter i is indifferent between playing any of the strategies. In particular vl =  ^  
is a best response. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium has all voters always splitting their 
voting power equally among both issues.
In the remainder of the proof we show that there exists only one more (and only one) 
equilibrium which corresponds to the one in which non-indifferent voters invest all their 
voting power on their preferred issue.57
Any other equilibrium will have non-indifferent voters investing more than ^  votes on 
their preferred issue. Consequently, any voter with 6 € [0, ^) clearly invests all his voting 
power on his preferred issue. Suppose now that there are some voters with 6 G [^, l] 
such that vl < V. Theorem 1 tell us that the optimal strategy is a well behaved function 
(decreasing with respect to 6) thus we can consider a parameter 6 G [^, l] such that any 
voter with 6+ > 0  invests strictly less votes on his preferred issue {v% (0+) < V) and any 
voter with 0~ < 6  sticks to the strategy v% = V.
5 7 The behaviour of indifferent voters does not need to be specified because they have zero measure.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that their best response to any of the equilibria is splitting their voting
power evenly.
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Given that both are acting optimally we have that the next two inequalities should hold:
(Pr (X < V ) ~  Pr (X < vi (0~))) • {9 - \ )  <
< (Pr (X < 2V) — Pr (X < V  + v{ (i9~))) • {2 - 0 ~}
(Pr (X < V) -  Pr (X < v* (i9~))) • {0+ -  ±} >
> (Pr (X < 2V) -  Pr (X  < V  +  vl (0~))) • {2 -  0+}
Given that the optimal function is decreasing we have that we should consider two possible 
cases: (1) the function is smooth at 9 (i.e.lim£_>o v% (& +  e'j = V)  and (2) there is a
discontinuity (i.e.lim£_>o vl ^0 + =  v < V).  Consequently, taking limits as 9~ and 9+
tend to 9 in the previous inequalities lead to two possible equalities depending on the 
behaviour of the optimal strategy at 9 :
1- (Pr (X < V) -  Pr (X < V)) ■ -  \  } =  (Pr (X < 2V) -  Pr (X < 2V)) • { 2  -  £} .
2- (Pr (X < V) -  Pr (X < v)) =  (Pr (X < 2V) -  Pr (X < V  +  v)) • { 2  -  .
Clearly, the first equality cannot be met because there is a positive measure of types 
playing the non-diversification strategy thus Pr (X  = 2V) > 0. The second case also 
leads to a contradiction given the following inequalities and the fact that one of them will 
always be strict:
2 0 - 1  < 2 - 0
Pr (X < V) -  Pr (X < v) < 2 ■ (Pr {X < 2V) -  Pr (X < V  +  v ) ) .
The second inequality needs some clarification. The term in brackets on the RHS accounts 
for all those cases in which both opponents are investing strictly more than (V  +  v ) votes 
(i.e. X  € (V +  v,2V] ). That is, those cases in which both voters have a type belonging 
to the interval |o, 9^j. Hence this occurs with probability p2 where p := Pr j#  G |^ 0,9^ j | .  
Instead, the LHS accounts for those cases in which X  belongs to [v,V). A necessary 
condition for that event is that none of the voters should invests V  votes. That is, it 
occurs with a probability lower than 1 — p. Given that 9 is uniformly distributed, we 
know that p >
Finally, we just need to see that the second inequality is strict for p > \  and the first one 
is strict for p = 5 . ■
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Lem m a 1.4 /  : R — > R is homogeneous of degree k if and only if the following first 
order partial differential equation is satisfied:
V/ (x )  • x =  & • / ( x ) .
Proof. Sufficiency. (Euler’s Theorem) Given that /  is homogeneous of degree k we have 
that for all A > 0 and all x € RN the following holds: f  (Ax) =  Afe • /  (x). Differentiating 
the equality with respect to A we obtain:
®i • (Ax) +  ... +  xN • -p -  {Xx) = k • Afc_1 • /  ( z ) .
O X i  o x n
For A =  1 we get our result.
Necessity.58 Define £ (A) := X ~ k  • f  (Ax) — /  (x) and differentiate such expression,
4' (A) := - k  \ - k- '  f ( \ x )  + \ - k
Xl  ■ S (AX) + -  + X N ' &  {XX)
Using the fact that V /  (x) ■ x =  k • /  (x) we have that £' (A) =  0. Hence, £ (A) is constant. 
Moreover, £ (1 ) =  0, thus £ (A) =  0 for all A > 0 which proves that /  is homogeneous of 
degree k. u
58 This part of the proof is extracted from Martin J. Osborne webpage
(www.chass.utoronto.ca/~osborne)
Chapter 2
A First Experiment on Qualitative 
Voting
2.1 Introduction
2.1 .1  M otivation
Voting is the most common tool for collective decision-making. It is the way we normally 
aggregate individual preferences into social decisions whenever we want to treat citizens 
equally (in particular, we do not allow monetary transfers so that endowment play no role 
in the decision process). Regardless of its relevance, not much research has been done 
trying to assess the optimality of different voting rules to different situations.
It is precisely on the grounds of equality that voting rules do not usually consider the 
intensities of the voters’ preferences. In the first Chapter we propose an alternative 
voting rule, Qualitative Voting (QV, hereafter), that is sensitive to the voters intensities 
of preferences and preserves an equal treatment of all voters. We consider a voting rule 
where the concept of decision preferred by most members is replaced by the concept 
of decision most preferred by members. We want votes to have an embedded quality 
which is somehow associated to the intensity of the voters’ preferences. Ultimately, we 
want to show under which circumstances the strategic interactions between voters do not 
undermine the gains we expect from them expressing their willingness to influence.
We see QV as a natural extension to the Majority Rule (MR, hereafter) where a group of 
voters that have to decide over the approval or dismissal of a predetermined set of issues
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is endowed with a fixed number of votes that can be distributed freely among the issues. 
Equality is preserved given that all voters are endowed with the same voting power. The 
main difference with respect to MR is that now voters do not need to attach the same 
voting power to each issue and can, consequently, trade off their voting power.
The fact that voters can intensify their votes on those issues they mostly care about 
allows two main improvements with respect to standard voting rules. On the one hand, it 
allows relatively strong minorities to decide over weak majorities —the fact that majorities 
usually impose their will regardless of the intensity of their preferences is known in the 
political science literature as "the problem of intensity" and motivates the first part of 
this Thesis. On the other hand, in conflict resolution situations where two parties need 
to decide over various conflicting issues, QV allows each party to unilaterally unlock the 
negotiation.
Theoretical properties of QV are studied in Chapter 1. We show that in a setting with two 
voters, two issues and preference intensities uniformly distributed across possible values, 
QV Pareto dominates MR and, moreover, achieves the only ex-ante optimal (incentive 
compatible) allocation. The result also holds true with three voters as long as the possible 
preference intensities differ substantially.
The novelty of QV lies in its simplicity, thus it seems natural to design a series of ex­
periments to further examine its properties. First we want to contrast the theoretical 
predictions with the experimental evidence. Second, we want to observe how voters be­
have in those situations where the theory remains silent. Ultimately, we want to evaluate 
the welfare achieved by our subjects through the use of QV.
In this Chapter we show preliminary evidence from a pilot experiment ran last June 2004 
with eighteen subjects in the Laboratori d ’Economia Experimental at University Pompeu 
Fabra. Needless to say, this Chapter is just a first step towards a more exhaustive analysis 
of QV and, most importantly, proposes the basic tools to be used in subsequent work. 
The main two variables we want to vary in this first experiment are the number of issues 
that need to be decided and the size of the group of voters that need to jointly decide over 
the previous issues. The informational structure is also very simple: voters are announced 
their own payments/valuations but know nothing about their opponents’. Our analysis 
is divided in three parts.
First we compare the outcome achieved in the experiment with the one that would have 
been achieved if MR was used.1 As a reference benchmark we compare both results to
1Note that the MR outcome is immediate given that there are only two choices for each issue (approval 
or dismissal) and no strategic voting can occur. That is, it is dominant for any player to truthfully declare 
whether he wishes the approval or dismissal of any of the issues.
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the outcome that maximises the sum of utilities —hereafter, the efficient outcome. Our 
data shows that QV is better able to replicate the efficient outcome than MR: QV reaches 
the efficient outcome in 6 8 % of the issues, while MR only does so in 37% of them.
Second, we evaluate the different outcomes in terms of welfare and remark that the gains 
of QV with respect to MR are not as noticeable as above. The reason for this to be the 
case is that, in our data, the MR outcome does very well whenever there are more than 
two voters per group. In any case, QV still does 20% better than MR. The more relevant 
gains axe observed precisely in the conflict resolution situations (that is, whenever two 
voters need to decide over various issues on which they have opposing views) where MR 
does not allow any decision to be made and ties occur in all issues and QV displays all of 
its strength in allowing voters to trade-off their interest across issues and unlocking the 
MR outcome.
We then analyse the subjects’ voting behaviour in order to understand what is driving 
our former results. Within this analysis we first identify what we call elementary errors. 
That is, voting profiles where voters cast most of their votes in issues that axe not their 
most preferred ones. This is clearly non-optimal given that they know nothing about 
their opponent’s payments. We then turn to the more precise analysis of the subjects’ 
voting behaviour. On the one hand, we observe that players vote according to equilibrium 
predictions—that is, they invest most votes in their most preferred issue whenever they 
need to decide over two issues. On the other hand, in order to anlayse what happens where 
the theory still remains silent we compute three scores associated with the observed voting 
decisions.2 These scores capture (1) how close the voting behaviour is from truthfully 
revealing voters’ preferences (a subject is truthful whenever the ratio between his votes 
coincides with his relative intensities towards the issues); (2 ) how close the voting profile 
is from distributing evenly the voting power across issues; and, (3) how close the voting 
strategy is from concentrating all the voting power in the most preferred issue.
We want to use the scores to test two hypothesis. If voters act according to how pivotal 
their votes are we expect that an increase in the number of players per group (that is, 
as we increase the total number of votes that are cast in the decision of a given set of 
issues) should lead voters to a higher concentration of their voting power in their most 
preferred issue —this should be captured by our third score. Instead, an increase in the 
number of issues distributes the total number of votes across more issues hence each vote 
becomes now more pivotal. Therefore, voters should diversify their voting power across 
issues increasing their chances to be pivotal in more issues —this should be captured by
2 We define these scores by computing the minimal angle between a hypothetical voting profile and the 
observed one. As a result, the smaller the angle is the closer the subject’s behaviour is to the one captured 
by the hypothetical voting profile.
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the second score.
Our data shows none of these effects. The only certain effect we observe is that whenever 
voters face many issues (in our case six), they tend to drop the two or three issues with 
lowest payments and focus their attention (and votes) on the remaining issues. This 
is consistent with an explanation based on computational complexity and is, indeed, 
endorsed by some of the answers in the questionnaire that was handed at the end of the 
experiment.
In the remainder of this Section we relate our work to the existing literature. In Section
2.2 we introduce the theoretical model and its predictions. Section 2.3 introduces the 
experimental design and presents two clarifying examples. Preliminary results based on 
the data of our experiment and, more importantly, the tools through which subsequent 
experiments need to be analysed are contained in Section 2.4. Finally, Section 2.5 discloses 
our view on how further experiments on QV need to be conducted. Section 2.6 concludes 
the Chapter.
2.1.2 R elated literature
The lack of simple alternative voting rules that capture the intensity of the voters’s 
preferences justify the lack of experimental evidence around our subject.
First and most related to our work is the experimental study of storable votes by Casella, 
Gelman and Palfrey (2003). Storable votes is a mechanism to be used in situations where 
voters have to decide over the same binary decision repeatedly over time. It allows voters 
to abstain and store that vote for further meetings when the intensity of his preference 
may be stronger. In their experimental analysis they show that the welfare achieved by 
subjects is remarkably close to theoretical predictions even when players do not exactly 
follow the theoretical equilibrium predictions.
Secondly, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981) propose a setting analogous to ours where 
five issues have to be approved or dismissed. They allow subjects to consider bills either 
sequentially or simultaneously as a package. The latter allows for the intensity of pref­
erences to intervene in a similar fashion as committees or parties bundle issues together 
—see Shepsle and Weingast (1994) and Levy (2004). Their main message is that when­
ever players axe given ordinal information about their opponents’ preferences, strategic 
interactions make subjects worse off with respect to the no information situation.
Finally, Yuval (2002) also proposes a first empirical investigation of the mechanism of
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Sequential Voting by Veto. The core of his analysis relies on showing that agents are more 
likely to act sincerely whenever the size of the agenda increases. That is, whenever the 
calculation of strategic voting becomes increasingly more complex.
A voting game is defined as a situation where I  voters have to dismiss or approve N  issues 
and no monetary transfers are allowed. Voters privately know their preference profile 
across the N  issues and the prior distributions from which these preferences are drawn 
are common knowledge. From a mechanism design perspective this is a multidimensional 
problem with multilateral asymmetric information and no transfers.
Voters and issues are denoted i G {1,2,...,/}  and n G {1,2,...N }, respectively. Voter Vs 
valuation towards issue n is 9ln. The preference vector of voter i is 9l =  (0 \,..., 0lN) G 0 C  
Rn . Preferences should be interpreted as follows: a positive type {0ln > 0) wishes the 
approval of the issue, a negative one (6ln < 0 ) wishes its dismissal and the type’s absolute 
value (|0 ” |) captures the intensity of the preference towards that particular issue.
Voter i ’s payoff on a given voting procedure n is described as follows,
An allocation is a AT-tuple of probabilities that corresponds to the probability of approving 
each of the N  issues. The set of allocations is defined as
where pn is the probability of issue n  to be approved. In general pn can take any value 
in the interval [0 , 1] but note that a voting rule yields only three outcomes: an issue 
is approved, dismissed or tied. The latter can be seen as delaying the issue until the 
following meeting and, in our risk neutral framework, it is equivalent to approving the 
issue with probability
3 In the definition of payoffs we implicitly assume that issues are independently valued. That is, there 
are no complementarities between the issues. Provided that issues are independently valued, results can 
be extended to any linear transformation of the payoffs.
2.2 The model
9ln if the issue is approved 
—01, if the issue is dismissed
and the total payoff is the sum of the individual payoffs across the N  voting procedures.3
x  = {(pi, ~.,Pn ) : P i ,-,P N  e  [0,1]}
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A voter with preferences 6l obtains the following utility from an allocation p G X :
N N
U {P’01) l== J 2 Pn0n +  t1 (~ 6n) =  (2Pn ~  ^  6n-
n = l n = l
Players are endowed with V  votes that can be freely distributed between the issues. The 
votes can have a positive or negative value capturing the will of the voter towards the 
approval or dismissal of the issue. The action space is the collection of voting profiles:
V := |(ui,...,Uiv) 6 { - y , . . . , - l , 0 _,0+,l , . . . ,y}JV : |vi| + ... + |vjv| = v }
An issue is approved through QV whenever the sum of votes towards that issue is positive. 
It is dismissed whenever the sum is negative. Finally, if the sum of votes is zero the will 
of the majority of voters is implemented or otherwise the issue is tied (alternatively, the 
issue is approved or dismissed with equal probability). That is,
QV (n = l  + N ): <
v i +  ... +  > 0
vh +  -  +  vIn < 0
«J + ... + v£ = 0
The issue is approved 
The issue is dismissed 
J The will of the majority is implemented. 
I Otherwise, a tie occurs.
We can further define the outcome of MR in this context as the one where all voters 
evenly split their voting power among all issues. Formally,
MR (n = 1 + N ): <
# { z : < > 0 } > # { i : < < 0 }
#  {* : vh > °} < #  {* : vh < °}
#  { i : vln > 0 } =  #  {*: v* < 0 }
The issue is approved 
The issue is dismissed 
The issue is delayed.
The relevant results in from the previous Chapter for our experiment are best summarised 
through Theorems 1.1 and 1.2. They regard the use of QV as an alternative voting rule 
that would allow the expression of the voters’ willingness to influence.
The first theorem states that in a setting with two voters, two issues, discrete preferences 
(i.e. 6%n 6  {± 0 , ± 0 }, 0  > 0 > 0 ) and independent uniform priors on the other voter’s 
preferences, QV reaches the only ex-ante optimal allocation. That allocation corresponds 
to the one where non-indifferent voters invest all voting power on their most preferred 
issue and indifferent voters evenly split their voting power. Therefore, QV unlocks conflict 
resolution situations. It allows voters to simultaneously and non-cooperatively declare
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which issue they prefer and hence extract all possible gains from heterogeneous preferences 
—that is, each voter decides on his preferred issue whenever it does not coincide with the 
preferred issue of the other voter.
The second theorem asserts that the previous result holds true whenever we introduce a 
third voter and as long as the possible preference intensities differ sufficiently (specifically, 
6/9 < 1/3). The introduction of a third voter yields a departure from the pure conflict 
resolution situation so that we can characterise when it is incentive compatible for very 
enthusiastic minorities to decide over weak majorities.
2.3 Experimental design
Eighteen subjects participate in the experiment.4 The experiment was programmed and 
conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).5
To induce the appropriate preferences we simply assign each player different payments 
in case each of the issues is approved or dismissed: a high payment induces an intense 
preference and, on the contrary, a low payment induces a weak preference. Payments are 
integer values uniformly and independently distributed between 1 and 1 0 0  and players 
are told so.
We partition the 18 players into three sets of six players so as to obtain three independent 
observations.6 At each period, players from each partition are randomly matched in 
groups of two, three or six members. Subjects are simply told that they are randomly 
matched into groups of different size at each period. At each period, players are endowed 
with 30 votes to be distributed among the issues.
The structure of the experiment is summarised in the following table.
4The pilot experiment was conducted last June 2004 in the Laboratori d ’Economia Experimental (Uni­
versity Pompeu Fabra)
5 The data, programme code and instructions for the experiment are available upon request.
6 We observe no significant difference between the three independent observations therefore, in the 
subsequent analysis, we will merge the data.
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Subjects Group Size Number of Issues
18 2 2
18 2 3
18 2 6
18 3 2
18 3 3
18 3 6
18 6 2
18 6 3
18 6 6
Each row is repeated 3 times. Hence subjects play a total of 27 voting games.
Given that this first experiment was just a pilot, we paid a flat rate to our participants. 
In subsequent experiments we should randomly select a certain number of voting games 
and pay subjects according to their payoff on those periods.
In our experimental design we distinguish between the conflict resolution and the com­
mittee meeting situations. In the former, two voters need to decide over various issues on 
which they have opposing views. In the latter, three or six subjects need to vote on some 
discerning issues and there is an equal chance that any of the voters wish the approval or 
dismissal of any of the issues —hence unanimous wills may exist over some issues.
At the beginning of each period subjects are told whether they are facing a conflict 
resolution or a committee meeting situation (in the latter case they are also told the size 
of their group —3 or 6  voters). They are then informed of their payments and asked to 
cast their votes.7 Once all have done so, the programme computes the outcome for each 
group and announces the following information to players: (i) their payments for each of 
the issues; (ii) how many people wished the approval or dismissal on each of the issues; 
(iii) the sum of votes on each issue; (iv) the final outcome on each of the issues; (v) the 
precise voting profiles cast by each member in their group; and finally (vi) their payment 
for that period.
7 The programme requires any single entrance to be an integer between 0 and 30 and the sum of them 
to be 30. For simplicity, voters do not need to attribute a sign to their vote -th e programme automatically 
plays the dominant strategy of assigning a positive sign when the voter wishes the approval and a negative 
sign when he wishes its dismissal.
CHAPTER 2. A  FIRST EXPERIMENT ON QUALITATIVE VOTING 78
2.3.1 Conflict resolution exam ple
There are two players. Each one is endowed with 30 votes. Players are announced their 
payments and know that their opponent wishes the opposite they wish (that is, one player 
wishes the dismissal of all issues and the other their approval). They are then asked to 
submit their voting profiles. The following table summarises the information and their 
actions (Figure A1 in the appendix captures the screen shot for player 1).
Paym ents Voting profile
P layer 1 
Player 2
(87,38,13) 
(-1 ,-4 8 ,-1 0 0 )
(2 0 , 1 0 , 0 ) 
(0,5,25)
The outcome is that the first two issues are approved and the third one is dismissed (that 
is, the outcome is (1,1, —1)). Payments are 112 and 51 for players 1 and 2 respectively 
—see the outcome screen shot for player 1 in Figure A2. Note that if voters used MR ties 
would occur in all issues and both players get a zero payment.
2.3.2 C om m ittee m eeting exam ple
There are three players. Each one is endowed with 30 votes. Players are announced their 
payments and are asked to submit their voting profiles. The following table summarises 
the information and their actions (Figure A3 captures the screen-shot for player 1 ).
Paym ents Voting profile
P layer 1 (-38,71,78) (0,15,15)
P layer 2 (-53 ,-59 ,33) (13,13,4)
P layer 3 (57, -24,15) (15,10,5)
The outcome is that issues one and three are approved and issue two is dismissed. Pay­
ments are -31, 39 and 96 for players 1, 2 and 3 respectively —see the outcome screen shot 
for player 1 in Figure A4.
If voters used MR the first two issues would be dismissed and the third one approved. 
Payments would be: 45, 145 and 18. Note that the realised outcome of QV does not 
Pareto improve the MR outcome in this case —nor it dominates it in utilitarian terms.
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2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 R ealised outcom es
The upper bound in terms of welfare is given by the efficient outcome (EffO, hereafter), 
the one that maximizes the sum of utilities. Specifically, an issue is approved when the 
sum of utilities towards that issue is positive, and dismissed when it is negative.
The ultimate goal of our analysis is to compare QV with MR. To do so we need to know 
the outcome that would have been obtained if subjects used MR. To compute this outcome 
we just need to count how many individuals wish the approval or the dismissal of each 
issue and assign the majoritarian will to each issue. We refer to this outcome as MRO.
Finally we define the outcome achieved in our experiment as the QVO.
During our experiment there were a total of 594 issues that were approved, dismissed 
or tied. In the next table we compare the QVO with the efficient and MR ones. We 
compute the percentage of outcomes for which the different outcomes coincide. For in­
stance, row one counts the number of issues for which all outcomes coincide (that is, 
EffO=MRO=QVO). Instead, row two counts the number of issues for which the MRO 
and QVO coincide but are different from EffO.
Total observations 594
EffO MRO QVO 36%
EffO MRO 5%
EffO QVO 39%
EffO 2 0 %
MRO QVO 4%
MRO 55%
QVO 2 1 %
MR reaches the efficient outcome in 41% (36% + 5%) of the occasions. In those situations 
it makes no sense to propose an alternative voting rule to MR given that this one is 
achieving the first best outcome. Nevertheless, we can see that QV manages to do at 
least as good as MR in almost 90% of the cases (36% out of 41%). Whenever MR does 
not reach the efficient outcome, QV does so about two thirds of the times.8 Instead, MR
8Note that MR does not reach the EffO a 59% (100%-36%-5% or 4%+55%) of the times. In the
CHAPTER 2. A  FIRST EXPERIMENT ON QUALITATIVE VOTING 80
reaches the efficient outcome whenever QV does not in 5% of the issues.
Overall, QV does much better than MR and it does very well replicating the efficient 
outcome: QV reaches the efficient outcome in three fourths of the issues as opposed to 
the 41% of MR.
Recall that MR was only able to replicate the efficient outcome 37% of the times.
The following table disaggregate the data above by the number of issues that were being 
voted (N  =  2 ,3 ,6 ) and the number of players that were being grouped (I =  2 ,3 ,6 ).
N  =  2 N  =  3 N =  6 1 =  2 1 =  3 1  =  6
Total observations 108 162 324 297 198 99
EffO MRO QVO 37% 39% 34% 0 % 78% 58%
EffO MRO 5% 4% 6 % 0 % 1 2 % 9%
EffO QVO 31% 39% 42% 67% 6 % 23%
EffO 27% 19% 18% 33% 5% 1 0 %
MRO QVO 5% 3% 5% 6 % 5% 0 %
MRO 55% 54% 55% 94% 6 % 33%
QVO 28% 19% 19% 27% 1 2 % 19%
The first three columns do not show any significant difference but we can observe that the 
gains we observe from allowing players to express their willingness to influence increase 
as we increase the number of issues. In particular we see that QV reaches the Efficient 
outcome whenever MR does not in 31, 39 and 42 percent of the times when they are 
voting towards 2, 3, or 6  issues, respectively. As we could have predicted, the gains from 
trade that arise when we consider multidimensional settings increase when we increase 
the opportunities of trade through the inclusion of more issues.
Finally, the last three columns show that the strengths of QV lie mainly in the two issues 
case (QV reaches the efficient outcome a 67% of the times when MR never does so). When 
we consider three issues, instead, we can see that there is not much scope of improvement 
with respect to the MR —the MR reaches the efficient outcome a 90% of the times. That 
can be explained by the fact that whenever there are three players any player is ’very’ 
pivotal given that it requires both his opponents to be against his position for his will not 
to be implemented. In any case, QV manages to reach the efficient outcome 84% of the 
times.
situations where MR does not reach the EffO, QV does so a 36% of the times. Hence, it is an approximate 
66% of the times (39/59).
CHAPTER 2. A FIRST EXPERIMENT ON QUALITATIVE VOTING 81
We turn next to quantifying these results in terms of voters’ welfare.
2.4.2 W elfare analysis
The experiment consists of 18 subjects playing 27 voting games thus we have a total of 
486 observations on voters’ welfare. The table below shows the realised average payoff 
and compares it with the one obtained when using MR. Using the efficient outcome as 
our benchmark we obtain the scores in the last column and we see that QV is able to 
improve upon the welfare obtained through MR —it does 20% better.
average score
Efficient Payoff 72.82 1 0 0
Realised Payoff 55.11 76
MR Payoff 46.11 63
Note that the efficient outcome constitutes a non achievable upper bound to our analysis. 
In Chapter 1 we proved that the efficient outcome is in general not implementable. This is 
because it requires interpersonal comparison of utilities and we show that for a mechanism 
to be implementable it needs to be sensitive only to the relative intensities between the 
issue. In other words, it cannot treat very enthusiastic voters better than apathetic ones. 
Otherwise, those with weaker preferences will have an incentive to pretend they are also 
very enthusiastic. Obviously, the EffO implies such comparisons.9
We can disaggregate the Realised and MR scores by the number of issues being bundled 
and the size of the committee that had to decide. We expect that a higher number of 
issues (increase in N ) would benefit the use of QV because voters have more possibilities 
to trade off their voting power across issues. 10 Conversely, an increase in the number 
of members in the committee (increase in I) should decrease the gains we expect from 
allowing voters to express their willingness to influence given that players become less 
pivotal thus their role through any voting rule is diluted.
9 The fact that the efficient outcome is in general not implementable is best captured in the following 
example:
Consider a conflict resolution situation with two issues and imagine that the two players’ 
payments/preferences profiles are : (90,60) and (—10, —40). The efficient allocation requires 
both issues to be approved and the efficient utilitarian social welfare is 100. Nevertheless, 
approving both issues is not incentive compatible. The implementable allocation that max­
imises the sum of the voter’s utilities consists of approving the first issue and dismissing the 
second one.
10Jackson and Sonnenschein (2003) show theoretically that an increase in the number of issues being 
bundled implies, at the limit, the achievement of the efficient outcome.
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The following table captures the scores of QV (coefficient above) and MR (coefficients 
below) by group size (7) and number of issues (N).
1 =  2
1 =  3
1 =  6
The induced preferences in the conflict resolution case (7 =  2) are such that one subject 
wishes the approval of all issues and his opponent wishes their dismissal —that is, they 
have opposing preferences. In that situation MR yields ties and obtains a zero score in 
all issues. QV improves upon that allocation and, as noted above, the gains increase with 
the number of issues we consider. The extremely positive effects we observe in the conflict 
resolution situation contrast with the weaker results of the committee meeting examples. 
The small gains from the use of QV are particularly evident in the case of group size three 
or six.
When 7 =  3, MR does extremely well. This is because under such a rule any player is 
very pivotal —it needs to be the case that both his opponents are against his position for 
the issue to be decided against his will. Hence, there is not much scope for improvement. 
Moreover, QV needs a more complex reasoning and may introduce errors in the voting 
profile. Overall QV reaches a slightly lower welfare than MR in this framework.
The argument for which MR does very well when there are only three players per group 
fails to hold true when we consider bigger groups. We can see that the MR scores when 
7 =  6  are always below the scores obtained when 7 =  3. As opposed to the situation with 
group size three, QV does almost 50% better than MR when six subjects are only voting 
upon two issues. Instead,QV does not manage to do better than MR in situations with 
more than two issues.
The committee meeting examples do not exhibit any longer increasing gains of the use of 
QV when voters decide upon more issues. Indeed, a larger number of issues increases the 
trading possibilities but it also adds more complexity to the subjects’ strategy space. The 
latter effect may induce lower than optimal responses. Precisely, some respondents to 
the questionnaire that was distributed after the experiment described that whenever they 
were confronted with six issues they dropped the two or three issues with lower payments
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and focused their attention (and votes) on the remaining ones. This aspect is treated 
within the next section where we analyse the individuals’ voting behaviour.
2.4.3 Voting behaviour
2.4.3.1 Elementary errors
Subjects may act more or less strategically according to the situation they are in (that 
is, group size and number of issues), their history in the experiment and their individual 
characteristics. Before analysing how they vote depending on their induced preferences 
we want to check whether they understood the game they were playing. For this we 
compute what we consider elementary errors (EE).
Recall that voters do not know the payments of any of their opponents and just know that 
in the conflict resolution situation their opponent has opposing preferences. Therefore, 
the issue where the highest number of votes is invested should coincide with the one of 
highest payment. In light of this, we classify as EE the voting profiles where the former 
does not happen. The next table summarises the total number of such errors per subject:
subject #  EE subject #  EE subject #  EE
1 17 7 3 13 2
2 3 8 1 1 14 0
3 5 9 4 15 0
4 0 1 0 0 16 1
5 17 11 0 17 6
6 8 12 1 18 0
There are few reasons why these errors might occur. First, and most importantly, the 
instructions may not be clear enough (we plan to simplify the experimental design in the 
future). Second, it may be the case that some people only made EE in the first periods 
but then learned how to play in subsequent periods. Finally, some errors may not be 
very big in the sense that they may have assigned a single extra vote to an issue that 
was just given a slightly lower payment. We have checked in detail the distribution of EE 
and found no clear evidence of the latter two reasons. For instance player 1 played the 
voting profile (3,7,20) when he was given the payments (44,57,45) and did not make EE 
in periods 1, 4, 6 , 12, 14, 15, 20, 25, 26 and 27.
Most importantly, the presence of EE cannot fully explain the non-substantial welfare
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obtained by QV in the committee meeting situations.
2.4.3.2 Strategic vs. truthful behaviour
We emphasised in Section 2.4.2 that some players may move away from a truthtelling 
strategy driven by a higher complexity of the game. This puts forward a question regard­
ing what we understand by strategic behaviour as opposed to truthtelling behaviour. It 
is indeed the case that we can identify situation where a player is deviating from truthful 
behaviour. These deviations may be driven by a more complex reasoning. Conversely, 
deviations from truthful behaviour may be driven by a naive strategy caused by the 
increased complexity of the setting —the latter may not be regarded as strategic behav­
iour.11 Without entering this debate, we call strategic behaviour any departure from 
truthful behaviour.
We want to understand whether the departure from truthful behaviour leads towards a 
diversifying or intensifying strategy. In other words, we want to know if subjects try 
to increase their stakes in most issues or, alternatively, they invest most of their voting 
power in only a few issues.
Our multidimensional setting implies that payments in a given period or voting profiles are 
iV-tuples (or vectors) of integer values. In order to identify how close a voter is from being 
truthful we need to identify how closely his voting profile replicates his payment profile. 
For that purpose we compute a score defined as the minimal angle formed by these two 
vectors. We do so using the expression of the dot product of two iV-dimensional vectors 
v =  (vi> •••> vn ) and w =  (w\
v - w = |M| • ||u;|| • coscc.
Thus the angle between the two vectors v and w is,
( v ■ w \I M I  •  H I  /a = arccos
v\ • w\ +  ... +  vn ■ w\— arccos '
+ . . . + « & •  ^ w \ + . . . + w
11 For instance McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981) show precisely in a related experiment that more infor­
mation makes the strategic interaction too difficult and drives players to concentrate their behaviour in 
fewer issues. Instead, Yuval (2002) shows that increased complexity induces players being more truthful 
-nevertheless his argument holds because players are confronted with unidimensional decisions at a time 
in a sequential voting by veto framework.
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This way we can define atruth as the angle between the cast voting profile (v) and the 
vector of payments (or induced preferences). The smaller this angle is, the more truthful 
the voter behaviour is.
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how much the strategies followed by our subjects differ from the MR strategy —when 
adiv is zero it denotes that the cast voting profile coincides with perfect diversification 
of voting power across issues. It is clear that players are using QV to intensify their 
voting power on certain issues and very seldom they replicate the MR strategy. The pike 
we observe around the 45° in the two and three issues denotes precisely that players are 
playing according to the predicted equilibrium behaviour. That is, they are investing 
most of their resources in only one issue.
Figure 2.1 just captures how much players differ from evenly splitting their voting power 
but this is obviously a partial analysis. To better understand their behaviour we should 
take into account their preferences. We first show in Figure 2 .2  whether players depart 
from behaving truthfully.
The most relevant fact we observe in Figure 2.2 is that as we increase the number of 
issues (as we move right) subjects tend to be less truthful. Instead we do not really see a 
significant difference in their behaviour as we vary the group size (as we move vertically). 
Any realisation above 45° in the two issue situation is what we have defined above as a 
essential errors. Note that we can observe a learning effect because elementary errors in
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difference as we vary the group size.
We can contrast our theoretical predictions with Figure 2.4: whenever subjects are acting 
strategically in the case of two issues and two or three voters per group they tend to 
invest all votes in their most preferred issue. We can conclude that the negative results 
we observed from the use of QV in the three players and two issues case is not due to 
non-optimal strategies but instead to the fact in this case MR renders each voter very 
pivotal (whenever intensities are uniformly and independently distributed).
In the conflict resolution situation with two issues there is a positive mass of voters with 
aint around 90°. That is, there are subjects investing most of their votes in only one 
issue as predicted by the theory, but this issue is the least preferred, a reflection of an 
elementary error. Once again we can observe some learning since the probability of this 
kind of error diminishes when we move away from the early stages of the game.
As long as we increase the number of issues, subjects move away from the intensification 
strategy and this behaviour is not accompanied by a diversification strategy (as observed 
in Figure 2.3). Both details provide evidence towards the assertion that, when confronted
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with many issues, subjects drop a few of them and concentrate on the subset of issues 
that is most valuable to them —as observed by McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981).
Finally, we do not observe any effect in Figure 2.4 of an increase in group size. Once 
again, we expected that an increase in the group size would induce subjects to invest 
most of their voting power on their most preferred issue(s) given that their probability of 
being pivotal diminished.
The analysis of the last two figures has tried to control for the subject no being truthful 
(®truth > 15°) and to identify a diversified or intensified behaviour that was not simply 
driven by the induced preferences.
2.5 A second experim ent on qualitative voting
The above analysis sets out the following step in our experimental QV research agenda. 
In further experiments we need to increase the number of subjects in order to obtain a 
larger data set that would allow us a more accurate quantitative analysis. Similarly, we 
need to adapt our experimental design to overcome some of the observed weaknesses in 
the present pilot.
Regarding the latter aspect we need all observations to be useful for our analysis and it 
is obviously futile to propose an alternative to MR when this one is already replicating 
the first best allocation. In a first stage of our analysis we need to check whether QV is 
able to improve upon the allocation achieved by MR and this is only possible when the 
latter is not efficient. The second stage would then consist of characterising when MR is 
not efficient. In future research we need to tackle the first stage inducing the appropriate 
preferences where MR is not efficient instead of allowing the computer to draw them from 
a uniform distribution.
We also plan to normalise the players’ payments so that their sum is constant. The 
purpose of this is twofold. On the one hand, we would ensure that the observations are 
comparable avoiding framing effects.12 On the other hand, it introduces a constraint 
imposed by incentive compatibility into the computation of the efficient outcome —thus 
making our upper bound in welfare (the efficient payoff) closer to what is implementable. 
The next example best captures the latter phenomenon.
12Framing effects imply that voters may behave differently when they are assigned payments (1,2) or 
(50,100). We want to abstract from such framing issues which have been broadly analysed in many 
different settings -see the seminal reference Kahneman and Tversky (1983).
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Exam ple: Consider a conflict resolution situation with two issues and 
imagine that the two players’ payments/preferences profiles are : (90,60) and 
(-1 0 ,-4 0 ). The efficient allocation requires both issues to be approved and 
the efficient utilitarian social welfare is 100. Nevertheless, approving both 
issues is not incentive compatible and the implementable allocation that max­
imises the sum of the voter’s utilities consists of approving the first issue and 
dismissing the second one (that is, it requires not undertaking interpersonal 
comparisons of utility and considering instead which is the most preferred 
issue by each player).
Normalisation implies that the payments are (60,40) and (—20, —80). Hence 
the efficient outcome coincides with the implementable efficient one.
In future work we may also consider relaxing the informational assumptions. We may 
first consider disclosing how many voters are in favour or against each of the issues before 
subjects cast their votes. This may make our treatment more appropriate for certain 
situations where committee members almost certainly know the stand of their opponents 
but may not know the intensity of their preferences. This information may also overcome 
the inefficiency of QV in the present setting where voters may be wasting some votes 
on issues were a unanimous will exists. Subsequent experiments may disclose additional 
information about the opponents’ intensity of preferences. 13
The variation in the group size never seemed to be relevant in our data. This may be 
due to the fact that the information about group size was only conveyed through a small 
number in a corner of the computer screen. We may be able to disclose this information 
in a more explicit way without manipulating subjects’ behaviour.
2.6 Conclusion
This Chapter is a first step towards a thorough experimental analysis of the voting system 
we call Qualitative Voting. As opposed to majority rule, QV allows voters to express 
their relative preferences and hence their willingness to influence. In Chapter 1 , we have
13 The experimental literature on voting has mostly focussed on how information affects the strategic 
behaviour of voters. For instance Eckel and Holt (1989) or McKelvey and Ordeshook (1981) emphasize 
that more information may complicate the game hence reduce strategic behaviour. Another strand of 
the literature has pointed out, instead, that information may act as a coordination device Forsythe et al 
(1993). In our companion theoretical paper we have proved that QV is very sensitive to the informational 
structure. Namely, it is not possible to find a mechanism that is sensitive to the voters’ intensity of 
preferences, satisfies the unanimity property and is robust to any specification of the priors. Be that as it 
may, there is still scope to design an experiment with complete information to realise how subjects react 
to such environment.
CHAPTER 2. A FIRST EXPERIMENT ON QUALITATIVE VOTING 91
shown that in a setting with two or three voters, two issues and uniform independent 
priors, QV Pareto dominates majority rule. Furthermore, it achieves the only ex-ante 
incentive compatible optimal allocation. The experiment in this Chapter tries to build 
on the theoretical findings from the first Chapter. For this, we provide each of our 18 
experiment participants with an endowment of 30 votes to allocate freely across issues in 
a variety of settings (two, three, and six issues to be voted in groups of two, three, or six 
members).
We can conclude that subjects who belong to groups of size two or three play according 
to equilibrium predictions when voting towards two issues. That is, they invest most of 
their voting power in their most preferred issue.
More generally and in terms of welfare, the gains of QV with respect to MR are very 
noticeable in the conflict resolution situation but are diluted for potentially different 
reasons in the committee meeting examples. We also observe that players tend to focus 
their attention on a few number of issues when they face the decision over various issues. 
The welfare implications of this fact may vary a great deal depending on the preferences’ 
and their prior distribution and open the question of the effect of agenda setting in our 
environment.
This Chapter suggests the basic measures to be used in subsequent work when analysing 
QV and, more generally, voting in multidimensional settings. A way to recognise how 
truthful voters are and, whenever they are not, whether they are diversifying or intensi­
fying their voting power.
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Voter Turnout and Electoral 
Com petition
joint w ith Berta Esteve-Volart
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 M otivation
Why do individuals vote, and how can political parties influence the individuals’ decision 
to go to the polls? This Chapter aims at providing an answer to this question. In 
particular, we analyse how politicians anticipate the voters’ decision of turning out to 
the polls and how they strategically react to this decision. In order to do so we offer a 
comprehensive theory of turnout and electoral competition. The underlying assumption in 
this Chapter is that one of the causes of the decline in turnout in established democracies 
can be found in the nature of electoral competition. 1
Following the seminal work by Downs (1957), models of electoral competition have shown 
that politicians have incentives to move towards the median voter in order to attract at 
least half of the electorate. As a result, considering that rational agents turn out to vote 
only if the benefits of doing so outweigh its costs, we have that more electoral competition 
leads, ceteris paribus, to lower voter turnout.
1In the same way that competition between firms may erode their own profits, we show how competition 
between parties erodes their electoral support and hence decreases turnout.
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We challenge this view by proposing a simple model a la Wittman (1977) where policy 
motivated candidates spatially compete to implement their announced policy. In our 
model, citizens only vote if candidates offer platforms that differ enough. If both can­
didates’ platforms converge to the median voter’s most preferred platform there are no 
gains from selecting one candidate over another, thus, no one turns out to vote given that 
voting is costly. As a consequence politicians offer differentiated policies (away from the 
median voter) to provide incentives for some voters to turn out at the polls — politicians 
anticipate abstention and they offer divergent policies. The main intuition behind our 
model is that the more the individuals’ perceptions about the two candidates’ platforms 
differ (with respect to their own policy preferences), the higher is the voter’s incentive to 
vote. A related implication from the model is that moderate (as opposed to liberal or 
conservative) individuals tend to vote less.
This simple rationale is the key to our analysis. We first propose a simple model for­
malising that idea and we then analyse data from the United States’ biennial National 
Electoral Studies (NES). We use the NES Cumulative Data File (Sapiro et al 2001), which 
allows us to explore elections held during the 1972-2000 period. Our empirical evidence 
supports our model’s prediction; namely, that a perceived low difference between the 
platforms of both the Democratic and Republican parties tends to decrease an agent’s 
probability to vote. In particular, we find that an increase from zero perceived differ­
ence to the maximum perceived difference between the two parties’ ideology increases the 
turnout probability of about 10 percentage points. We find that this result is robust to 
the inclusion of a series of socioeconomic, demographic, and political controls, state level 
institutional controls, state and year fixed-effects, state-specific time trends, and to the 
model specification. This effect is larger if we consider only the perceived differences be­
tween presidential candidates: in that case, an increase from zero perceived difference to 
the maximum perceived difference between the two parties’ ideology increases the turnout 
probability of about 14 percentage points. A lower but statistically significant effect also 
appears for differences in the perception of the parties’ positions on several particular 
issues, such as guaranteed jobs, aid to African-Americans, and cooperation with the (now 
ex) USSR. Using the same set of controls, we also confirm that moderate individuals have 
a lower probability to turn out to vote. Finally, given the well-known overreporting con­
cern for declared turnout in surveys such as the NES, we further check for the robustness 
of our results using only the set of validated votes —in all cases, our results do not change.
This Chapter introduces a straightforward and, to our knowledge, not yet analysed model 
of how political competition may affect turnout. Moreover, we hope that it helps ratio­
nalise the increasing lack of interest towards politics. In a complex political scenario with 
many different dimensions, political competition leads to the perception of only slight
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variations among platforms in each single dimension. Consequently, only voters who 
care about most of the issues, or that are politically educated enough, can perceive a 
difference between platforms that is large enough for their vote to be cast; the rest of the 
electorate simply abstains on the grounds that all politicians are/offer the same stuff or, 
as George Wallace put it in 1968:2
“There isn’t a dime’s worth of difference between the Democratic and Republican parties”
We are thus left with an inherent contradiction. A wealthy political system leads parties 
to compete and hence offer very similar platforms. In turn, this competition depresses 
voter turnout, which ultimately hinges on the legitimacy of the political system — given 
that a society’s representatives are then being elected by only a minority of the population.
The rest of the Chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.1.2, we relate this study to 
the more relevant existing literature. Section 3.2 introduces a model that explores parties’ 
strategies under electoral competition facing the possibility of the electorate’s abstention. 
In Section 3.3, we describe the data and in particular the variables more relevant to our 
analysis. In Section 3.4 we turn to the empirical evidence. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes 
and discusses some policy implications.
3.1.2 R elated literature
The purpose of this Section is not to offer a comprehensive review on the theoretical and 
empirical literature on turnout and political competition. We therefore just highlight the 
most relevant papers for our analysis.
As mentioned above, it was Downs (1957) who introduced the most basic notion of spa­
tial electoral competition and derived the well-known convergence result. Since then, the 
literature has offered many different ways to explain the divergence of political candi­
dates: introducing politicians’ uncertainty about voters’ preferences (Calvert 1985 and 
Wittman 1983), considering the threat of a third party entering the election (Palfrey 
1984), having parties determining the national policy when candidates compete in dif­
ferent constituencies (Eyster and Kittsteiner 2004, Callander 2003), considering dynamic 
incentives (Alesina 1988), admitting that any citizen could rim for election (Besley and 
Coate 1997) or assuming an incumbency advantage (Bernhardt and Ingberman 1985). 
Our work can also be seen as an alternative way to overcome the convergence result by
2 George Wallace was a third-party presidential candidate in 1968.
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adding the turnout decision of the electorate to the spatial model of electoral competition. 
Nonetheless, below we offer no empirical evidence to support our model above any other 
model of party divergence. Elements from all of them could be at work.
Few authors introduce the turnout decision into a model of electoral competition. On the 
one hand, some authors proposed probabilistic voting models as a means to allow voters 
that are indifferent between the platforms to abstain with some probability (Hinich and 
Ordeshook 1969, Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook 1972). This assumption smoothens the 
candidates’ payoffs and ensures the general existence of two-candidate electoral equilibria. 
Nevertheless, the probability of abstention is not microfounded. Moreover, in equilibria 
both parties converge. On the other hand, Myerson (2000) proposes the theory of large 
Poisson games where the size of the electorate is supposed to be a random variable —with 
the drawback that leads to platform convergence and hence zero turnout whenever there 
is a unique policy that maximizes the electorate aggregate utility.
The empirical literature on voters’ turnout spans several decades and countries. Related 
to our analysis in this Chapter, there exists a substantial literature on policy voting in US 
elections (see Sapiro for a review on literature using data from the NES). These papers try 
and assert whether the electorate is sensitive to difference in platforms —‘issue difference’. 
While early work by Campbell et al (1960) and others argued that voters were not able 
to perceive differences between candidates’ policies, subsequent evidence has been more 
favourable to the existence of such sensitivity (Aldrich et al 1989, Pomper 1972, Page 
and Brody 1972 with regards to the Vietnam war, and Palfrey and Poole 1987). There 
are several features that distinguish our Chapter from these previous studies. First, they 
usually focus on one election year, second, many of them do not address turnout but 
rather focus on the choice among Democratic and Republican candidates, and third, 
most of them do no control for other individual characteristics. Of these, Palfrey and 
Poole (1987) is the closest in spirit to this Chapter’s findings’ that more informed agents 
perceive platforms to be more different across candidates, and that more informed agents 
tend to vote more. However, Palfrey and Poole (1987) does not explore the connection 
between both features, which is the focus of our Chapter. In fact, our results suggest that 
controlling for information, individuals who perceive political parties to be more different 
are more likely to vote. That is, information is not the only link between perception about 
parties and vote.
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3.2 The m odel
We consider a standard model of spatial electoral competition with two politicians that are 
policy driven. That is, they only care about the implemented policy by the government.
Regarding the voting decision of the electorate we consider the standard Downsian ap­
proach where citizens vote only if the benefits from doing so outweigh the costs. Hence, 
only if the following inequality holds,
p A > C
where p denotes de probability of being pivotal, A  denotes the utility difference between 
the most preferred politician and the remaining one and C denotes the cost of voting 
(that is, the opportunity costs of going to the polls). We assume p G (0,1) and C > 0 to 
avoid trivial solutions.
There is a large debate in the literature about considering perfectly rational voters that 
compute their probability of being pivotal in a given election. Not only such an assumption 
is controversial but also implies infinitessimal benefits from voting when considering large 
electorates and hence turnout tends to zero (see, for instance, Palfrey and Rosenthal 1983). 
The fact that empirically there is an increase in turnout when elections are perceived to be 
close shows that there is indeed an effect, but the high turnout observed in the real world 
suggests that agents are not perfectly rational —or, putting it in Daniel Kahneman’s 
words, they may be led by intuition and impulse rather than reason.3
We avoid such debate here by assuming that the probability of being pivotal is exoge­
nously given and hence focus our attention on the simple rationale behind our analysis. 
Nevertheless, all our qualitative results would follow if we relaxed such assumption.
3.2.1 A  unidim ensional policy space
Consider a compact and convex unidimensional policy space V  =  [—1,1]. There is a 
continuum of voters whose preferred policy is uniformly distributed along V.  Voter z’s 
preferred policy is denoted g % .  Whenever a policy is implemented, voter i gets a disutility 
equal to the distance between the implemented policy and her preferred one:4 U i ( g )  =
3See Daniel Kahneman’s 2002 Nobel Prize lecture.
4The assumption that an agent’s utility function is linear in the distance between the policy imple­
mented and the agent’s most preferred policy is essential to obtain theoretical predictions that are inde­
pendent of the priors considered. Assuming concave utility functions in an electoral model with turnout 
decision leads politicians to shift their offered policies to those points where a mass of the electorate is
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- d(g,gl ) =  - \ g - g ll
The policies are implemented by an elected politician. There are two polarised candidates 
L  (left) and R  (right) that compete in order to implement their announced policies. 
Candidates only care about the policy implemented by the government as first proposed 
by Wittman (1977). Left and right candidates’ preferred polices are equal to —1 and 1, 
respectively.
The described setting contrasts with the Downsian model of electoral competition where 
politicians are solely driven by their desire of winning office. This adds an additional 
component to the analysis given that politicians do not solely want to offer a policy that 
attracts at least half of the electorate but they care about the offered policy. Having 
policy-driven polarised candidates introduces a trade-off because politicians need to move 
towards the median voter to attract most of the electorate but this has an embedded cost 
because they are moving away from their ideal policy. Below we detail the robustness of 
our results to the case of politicians that are also rent-seeking.
Both candidates simultaneously announce a platform to the electorate ( g K ,  k  =  L ,  R )  
which is credible in the sense that they are able to commit to implement such policy if 
they are elected. The winner is decided by plurality voting. That is, the winner is the 
candidate that obtains the highest share of votes. In case of ties a fair lottery is played 
and both announced policies are implemented with equal probability. We can define the 
expected payoff of candidate L as
Pl (9L,9R) ■ UL(gL) +  PR(gL,gR) ■ UL(gR)
where Ui,{g) =  — d(g, — 1) and PK(gL,gR) is the probability of candidate k  winning the 
election given the announced platforms ( g L , g R ) .  Note that P L , { g L , g R )  = 1 — P R . { g L , g R )  
for all { g L , g R )  £  V  x V .  The expected payoff of candidate R  is defined analogously.
Next we describe the second stage of the game. In this stage, agents need to decide 
whether to abstain, vote for candidate L, or vote for candidate R  once politicians have 
announced their respective platforms.
For any agent i the benefits from voting are
where p is the probability of voter i being pivotal. Given that p is exogenous we have
concentrated (i.e. in general, the set of agents voting for a candidate is in this case a closed set strictly 
included in V).
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that an agent votes if and only if
|U i ( g L )  -  U i ( g R ) | > -  =: c.t I p
Whenever an agent votes she does so in favour of her preferred candidate —the one 
closest to her bliss point. In case she is indifferent, she votes for each candidate with 
equal probability.
The former description induces a two-stage extensive form game. Solving it by backward 
induction we can easily prove the following result.
Proposition 3.1 There exists a unique equilibrium in which the candidates’ announced 
policies diverge; (gL,gR) = §).
Citizens to the left of ^  vote for candidate L, those to the right of f  vote for candidate 
R, and those in between abstain.
Proof. In equilibria, Pi(gL,gR) =  Pji(gL,gR) =  This follows immediately from 
realising that if, say, candidate R  wins the election with certainty then candidate L is 
better off by proposing a platform infinitesimally to the left of gR. These offered platforms 
induce no turnout hence both candidates win the election with equal probability thus 
candidate L  is better off.
Given that candidates are policy driven there is a centrifugal force that will tend to 
separate them as much as possible preserving the condition that Pl = Pr  = That 
is, the distance between both platforms is in equilibrium equal to c, or d(gR,gL) =  c. 
Moreover, given our distributional assumptions (the electorate is uniformly distributed 
on V) we have that the equilibria should be symmetric—both candidates need to be 
equidistant from the median voter.6 Hence, the only announced policies by candidates in 
equilibrium are (gL,gR) = , §).
The proof ends with the observation that the former pair of announced policies is indeed 
an equilibrium. Note that a deviation towards the median voter by any of the candidates 
entails a cost while does not change her probability of winning; conversely, a deviation
5In spatial models of electoral competition a centrifugal force (as opposed to a centripetal force) is 
usually understood as an incentive for politicians to offer differentiated platforms or platforms away from 
the median voter.
6 This result heavily relies on the assumed symmetric distribution. For instance, a non-symmetric 
distribution implies asymmetric offered platforms.
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Figure 3.1: The unidimensional case
towards the extremes makes the deviating candidate lose the election with probability 
one. ■
Figure 3.1 depicts the equilibrium policies and the equilibrium behaviour of individuals. 
It is relevant to realise that voters in centrist or moderate positions abstain given that 
politicians are considered to be too similar for them to be worth voting. The voter with 
bliss point gl = 0  sees both platforms as equally apart from her most preferred one and 
hence gets null benefit from going to the polls. Note also that both candidates extract 
all possible gains from the abstention by pulling their offered platforms towards their 
most preferred ones (that is, towards the extremes). Abstention introduces a centrifugal 
force that counteracts the centripetal force that arises from electoral competition and 
candidates diverge exactly by c inducing a proportion of |  of the electorate to abstain. A 
higher voting cost increases abstention but also increases divergence between platforms.
There has been a persistent concern in the existing literature about the convergence result 
obtained in the standard model of electoral competition. The simple model above can 
be seen as a new way to explain divergence in a model of electoral competition without 
the need of introducing uncertainty. Regarding the set of voters that abstain, the result 
is also consistent with US data on elections where we can observe that non-voters tend 
to have more centrists preferences than voters do, we come back to this point in Section 
3.4.4.7
Note also that whenever politicians are only motivated by winning office the strategies 
described in Proposition 3.1 are still an equilibrium given that no candidate can improve
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unique, any pair of policies in the interval [^p, |]  is an equilibrium. This is because 
a party that offers a policy on the former interval ensures that the opposing party can 
never attract more than half of the electorate. Introducing an infinitessimal preference 
towards the implemented policy and assuming that politicians are sufficiently polarised 
leads to our uniqueness result because candidates select the described equilibrium out of 
all possible pairs from the interval [^p, | ] .
3.2.2 H eterogeneous voters
As a first extension from the previous model assume that there are two class of voters: 
those with high opportunity costs of voting and those with low opportunity costs (ch > 
cl > 0). We further assume that the distribution of voting costs and policy preferences 
across the population are independent.
Given the above description of voters, we can reinterpret high cost voters as voters who 
are less sensitive to the difference between platforms. Recall that a high opportunity cost 
voter turns out to vote if and only if |U i ( g L )  —  U i ( g R ) \  > ch. Equivalently, she turns out 
to vote if and only if A • \ U i ( g L )  — U i { g R ) \  > cl where A =  ^  < 1. This allows us to 
reinterpret heterogeneous voters as citizens with equal voting costs who derive different 
marginal utilities from the distance between platforms. Thus, agents with higher costs 
are less sensitive to the distance between platforms.
A similar reasoning as before shows that there exists a unique equilibrium in which politi­
cians diverge by a distance cl. To show that this is the case imagine there is an equilibrium 
such that the distance is strictly larger than cl. In that situation one of the candidates 
can unilaterally move inwards by an e > 0  small enough such that the distance between 
platforms is still higher than c*. Clearly there still is a positive mass of agents turning out 
to vote, but the candidate that deviated is now strictly closer to the median voter than 
her opponent —and hence wins the election with certainty. Consequently the only equi­
librium looks like the one with homogeneous voters but the distance between platforms is 
now the minimal distance that makes some voters turn out to vote. Note that this result 
is independent of the mass of low opportunity costs voters. The following Proposition 
summarises this result.
Proposition 3.2 There exists a unique equilibrium in which the candidates’ announced 
policies diverge; (gL,gR) =
Low cost citizens to the left of ^  vote for candidate L, low cost citizens to the right of 
tt vote for candidate R, and citizens in between abstain. All high cost citizens abstain.
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We can therefore conclude that electoral competition leads politicians to target only the 
most sensitive groups. The situation where the whole population is targeted does not 
constitute an equilibrium because politicians can unilaterally deviate towards the median 
voter making the whole set of less sensitive population abstain and capture more than half 
of the most sensitive voters. The deviating party wins the election at an infinitessimal 
cost and overall we observe a decrease in turnout.
C orollary 3.1 Electoral competition leads politicians to target only the most sensitive 
voters, hence less sensitive voters abstain.
There is an immediate consequence of this simple model that contrasts with the existing 
literature. In case that the two sets of voters have sufficiently different median points the 
model leads to non-existence of equilibria. Hence we have a unidimensional model with 
single-peaked preferences with the slight modification of introducing the turnout decision 
of heterogeneous voters that leads, as opposed to most of the literature in unidimensional 
spatial electoral competition, to non-existence of equilibria.
Heuristically we have provided a rationalisation for most stylised facts in voter turnout. 
It has been found (see Section 3.1.2) that a greater involvement in social institutions or 
a higher level of education or income increases the likelihood of citizens turning out to 
vote. We can build a bridge between these facts and our model by assuming that voters 
that are more involved with social institutions, more educated or richer tend to be more 
sensitive to the offered policies by politicians and hence, following Corollary 3.1, tend to 
vote more given that political competition tends to target these groups of citizens.
Next we turn to extending the rationale of Corollary 3.1 to a multidimensional policy 
space where its applicability and relevance to the real world becomes clearer.
3.2.3 A  m ultidimensional policy space
Politicians do not solely offer policies on a single dimension. Party programmes have 
reached a level of complexity that very few voters (if any) can grasp. Pennings (2002) 
compares the manifestos of most political parties in the European Union and shows 
that the policy space is composed by strictly more than two dimensions. Hence the 
unidimensional case, though useful in some instances, cannot be treated as a mirror of 
the complex political arena. Building further on such a model is also consistent with the 
belief that parties can no longer be classified only through a unidimensional left-right 
scale.
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The problem of a multidimensional model from a theoretic perspective is that ensuring 
the existence of equilibria requires very strong conditions on the distribution of voters.8 
In the present Chapter we avoid such questions by choosing a uniform distribution.
As important as the dimensionality of the policy space is the fact that most voters are 
only interested in a few issues. And most importantly, different voters may care about 
different issues. That is precisely the driving force of our analysis. Given that electoral 
competition targets only the most sensitive voters, we have that in a multidimensional 
world the distance between policies is the minimal distance that attracts those voters. 
Consequently, the perceived distance between platforms by a voter who only cares about 
a few issues does not generally compensate for her opportunity cost of voting.
Electoral competition in a multidimensional world provides the right incentives to those 
individuals who care about the whole set of issues. The rest perceive “politicians as being 
all alike” and, as a result, show no interest towards politics and ultimately abstain.
Consider an extension of the model above to best capture this intuition. Assume a 
bidimensional policy space ( V  = [— 1, l]2) and the preferred policies of L and R  politicians 
to be (—1, —1) and (1,1), respectively. Moreover suppose that the first issue regards some 
aspect of the welfare state that all voters care about. The second issue, instead, regards 
some aspect that only concerns a proportion a  £ (0 , 1 ) of the population (e.g. an issue 
that only concerns particular interest groups such as abortion laws, university tuition fees 
or the use of stem cells). More generally we could consider that the relative intensity 
across issues varies among different groups of voters.
The most sensitive voters in this scenario are those who care about both issues. Their 
disutility from an implemented policy g is computed according to the following distance:9
Ui{g) = —d(g,gl) = -  (|yi -  g\\ +  \g2 -  g%2\) •
The less sensitive voters’ preferences are computed as in the unidimensional setting:
U\{g) =  -d (g ,g l) = - \ g i - g \ \ .
Assume all voters have an identical cost of voting c > 0, g is uniformly distributed on V
8 Intuitively, for an equilibrium to exist in the multidimensional space we need the distribution of 
preferred policies to have a median point (i.e. a point that belongs to all hyperplanes that separate the 
space in two equal parts given the provided prior distribution). For further reference, see Austen-Smith 
and Banks (1999) and references therein.
9 This distance is induced by the norm sub one or taxicab norm.
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Voters for  
can d id ate  R
V oters fo r  
candidate L
Figure 3.2: The multidimensional case
and the probability of being a voter that cares about both issues (a) is independent of 
the policy preferences. The following Proposition characterises the unique equilibrium.
P ro p o sitio n  3 .3  There exists a unique equilibrium in which the candidates’ announced 
policies diverge; (gL,gR) =  { ( ^ ,  =f) , (§, f ) } .
Citizens who care only about one issue abstain while citizens who care about both issues 
vote for L if  and only if g < ( ^ ,  =f), and for R if and only if g < ( ^ ,  .10
The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3.2. Once again we see that politicians 
adapt their policy to the most sensitive voters and only voters to either side of the offered 
platforms vote for their closest party. Voters in between as well as less sensitive voters 
abstain (see Figure 3.2).
At this point we can propose a new explanation for the lack of interest towards politics. 
Political parties have increasingly targeted their policies on special interest groups intro­
ducing new issues into the political agenda in order to attract those voters who only care 
about these issues. This increase in the number of issues, together with the fact that 
political competition tends to respond only to the most sensitive voters (as pointed out in 
Corollary 3.1), makes politicians differ only marginally on each issue. As a consequence, 
only those voters who care about most of the issues or only those who are politically well
10The vector inequalities should be interpreted com ponentwise (i.e. g > 0 <=> gn >  0, Vn).
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educated can perceive enough difference between political parties relative to their own 
political preferences to show up at the polls. The rest of the population cannot perceive 
any big difference between political parties and abstain on the grounds that politicians 
are all the same and hence there is no real difference between voting for any one of them.
3.3 D ata and descriptive analysis
We test the model with data from repeated cross-sections from the American biennial 
National Electoral Studies (NES), in particular the NES 1948-2002 Cumulative Data File 
(Sapiro et al 2001).
The data base contains detailed information on voter turnout and participation, their per­
ceptions about political parties, their ideology, their support of the political system, and 
demographic characteristics of individuals. Our broad usable sample spans the 1972-2000 
period. We construct our variables of interest from information about the individuals’ 
positioning on specific issues, and about how individuals perceive the Democratic and 
Republican parties in the United States with respect to those issues.11 The issues on 
which the respondent is interviewed are: defense spending, health care, guaranteed jobs, 
aid to African-Americans, rights of the accused, women’s equal rights, government ser­
vices/spending, cooperation with the USSR, urban unrest, and school busing. These 
questions are asked in different periods which determines a different sample size in each 
case. Additionally, there is a general question on the respondent’s ideology.12
In Table 1 we provide descriptive statistics about the scores for all these variables.
Some information about the intensity of the respondent’s preferences is given as well.13 
The list of options and a description of how we mapped them to the set of issues described 
above is in the Data Appendix. We also have information on the degree of partisanship 
of respondents from several questions.14 Similarly, we include a proxy for the degree to
11 For instance, the question regarding the issue of defense spending reads as follows: Some people believe 
that we should spend much less money for defense. Where would you place yourself on a [seven point] 
scale, or haven’t you thought much about this? Where would you place the Democratic (Republican) party 
on this scale? In this given example, scores number one and seven correspond to greatly decrease defense 
spending and greatly increase defense spending, respectively.
12 We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on 
which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal [score equal to one] 
to extremely conservative [score equal to seven]. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven’t 
you thought much about this?
13 What do you think that are the most important problems facing this country? Of all you’ve told me, 
what would you say is the single most important problem the country faces?
14In one of the questions regarding partisanship respondents are asked: Generally speaking, do you 
usually see yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? again, a scale is given that
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which respondents consider voting a duty.15 As a further political control, we use an 
index of political participation.16
Other variables that we consider in the analysis axe newspaper information,17 the income 
and education levels of the respondent, and demographic variables such as racial/ethnic 
group, age, gender, religious affiliation, frequency of church attendance, marital status, 
and number of children in the household. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for this 
second set of variables.
Finally, we use some state-level variables from Besley and Case (1993) as controls. As 
institutional controls, we introduce the type of registration that voters can have (that is,, 
whether an individual can register during the polling day or not, or whether conventional 
registration is available only), whether citizens’ initiatives are permitted, and whether the 
state has restrictions on corporate campaign contributions. Additionally, we also control 
for voting age population.
3.4 Empirical analysis
3.4.1 B asic results
The empirical analysis explores how the different individuals’ perceptions about political 
party platforms have impacted on voter turnout. In our main specification we estimate 
the following Probit regression:
Vist = Ots + + T a + P A ist + <})Xist + ip W st + Sist
ranges between one (strong Democrat) and seven (strong Republican), with Independents in the middle.
15 They are asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statement: If a person doesn’t care 
how an election comes out then that person shouldn’t vote in it. We interpret those who disagree as having 
a higher sense of duty, as opposed to those who agree with the statement.
16 Respondents are asked the following questions. 1. During the campaign, did you talk to any people 
and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates? 2. Did you 
go to any political meetings, rallies, fund raising dinners, or things like that in support of a particular 
candidate? 3. Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates? 4. Did you wear a 
campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign in your window or in front of your 
house? 5. Did you give money to a political party during this election year? Did you give money to an 
individual candidate running for public office? 6. Have you ever written a letter to any public officials 
giving them your opinion about something that should be done? Each answer gets one or zero points 
depending on whether the respondent answers yes or not respectively. We then use the sum of the points 
in all six questions as an index of the political participation of that individual.
17Did you read about the campaign in any newspaper? For 1988, and from 1992 onwards, this question 
was formulated as [If the respondent has read a daily newspaper in the past week:] Did you read about the 
campaign in any newspaper? For other years, the question was not restricted to a specific period of time.
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where V{St is the voter turnout variable for individual i in state s and year t (which is 
equal to one if the individual declares that she has voted, and equal to zero if she declares 
that she has not), as is a state fixed effect, 7 t is a year fixed effect, r s is a state-specific 
time trend, Aist is the perceived distance between party platforms, XiSt is the vector of 
individual demographic and socioeconomic controls, and Wst is a vector of state controls.
In all regressions we cluster our standard errors by state so as to avoid potential problems 
with autocorrelation (Bertrand et al 2003).
While the theoretical section clearly distinguishes between the unidimensional and mul­
tidimensional policy spaces, our data base does not allow for such a clear-cut distinction. 
We show below how our results are consistent with both dimensional spaces.
The most straightforward way to test the implications of our model is to use the pol­
icy dimension that most closely summarises the policy preferences of our agents. We 
have information on how agents perceive their own preferences and the preferences of the 
Democratic and Republican parties respectively on a number of issues: first, a broader 
liberal/conservative scale, and second, on a list of more specific aspects such as gov­
ernment health insurance, guaranteed jobs, aid to African-Americans, women’s rights, 
government services/spending, cooperation with the USSR, and defense spending (see 
more information about these categories and scores in Section 3.3). We now focus on 
the first characteristic, which we may consider more ideological, and construct our main 
variable of interest, A, as follows. Recall that in the unidimensional setting, individual i 
votes whenever \ U i ( g L )  —  U i ( g R ) | > c, that is, whenever the utility distance between the 
two platforms is large enough. Accordingly, we define
Ai = ||sf - S i \  -  |* ? -* ||
where Si is the score given by individual i about her preference on that issue, and s f  is 
the score given by i about party «’s policy position. Thus, A{ is a measure of Vs perceived 
distance between party platforms with respect to her preferences.
In Table 3 we present our main empirical findings. Our goal is to show that the perceived 
distance between party ideological platforms with respect to i ’s preferences can signifi­
cantly affect the probability of turning out at the polls. For this purpose we run several 
Probit regressions. In columns 1 and 2 we present the estimated coefficients without 
controls, with just fixed effects and state-specific time trends. Our variable of interest 
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. In column 3, we introduce our main 
political, socioeconomic and demographic individual controls: the perceived ideological 
distance between the two parties’ platforms is still significant at the 1 percent level. To
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have an idea of the magnitude of the effect, the same column tells us that the fact that 
somebody has read in the newspaper about the campaign increases the probability of 
her voting of 11 percentage points. This result is consistent with previous evidence that 
information matters (e.g. Palfrey and Poole 1987).18 We find that the fact that a person 
perceives both ideological platforms as being very different (take the maximum distance 
which equals six) implies that, ceteris paribus, her probability of voting is 10 percentage 
points larger than that of a person who sees no difference between the two platforms. In 
short, the effect of maximum perceived distance is of about the same order of magnitude 
as the effect of having read about the campaign on the newspaper. Other interesting, 
although not new, results follow: individuals vote more often in presidential elections, the 
probability of voting increases significantly with the degree of partisanship, older, richer, 
and more educated individuals tend to vote more, while divorced individuals tend to vote 
less. We also find that the more often a person goes to church, the higher her probability 
of turning out at the polls. Consequently we might interpret church attendance as part 
of an individual’s social or community involvement.
We refer to the result in column 3 as our benchmark estimate. In Table 4 we proceed 
to include further controls. In column 1, we introduce our proxy for voting as a sense 
of duty. This variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on turnout; how­
ever, our variable of interest is still significant at the 1 percent level and its estimated 
effect is of about the same size as in Table 3. In column 2, we introduce our index of 
political participation: our results also hold true. Finally, column 3 includes a series of 
state controls from Besley and Case (1993). Although contrary to intuition and previous 
evidence, most of these variables appear to have negative signs in this regression—we will 
come back to their effect once we evaluate validated turnout (instead of only focusing on 
reported turnout, as has been the case so far).
3.4 .2  R obu stn ess checks
3.4.2.1 Validated turnout
It has been argued that studies using reported turnout, such as the NES, may suffer from 
an overreporting problem (Burden 2000). In our case, we calculate real turnout to be 4 
to 17 percentage points lower than reported one depending on the vote validation method 
used (Table 2). There is a possibility that these could be affecting our results: other
18 In our case, this could be due to either agents being more informed about parties’ platforms through 
the newspaper (and this is an effect our variable of interest, A , is presumably picking up), or due to the 
fact that reading about the campaign reminds voters of the upcoming election.
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studies suggest that voters who falsely report their turnout tend to be different from the 
population at large, that is, more educated, and older (Silver et al 1986).
In order to discard the possibility that false reports are driving our results, in Table 5 
we re-estimate columns 3 in Table 3 and Table 4 using only validated turnout. Table 
Al gives information on the real voting patterns of individuals interviewed by the NES. 
There are mainly three possibilities: 1) that a person’s record was found and that it was 
confirmed that she did vote (60% of observations), 2) that the person’s registration record 
was found, without a record of that person voting (19% of observations), and 3) that a 
registration record was not found, and neither a record of her vote.19
In our first method of vote validation, we consider votes under 1) to be valid, and votes 
under 2) to be false, and hence we classify the latter as abstentions. Votes under 3) 
remain as missing observations. That is, this method considers only votes for which we 
have complete information. In our second method of validation, we suppose that votes 
under 3) are also false votes. The rationale of these two methods is that the reality is 
probably somewhere in between these two hypotheses. Finding that our results do not 
change under any of these two extreme possibilities would therefore give more credit to 
our results. Table 5 shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of only validated 
votes under either validated method. In fact, our key estimated coefficient is very similar 
to our benchmark coefficient (column 3 in Table 3). In sum, overreporting does not seem 
to be driving our results. We have checked all our regressions with only the validated 
samples and our results are still preserved. We have included some of these checks in the 
Tables in the Appendix. The negative signs for some of the institutional variables are 
actually positive once we only consider validated turnout: for instance, ceteris paribus, 
states that allow for polling day registration and citizens’ initiatives tend to have higher 
turnout, while restrictions on corporate campaign contribution now has a negative effect 
on turnout (see Table A2).
3.4.2.2 Alternative models
We perform a further robustness check by making sure that our results are not driven by 
the Probit model. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 6 respectively provide estimates under the 
Logit and linear probability models. Both models throw positive significant relationships 
between our variable of interest and turnout.20
19 There were also a number of observations in which individuals reported not voting while the validation 
apparently confirmed their voting. We have interpreted these as missing values. However, our results do 
not change if we consider those observations as "validated votes".
20Table A3 in the appendix provides the respective validated turnout regressions.
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3.4.3 Other policy dimensions
In Table 7 we take advantage of information on the individuals’ perception on the distance 
between parties across other issues.21 Table 7 shows Probit regressions with other Ai’s 
which correspond to other specific dimensions, such as government health insurance. We 
would expect to see an effect both if there is enough variability in the way that people 
perceive distances between the parties in these dimensions, and if these issues are of 
importance to the population. We do find a statistically significant effect in three of these 
additional issues: guaranteed jobs, aid to African-Americans, and cooperation with the 
(now ex) USSR.
In Table 8, we run similar regressions but now only focusing on the individuals’ percep­
tions about presidential candidates' (instead of political parties’) different platforms with 
respect to their preferences. In column 1, we use our benchmark liberal/conservative 
dimension: we estimate a somewhat larger effect than in the case of political parties: 
while the effect was an approximate 10 percentage point increase from no difference to 
maximum difference, now this is estimated to be about 15 percentage points. This could 
be either due to the fact that people vote differently in the case of a presidential elec­
tion, or to the fact that people have a more accurate perception of platform difference 
(given that platforms are mainly represented by a sole candidate instead of different can­
didates per state). Consistent with this larger broad effect, we find larger effects in the 
other dimensions too (in fact, differences in the perception of how candidates see govern­
ment services/spending, and defense spending, seem to also matter for turnout if we only 
consider presidential candidates).
In sum, the evidence from these two tables confirms that there is a relationship between 
perceptions of platforms and voting behaviour in more than a pure ideological sense.
If the premise that citizens vote on the grounds of a multidimensional policy space is 
true, we would expect to find a higher effect when we only consider each individual’s 
most important issue instead of the more general liberal/conservative scale —indeed, an 
individual’s voting decision should react more with respect to the problem she considers 
most important. This is what we consider next.
The NES contains information on what every respondent considers the most important 
problem ( What do you think are the most important problems facing this country? Of 
all you’ve told me, what would you say is the single most important problem the country 
faces?). Ideally, we would like to have a list of options that relates the answers to this
21 Correlations between A  on the liberal/conservative scale and the As in these other dimensions are in 
the range 24-36%.
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question to the list of policy issues in various dimensions that we have seen in Tables 6 
and 7 and for which we have information on perceptions of individuals.However, the list 
of answers that respondents were posed with does not provide nearly as good a mapping 
of subjects.22
Table 9 shows results considering the seven-point scale score reported by the individual 
in (what we map as) her described most important problem.23 Columns 1-3 in Table 9 
show that there is a positive significant effect between either of these three measures of 
A  for the most important problem, and voter turnout. However, we also observe that 
the estimated effect is smaller than our benchmark effect (Column 3, Table 3). This is 
surprising: if our measure is well constructed, we would expect that taking into account 
the intensity of preferences would make our estimated coefficient larger —that is, in view 
of Section 3.2.2 we would expect the probability of an agent’s voting to be more sensitive 
to the issue she considers most crucial. We think that the reason for this relatively low 
coefficient may be two-fold. First, it is possible that our less-than-ideal mapping generates 
measurement errors and hence the key estimates in Table 9 suffer from attenuation bias. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, we think that it might be the case that the 
liberal/conservative dimension may already represent every individual’s most important 
problem better than our mapping: in what would be an example of framing.2* It is 
possible that for example a mother concerned with the quality of public education for 
her children may find the country’s most important problem to be public education, and 
identifies her views of the parties’ political ideological positions under that frame (that 
is, categorising the Democratic party as very liberal if she thinks that the Democrats 
substantially promote public education, while categorising the Republican party as very 
conservative if she thinks that the Republicans do not promote public education). This 
view is consistent with the unidimensional model in Section 3.2.1 and can also represent 
a framing of the intensity of preferences consistent with the multidimensional model in 
Section 3.2.3.
22For instance, "agriculture" was an answer option for the most important problem however, we do 
not have a seven-point scale to capture the positioning and perception of the respondents. Similarly, 
we have scores for different issues corresponding all to the same most important problem category. For 
example, the public order category includes the issues of urban unrest, rights of accused, and women’s 
equal rights. The mapping of most important problem categories and seven-point scales is described in 
the Data Appendix.
23In the cases that we have more than one A  for a given most important problem, we have calculated 
the regressor in three ways. First, we use the maximum of the, say, several seven-point scales differences, 
second, we use the minimum, and finally, we take the average of As.
24There is a burgeoning literature in both (behavioural) economics and psychology that finds that the 
way in which questions or situations are posed critically influences an outcome. See e.g. McNeil et al 
(1982) for an application to medicine and Kahneman and Tversky (1983) for an application to decisions 
involving risk and monetary payoffs.
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3.4.4 Voting patterns of moderates
Another implication of the model is that individuals who are in the centre of the political 
spectrum (see Figures 3.1 or 3.2) tend to vote less than individuals who are in either ex­
treme. In order to test this, we classify voters into moderate and non-moderate according 
to two criteria.25
Table 10 shows that under both classifications we find that moderates tend to vote less 
than non-moderates.26
3.5 Conclusion
This Chapter tries to build on the existing knowledge on voter turnout but analysing 
the interaction between electoral competition and voters’ turnout decision. Models of 
electoral competition have since Downs (1957) shown that political parties have incentives 
to converge on policy platforms in order to attract at least half of the electorate. In this 
context, more electoral competition would lead to lower voter turnout.
The theoretical section in this Chapter challenges this setting by providing a simple model 
a la Wittman (1977) where policy driven candidates spatially compete to implement their 
announced policy. In our model, citizens only vote if candidates offer platforms different 
enough (if both candidates converge to the median voter’s preferred platform there are 
no gains from selecting one candidate over another, thus, no one turns out to vote given 
that voting has a cost). If politicians’ preferences are polarised they strategically choose 
divergent policy platforms. In our two-party model, citizens who position themselves 
relatively to the left or right of the political spectrum vote for the party that is closer 
to them, while citizens who position themselves in the central, more moderate, positions 
abstain. Allowing for heterogenous voters does not alter this finding. In a refinement of 
this unidimensional model, we develop a multidimensional policy space model that allows 
for additional dimensions of interest to voters. In the same spirit as the unidimensional 
model, we find that voters who are more sensitive to the policy issues at stake vote. 
Similarly, moderate voters decide to abstain.
25 We use information from the question: When it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as 
1) extremely liberal, 2) liberal, 3) slightly liberal, 4) moderate or middle of the road, 5) slightly conservative, 
6) extremely conservative? Under the first criterion, we classify first strict moderates as those individuals 
who position themselves in category 4), and then broad moderates as those who position themselves in 
categories 3), 4) or 5), that is, we include both slight liberals and slight conservatives in our second 
measure of moderate voters.
26 Table A4 in the appendix provides the corresponding validated turnout regressions.
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Thus, the main intuition derived from our model is that the bigger is the difference in the 
individuals’ perceptions of the two candidates’ platforms (relative to the voter’s policy 
preferences), the higher the incentive to vote. A related implication from the model is 
that moderate (as opposed to liberal or conservative) individuals tend to vote less.
We test these two implications of our model using data from the United States’ National 
Electoral Studies for 1972-2000. These data base contains respondents’ perceptions about 
the Democratic and Republican (as well as their own) spatial positions in the political 
spectrum.
Our empirical evidence supports our model’s prediction: namely, that a perceived low 
difference between the platforms of both the Democratic and Republican parties tends 
to decrease an agent’s probability to vote. We find that an increase from zero perceived 
difference to the maximum perceived difference between the two parties’ ideology increases 
the probability of turnout of about 10 percentage points. This is similar in size to the 
effect of newspaper information on voter turnout, as measured in the same data base. Our 
result is robust to the inclusion of a series of socioeconomic, demographic, and political 
individual controls, state-level institutional controls, state and year fixed-effects, state- 
specific time trends, and to the model specification.
We also find that the effect is larger if we consider only the perceived differences between 
presidential candidates. Moreover, a lower but statistically significant positive effect also 
arises for perceptions about the parties’ positions on several additional issues. Finally, 
using the same set of controls, we also confirm that moderate individuals have a lower 
probability to turn out to vote.
All our results are also robust to potential overreporting by survey respondents. We have 
checked all our regressions using only the set of validated votes and find no change in our 
findings.
In sum, this Chapter analyses an interaction, that of electoral competition and voter 
turnout. Although the effect that we find in the perceptions of party platforms on em­
pirical voter turnout is significant, we do not claim that it is sufficient to fully explain 
voter’s turnout. Indeed, and as other authors have pointed out, our understanding of 
voter turnout is still very limited and further research is needed.
What policy implications do we learn from this Chapter? We consider democratic soci­
eties to be fairer when they represent their individuals better. Therefore, society should 
care about extending voter turnout in order to improve representability of all citizens. 
In light of the findings in this Chapter, our political systems should favour institutional 
policies that 1 ) work towards decreasing the voting cost of citizens (for example, allowing
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for polling day registration), and 2 ) make party platforms more transparent to citizens, so 
that they are able to evaluate the distance between political parties’ platforms more ac­
curately. Possible ways in which to tackle the latter problem include establishing a board 
consisting of objective evaluators of party policies (extending the methodology already 
used in various areas of economic policy —see for instance the information provided by 
the American Evaluation Association), media regulation that encourages objectivity in 
party policy assessments, and last but not least, dealing with campaign spending limita­
tions in such a way that perceptions about party platforms’ differences improve. In this 
sense, further research should take a close look at the link between campaign spending 
regulation and the perceived difference between party programmes.
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3.6 D ata appendix
Descriptions of the questions our data draws from are in Section 4. This Data Appendix 
provides the mapping that we have used between the possible responses to the most 
important problem question and the list of policies given under the seven-point scales 
that we have used to construct the perceived difference between party platforms.
• Most important problem responses —> Policy Issues:
1 . Agricultural —> [None]
2. Economics —> [None]
3. Foreign affairs —» Defense spending; Cooperation with USSR
4. Government functioning —► [None]
5. Labour —> Guaranteed jobs
6 . Natural resources —> [None]
7. Public order —► Urban unrest; Rights of accused; Women’s equal rights
8 . Racial problems —> Aid to African-Americans
9. Social welfare —* Health care; Guaranteed jobs; Government services; School 
busing
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Table 1. Individuals’preferences and their percept ion of politicalp allies’plat forms
Mean Scores
Individual
(1)
Democrafic
(2)
Republican
(3)
Government health insurance 3.84 3.04 4.83
(2.14) (1.55) (1.56)
Jobs guaranteed 4.35 3.21 4.83
(1-87) (1.48) (1.48)
Aid to Afiican-Americans 4.45 3.18 4.49
(1-81) (1.46) (1.48)
Rights of the accused 4.28 3.37 4.09
(2.10) (1.53) (1.58)
Uibanunrest 3.38 3.13 4.17
(1.98) (1.49) (1.52)
Women’s equal rights 2.76 2.99 3.74
(1.96) (1.41) (1.57)
Government services/spending 3.88 3.01 4.69
(1.62) (137) (1.46)
Cooperation with the USSR 4.06 3.35 4.38
(1.83) (1.36) (151)
Defens e s pe nding 3.95 3.63 5.09
(159) (1.41) (133)
L iberal/C onse rvative 4.26 3.23 4.97
(1-37) (1 -43) (1.40)
Note: standard deviations in parentheses. Scores are given by respondent; ona seven-point scale, where tie 
most Kberal option gets a score equal to one and the most conservative option get a score equal to seven. The 
fust column reports the mean of the declared scored by die individual about herself. The second (third) column 
reports the me an of the s cored that the les pandent has assigns d to the D emocratic (Republic an) party. S ee 
S ectian 3 for more details.
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Table 2  Voter turnout and demographic and socioeconomic characteristics -  descriptive
statistics
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Turnout (%) 74.1 43.8
Turnout (validated)1 (%) 70.4 45.7
Turnout (validated)3 (%) 57 49.5
Newspaper information (=1 if read, =0 
otherwise) Oj66 0.47
Partisanship(=1 if partisan, =0 otherwise) Oj65 0.48
Duty(=l if people should vote, =0 otherwise) 050 0.50
Political participation (from 1 to 6) 156 0.95
Age 45.6 17.7
Female (%) 56.0 49.6
White (%) 80.5 39.6
African-Arne rican (%) 11.5 32.0
Asian (%) 1D5 10.2
Native American (%) 2.41 15.3
Hispanic (%) 434 20.4
Protestant (%) 62.6 48.4
Catholic (%) 24.2 42.8
Jewish (%) 2.19 14.6
Other religion or none (%) 11.0 31.3
Attends church every week (%) 26.9 44.3
Attends church almost every week (%) 11.1 31.5
Attends church once or twice a month (%) 13.5 34.2
Attends church a few times ayear(%) 23.8 42.6
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Married and living with spouse (%) 5S8 49.2
Never married (%) 154 36.1
Divorced (%) 9.7 29.6
Separated (%) 333 17.9
Widow ed(%) 11.1 31.4
Partners; not married (%) 1.7 12.8
Number o f children (%) 0.78 1.15
Grade school or less (%) 11 31.4
Highschool(%) 46 50.0
Some college (%) 22 41.7
College or advanced degree (%) 20 40.1
Income category 0 to 16 percentile (%) 17 37.1
Inoome category 17 to 33 percentile (%) 17 37.2
Income category 34 to 67 percentile (%) 34 47.2
Income category 68 to 95 percentile (%) 28 44.9
Income category 95 to 100 percentile (%) 52 22.1
1/The first validation method only inc lid es infcrmation for which the re^strafaon record was found.
2/The second validation method considers d> serrations for which a registration was not found as if  that person 
had not voted.
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Table 3. Voter turnout and the perceived distance between partied plat forms (with 
re jec t to the indfridual’sp references)-Liberal/Consexvaiiire
Dependent variable: V oter Turn cut. (=1 if vote^ =0 i f  not voted)
Probit (1) (2) (3)
A L ibe raUCons erv ative 0034 0.034 0.016
(7.62) (7.65) (3.44)
Newspaper information(= 1 if yes, =0 ifnofl 0.11
(565)
Pres id ential e lection 0.40
(728)
Female 002
(120)
Partisan: Leaning independent 
Weak partisan 
S trong partisan
0.10
(420)
009
(409)
0.15
(625)
Age: 3 0 -3 9  
4 0 -6 0  
More than60
007
(469)
0.11
(5.47)
0.16
(703)
Education: High school 
Some college 
College or advanced
0 06 
(267) 
0.11 
(4.19) 
0.15 
(5.74)
Income 17 -3 3  percentile 003
level:
34 -6 7  percentile 
6 3 —95 percentile 
95 -100 percentile
(137)
008
(329)
008
(262)
009
(266)
Race: African-American 
Asian 
Native American 
Hispanic
001
(0.18)
-0.02
(035)
-0.11
(306)
-0.001
(005)
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Church
attendance:
Marital
status:
Other or name 
Almas t e ve ryw eek 
Once/twice a month 
Few times a year 
Never 
No religious preference 
Never married 
Divorced 
Separated 
Widowed 
Partners 
Number o f  children
State effects YES YES
Year effect YES YES
State specific time trends NO YES
Nurrber o f observations 17082 17082
0J09
(335)
-0.03
(157)
-0.05
(236)
-0.07
(326)
- 0.12
(535)
-0.24
(458)
001
(033)
-0.04
(195)
-0.04
(113)
- 0.02
(0.76)
001
(0.17)
001
(084)
YES
YES
YES
7754
No te: t-s tat is tics calculate d w ih  robust s tandard errors clustered at the s tate leve 1 in pare nthe s es. S ee 
Section 4 for details aboutthe estimation procedure. Data details are in Section 3.
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Table 4. Voter turnout and tHep exceired distance betweenp arties' platforms (with 
resp ect to the ind widual’sp references) -  Liberal/Conservative -  Other controls
Dependeyt variable: V oter Turnout (=1 i f  voted, =4] if  not voted)
Prohit (1) (2) (?)
[State controls]
A Libe ralfConservative 0.019
(4.43)
01012
(2.34)
0.018
(398)
Ne wgcaper info rmatian 
(=1 if  yes, <1 i f  not)
0.16
(8.48)
0.11
(6.53)
0.14
(8.13)
Duty 0.09
(6.98)
Political participation index 0.09
(12.7)
Conventional registration 0.05
(1.27)
Polling day registration possible -0.25
(2.82)
Voting age ppulatian -0.01
(0.44)
Citise ns ’ initiative s prmdtted -1.00
(10.5)
Restriction on corporate campaign 
contributions 
Socioeconomic and demographic 
controls YES YES
0.01
(6.74)
YES
Stale effects YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES
State specific time trends YES YES YES
Number of observations 4276 7239 7233
Notes :t-stitis tics calculated with robust stand aid errors clustered at the state level in parentheses. See 
S action 4 for details about the estimation procedure. Data details are inS ec1ion3.
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Table 5. Validated voter turnout and the perceived dishnce between parties' 
platforms (with resp ect to the individual's preferences) -  Lib exal/Conseivative
dimension
Dependent variable: V alidated V oter Turnout
Prohit (1) 
Validation 1
(2) 
Validation 2
0 )  
Validation 1
A  Liber d/Canservc&ve 0.015
(5.20)
0021 
(5.44)
0.015
(518)
Newspaper information(=1 if 
yes, =0 if not)
0.10
(4.60)
0.15
(6.11)
0.10
(4.63)
Socioeconomic and demographic 
controls
YES YES YES
State cantrds NO NO YES
State effe cts YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES
State specific tim e trends YES YES YES
Number of observations 3726 4132 3726
Notes: the first validation method only nuclides information forw hich the registration record was found. 
The second validation method considers observations far which a registration was not found as if that 
person had not voted, t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in 
pare nftieses. See Section 4 for details out the estimation procedure. Data details are in Section 3. An 
extended version cf this table (Table A2) in the appendix provides estimates for all vari&les in the 
socioeconomic and demographic controls and state controls groups.
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Table 6. Logit and linear probability models
Dependent variable : V oter Turnout (=1 if vote 4, =0 i f  not voted)
(1) (2)
Logit OLS
A  Liberal/Conservefive 010 0.01
(3.88) (3.73)
Newspaper infermati on 0.72 0.13
(8J01) (8.25)
S o cioe c onomi c and demo graphi c
controls YES YES
State effects YES YES
Year effects YES YES
State specific time trends YES YES
Number o f observations 7240 7240
N otes: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at die state level. A presidential election 
dummy have also been included. See Section 4 for details about the estimation procedure. Data details are in 
Section 3.
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Table 7. Voter turnout and the perceived distance b etween parties' platforms (with
respect to the ind widuaTs preferences)- All dimensions
Dependent variable: V oter Turnout (=1 i f  voted, =0 if not voted)
Prohit (1) (?) 0 ) (4) (5) (6) (7) (S) (9)
A Liberal/ 
Conservative 
A Government 
health 
insurance
0D16
(3.44)
0.008
(1.03)
A Jobs 
guaranteed
0.01
(2.62)
A Aid to 
African- 
Americans
0.01
(2.47)
A Rigits of the 
accused
-0.001 
ip .52)
A Women’s 
equal rights
0.006
(102)
A Government 
services/ 
spending
0.008
(1.42)
A C cope ration 
with the USSR
0.01
(1.88)
A Defense 
spending
0.002
(0.62)
Socioeconomic
and
demographic
controls
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
S tate effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
State specific 
time trends YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Number of 
observations 7754 1881 5675 6526 1138 3791 S896 2954 6867
Note: t-statistics calculated with zobust standard ezzors clustered at the state level in parentheses. 
Newspaper information and a presidential dumzny have also been included. See Section 4 
for details about the estimation procedure. Data details axe in Section 3.
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Table 8. Voter turnout and the perceived distance b etweenp residential candidates'
 p fatforms (with respect to the individuals preferences) -  All dimensions___________
Depenttentvariable: V oter Turnout (=1 i f  voted, =0 i f  not voted)
Pr°Ut 0 )  CD (3) (4) &  <K> 0 ( 8 ) ®
A Libera!/ 0.024
conservative (5.22)
A Government 0JOO7
health insurance (1-30)
A Jobs 0.01
guaranteed (1.89)
A Aid to
African- 0.01
Americans (3.37)
A Rights of the -0.001
accused (0-32)
A Women’s -0.001
equal rights (0-21)
A Government 0.009
service s/spending (2.40)
A Cooperation 0.02
with the USSR (3.34)
A Defense 
spending
Socioeconomic 
and demographic 
controls 
State effecfc 
Y ear effects 
State specific 
time trends 
Number of 
observations
Note: t-statistics calculated with zobust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
Navspaper infirmationand a presidential dummy have alsobeen included. See Section 4 for de tails 
about the estimation procedure. Data details are in Section 3.
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
0.009
(2.49)
YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
3320 818 910 3226 1138 1914 2925 2971 3895
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Table 9. Voter turnout and the perceived distance between p arties1 plat firms (with 
re^ > ect to the indivilual’s preferences) -M ost Imporbnt Pxoblem
Depentkntvariable: Voter Turnout (=1 i f  votec^ =0 i f  notvoted)
0 ) (?) (3)
A  Most important problem 
(maximum A)
0.007 
Cl-90)
A Most important problem 
(minimum A)
0.009
(2.25)
A Most important problem 
(mean A)
0.008
(2.16)
N ewspaper information 0.14
(9-09)
0.14
(9.01)
0.14
(9.04)
Socioeconomic and demo graphic 
controls YES YES YES
State efleets YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES
S tate specific time trends YES YES YES
Number of observations 6851 6851 6851
Note: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors dust red at the sfete level in parentheses. 
Newspaper information and a presidential dummy have also been included. See Section 4 for details 
about the estimation procedure. Data details are in Section 3. See the Data Appendix for the 
cans tnction of the mapping b etwe en most important prdb lem res ponse s and policy issue s.
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Table 10. Voting patterns of moderates
Dependent variable: V oter Turnout (= 1 i f  voted. =0 i f  not voted)
(1) C2)
Strict moderate voters -0.033
(233)
Broadlymoderate voters -0.040
P.48)
N ewspaper information 0.11 0.06
Socioeconomic and demographic controls
(735) (5.67)
YES YES
State effects YES YES
Year effects YES YES
S tate specific time trends YES YES
Numb er of ob servatiorts 7545 7545
Note: t-statistics calculated with robust standard, errors clustered at the sfate level in parentheses. Stria 
moderates inclides only those individuals who on a seven-point scale where, have reported four points
('^ moderate”). Broadly moderates includes those individuals who on a seven-point scale where, have reported 
either three (“slightly liberal”), four (“moderate”), arfiw (“slightly conservative’) paints. N&vspaper 
information and a presidential dummy have also been included. See Section 4 for defails about the estimation 
procedure. Data details are in Section 3
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Table A1. Vote validation
Vote Validated Observations Percent
Yes 7219 60
Registration record found, no record of voting 2241 18.6
No registration record found, no record o f voting 2564 21.3
Notes: See Section 4 far details about the estimation procedure. Dab details are in Section 3.
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Table A2. Validated vo ter turnout and the perceived distancebetween parties* 
platforms (with resp ect to the individual’sp references) -  Lib eraLConservative 
dimension (extended Tab le 5)
Dependent variable: V alidated Voter Turnout
Prohit (1) (2) (3)
Validation 1 Validation 2 Validation!
A Liberal/Conservative 0.015 0021 0.015
(3.20) (344) (3.13)
Newspaper informational if  yes, =0 if 0.10 0.15 0.10
not) (4.60) (6.11) (4.63)
Pre sideniial elec tion 0.08 -0.11 0.06
(4.97) (3.08) (2.83)
Female 0.02 0.03 0.04
(1.71) (1.81) (2.08)
Partisan: Leaning independent 0.06 0.08 0.06
(2.84) (3.31) (2.83)
Weak partisan 0.04 0.07 0.04
(2.08) (3.04) (2.08)
Strong partisan 0.09 0.15 0.09
(4.44) (5.88) (4.45)
Age: 3 0 -3 9 0.05 0.08 0.05
(3.95) (4.95) (354)
4 0 -6 0 0.08 0.14 0.08
(5.18) (7.49) (5.17)
Mare than 60 0.11 0.19 0.11
(6.90) (9.64) (6.88)
Education High school 0.03 0.04 0.03
(2.60) (1.41) (1.44)
Some college 0.05 0.09 0.05
(2.21) (3.06) (2.18)
College oradvanced 0.10 0.15 0.10
(3.74) (4.88) (3.72)
Income level: 17-33 percentile 0.03 0.04 0.03
(2.60) (1.93) (2.65)
3 4 -67  percentile 0.06 0.10 0.03
(3.08) (3.81) (2.65)
6 8 -95  percentile 0.07 . 0.11 0.07
(4.03) (4.20) (4.05)
95 —100 percentile 0.07 0.11 0.07
(3.46) (4.59) (3.47)
Race: Black -0.03 -0.07 -0.03
(1.60) (2.80) (1.52)
Asian -0.05 -0.18 -0.05
(0.96) (2.16) (0.96)
Native American -0.09 -0.13 -0.09
(1.98) (2.61) (1.90)
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Jewish 0.03 0.02 0.03
(0.83) (052) (0.93)
Other or none 0.03 0.03 0.03
(0.63) (056) (0.66)
Church Almost every week -0.07 -0.07 -0.07
attendance: (2.50) (228) (2.52)
Once/tvicea month -0.09 -0.12 -0.09
(3.18) (354) p .20)
Few times a year -0.08 -0.11 -0.08
(4.07) (450) (4.06)
Never -0.14 -0.17 -0.14
(4.62) (509) (4.60)
N o religious 0.03 -0.17 -0.14
preference (0.63) (2.44) (2.57)
Marital status: N eve r married 0.02 -0.01 0.02
(1.00) (122) (1.03)
Divorced -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
(3.65) (355) (3-68)
Separated -0.03 -0.07 -0.03
(1.01) (1.72) (100)
Vfidowed -0.03 -0.06 -0.03
(1.28) (201) (1.30)
Partners -0.07 -0.08 -0.07
(1.68) (1.41) (1.63)
Nuxrber of children 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.13) (091) (0.14)
State controls: Conventional 0.09
registration (1.33)
Polling day 0.99
regis tration possib le (4.94)
Voting age 0.01
population (1.73)
Citizens' initiatives 1.00
permitted (5.45)
Restriction on -0.01
corporate campaign (33.0)
contributions
State effects YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES
S tate specific time trends YES YES YES
Numb er of ob servations 3726 4132 3726
N otes: the first validation method only inclides infcrrtration for which the registration record was found. 
The second validation method considers observations far which a registration was not found as if that 
person had not voted, t-statistics calculatedwithrobuststardarderxors clustered at the state level in 
parentheses. See Section 4 for details about the estimation procedure. Data details are inS ection3.
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Table A3. Logit and linear probability models -Vaidated Turnout
Dependent variable: Voter Turnout (=1 if  voteci =0 i f  not voted)
(1)
Logit
Validation 1
(2)
L ogt
Validation 2
©
OLS
Validation 1
OLS
Validation^
A  Liberal/Conservative 0.14
(2.94)
0.14
(3.29)
0.013
(2.73)
0.015
(2.95)
Newspaper information 0.78
(4.63)
0.89
(6.04)
0.11
(4.39)
0.14
(6.02)
Socioeconomic and 
demographic controls YES YES YES YES
S fate effects YES YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES YES
State specific time trends YES YES YES YES
Nunfc er of db servations 3726 4132 3726 4132
Note: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
Strict moderates in: hides arily those individuals who on a seven-point scale where, have reported four 
points (“inode rate”). Broadly moderates includes those individuals who an a seven-paint scale where, 
have repotted either three (“slightly liberal”), four ('Vnoderafe”X or five ('slightly conservative”) 
paints. Newspaperinfcrmationand a presidential dumny have also beeninclided. S ee S action 4 for 
details about the estimation procedure. Data defails are in S ectian 3.
C H A P TE R  3. T U R N O U T A N D  E L E C T O R A L  C O M P ETITIO N  
Table A4. ting patterns of moderates -  Validated Turnout
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Dependent variable: Voter Turnout (=1 if TOte  ^=0 if not voted)
(1) 
Vilidatuxi 1
(2) 
Vtlidttion 2
(3)
Validation 1
(4>
Validations
Strict moderate voters -0.02
(1.74)
-0.03
(2.1?)
Br oadly m oder ate voters -0.031
(2.32)
-0.033
(2.39)
N awsp ap er infor m ati on 0.08
(0.87)
0.10
(?.9S)
0.01
(0.82)
0.10
(3.92)
Socioeconomic and 
demographic controls YES YES YES YES
S fate effects YES YES YES YES
Year effects YES YES YES YES
State specific time trends YES YES YES YES
Nurrb er o f ob servations 3027 3149 3027 3149
Note: t-statistics calculated with robust standard errors clustered at the state level in parentheses.
Strict moderates ire ludes only those individuals who on a seven-point scale where, have reported four 
points ('Vnode rate”) . Bivadly moderates includes those individuals who an a seven-point scale where, 
have reported either three (“slightly lib eral”), four ('Vnode rate”), or five ( ‘slightly conservative”) 
points. Newspaperinfcrmationand a presidential dummy have also beeninclided. S ee S action 4 for 
details about the estimation procedure. Data defails are in S action 3.
Conclusion
In the first part of this Thesis we propose an alternative to the usual voting rule which 
is simple and allows voters to express their willingness to influence. A mechanism which 
seems the most natural extension to Majority Rule and that is proved to be not only 
superior to it but also a mechanism that achieves the best possible allocation and induces 
truthful revelation of the voters’ preferences in some general settings. Its essence relies 
on almost allowing for transferable utilities without introducing money; players can freely 
move their voting power across issues to strengthen their position in some issues.
Later, in Chapter 2 we offer the first step towards a thorough experimental analysis of the 
voting system we call Qualitative Voting. For this, we provide each of our 18 experiment 
participants with an endowment of 30 votes to allocate freely across issues in a variety of 
settings (two, three, and six issues to be voted in groups of two, three, or six members). 
We observe that the welfare gains of Qualitative Voting with respect to Majority Rule are 
very noticeable in the conflict resolution situation but are diluted for potentially different 
reasons in the committee meeting examples. We also observe that players tend to focus 
their attention on a few number of issues when they face the decision over various issues. 
The welfare implications of this fact are open for further analysis.
The difficulties of extending Qualitative Voting to more general settings are best captured 
by the results in the second half of Chapter 1. In there we show that it is impossible to 
allow the willingness to influence to play a role in general settings where unanimity needs 
to be satisfied.
The second part of this Thesis builds, instead, on the interaction between electoral com­
petition and voters’ turnout decision. We present a simple model where policy driven 
candidates spatially compete to implement their announced policy. In our model, citizens 
only vote if candidates offer platforms different enough (if both candidates converge to 
the median voter’s preferred platform there are no gains from selecting one candidate over 
another, thus, no one turns out to vote given that voting has a cost).
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The main intuition derived from our model is that the bigger is the difference in the 
individuals’ perceptions of the two candidates’ platforms (relative to the voter’s policy 
preferences), the higher the incentive to vote. A related implication from the model is 
that moderate (as opposed to liberal or conservative) individuals tend to vote less. We 
test these two implications of our theoretical model using data from the United States’ 
National Electoral Studies for 1972-2000 finding support for both predictions.
In light of the findings in Chapter 3, our political systems should favour institutional 
policies that make party platforms more transparent to citizens, so that they are able 
to evaluate the distance between political parties’ platforms more accurately. Possible 
ways in which to tackle this problem include establishing a board consisting of objective 
evaluators of party policies, media regulation that encourages objectivity in party policy 
assessments, and last but not least, dealing with campaign spending limitations in such 
a way that perceptions about party platforms’ differences improve.
Overall, this Thesis is characterised by the analysis of the strategic behaviour of different 
actors in voting games. The one of voters and the one of politicians. Nevertheless there 
is a rather different approach in both parts.
The first part takes a normative approach offering a new voting rule that allows voters 
to express their willingness to influence, characterising its properties and answering in 
a general manner the classical political science debate about the intensity problem. The 
second part, instead, has a positive slant and tries to understand the widely analysed topic 
of voters’ turnout in elections from a different perspective. We take an insider view into 
the paradox of voter turnout and look at the effects of political competition on turnout.
Both approaches are necessary but indeed the positive approach should just be (in our 
view) the initial step towards the normative one. As social scientists we are given the 
gift of interpreting what is happening around us thus we have the responsibility to try to 
improve or, at least, question our social institutions. Very deep in our hearts there should 
be the belief that our work will improve the world we live in.
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